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Abstract
This thesis explores the evolution of privacy regulations in the transatlantic space
since the adoption of the European Data Directive in 1995 up until the adoption of the
General Data Protection Regulation in 2016. In doing so, it more specifically investi-
gates how the rules governing the use of personal data by private companies in the United
States and the European Union were formed through the interactions between public and
private actors in both jurisdictions. Looking at the process of rule formation, previous
works have traditionally viewed national regulatory systems as discrete units of analy-
sis that could affect one another and yet always remained fundamentally distinct. The
starting point of this thesis is different. It considers that each jurisdiction’s regulatory
process is continuously shaped by decisions taken in the other and that through their
interactions they actually form a complex governance system that evolves based on two
joint processes: exploitation and exploration. The former emphasizes that privacy reg-
ulators will generally tend to exploit the data protection rules of those with whom they
previously had direct interactions. Meanwhile, the latter highlights that when preexisting
rules prove to be insufficient, privacy regulators will explore new ones based on the very
same interactions and relation to the broader system. The formation of data protection
rules is thus always understood in relational or systemic terms, rather than an individual
process. Based on a mix of content and network analysis, I further demonstrate that
by exploiting preexisting rules private actors offered a new institutional avenue for pub-
lic rules to cross national frontiers and promote greater regulatory convergence. At the
same time, the multiplication of privacy regulations and data protection rules adopted by
private actors created second-order information asymmetries, which in turn limited their
interest in exploring new ideas and experimenting with new data protection rules. In
addition to contributing to the literature on privacy and introducing a novel database on
data protection rules adopted over the last 20 years in the transatlantic area, this thesis
highlights how growing economic interdependence upends national regulatory processes
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Introduction
The amount of data that can be
pulled in is really infinite at this
point. With mobile devices -
latitude, longitude, altitude; if
someone’s in an elevator, [we can
change] an ad based on the floor
that they’re on in the elevator.
Frank O’Brin, CEO of Five Tier,
2019
In March 2018, investigative reporters from The Guardian and The New York
Times broke the news with revelations that two of the most significant political devel-
opments in the United States and the European Union, the election of Donald Trump
and the vote for Brexit, were tied with what was then the largest known data leak in
Facebook history. Based on leaked documents and information obtained from an ex-
employee turned whistleblower, they exposed that both the Trump and Leave campaign
had contracted with the same little-known consulting firm, Cambridge Analytica, to
send political advertising based on personal data harvested from between 50 to 87 mil-
lion active Facebook users largely unaware of it. Using a feature at the time allowing
app developers on Facebook to collect personal data from all personal connections of an
individual using their applications, data scientists had more precisely built and then sold
to Cambridge Analytica a database of psychological profiles that was used to send “mi-
crotargeted” political messages. The latter were expected to trigger emotional reactions
(or “inner demons” in the words of the whistleblower behind the scandal) in voters that
would steer them to vote in their desired direction. While it is still far from clear what
the real impact of these political advertising methods had on the results of both elections,
1
these revelations laid bare for everyone to see how valuable the use of personal data was
now considered to be by many companies and governments. Each political campaign in
effect paid Cambridge Analytica millions of US dollars and British pounds as part of
their bet to use personal data to steer election results in their favour.
Two months later, in what certainly appeared in hindsight increasingly needed,
the new European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) entered into force and
promised to reshape the regulation of privacy in Europe as well as globally. Following
years of protracted battles among industry and civil society groups, it replaced the more
than two decades old European Data Directive and introduced a revised and updated
‘rulebook’ for companies dealing with personal data from Europeans. Almost simulta-
neously, the legislature of California adopted the first comprehensive privacy law in the
United States covering both the public and private sectors. Despite no similar step being
taken at the federal level, it showed how far the United States had already come with
regards to privacy regulation for its largest state and host to some of the world-leading
digital companies to move in that direction. Other American states are now following
suit, adopting their own privacy law and progressively displaying what a comprehensive
privacy system could look like in the United States.
Both in the European Union and the United States, the regulatory framework
governing the use of personal data is in effect significantly different than a few years ago.
Just as new technologies dramatically transformed how personal data is being collected
and used, as the citation in the epigraph highlights, new laws changed what types of data
practices were considered acceptable in each jurisdiction and progressively contributed
to shaping private companies’ data uses. Legal changes are yet only one part of this
evolution. Next to new laws, various private companies have developed their own set of
rules listed in terms of use or privacy policies ’ statements. While often quickly glanced
at, the importance of these private rules should not be understated. They determine how
an individual’s privacy will actually be protected on the ground and for many companies
they are presented on an equal footing with public laws. Two years before the Cambridge
Analytica scandal broke out, Facebook (2016) was in fact pleading that its community
rules were equivalent to public laws and that new legislative actions from the Commission
were not needed in a host of issue-areas, including data protection. As these rules evolved,
they equally shape how our personal data is being protected.
How have data protection rules evolved in the United States and the European
Union since 1995? What led to the specific set of rules now being promoted in the
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European Union and the United States by public and private actors? To what extent did
they influence each other? These are the main research questions that I aim to answer
in the present work. The regulation of privacy has become an increasingly hot topic in a
global economy where data flows are quickly outgrowing any other types of international
exchanges. The European Union and the United States are moreover seen as the two
global leaders on the topic, with each promoting a different approach and seemingly
competing on the international stage to make its own adopted. In recent years, many were
prone to maintain that the European Union was winning in the “marketplace of ideas”
(Schwartz 2019). The adoption by the state of California of a comprehensive privacy
law as just stated was given as a prime example of this European success. In addition
to other countries, like Brazil and India, that had already followed suit and adopted a
comprehensive law, this first adoption of the so-called EU model by an American public
authority was viewed as a key sign of a shift of approach in the United States. If not for
governments, others saw in the implementation of European rules by American companies
throughout the United States an indication that the European Union had already won
this regulatory competition (Bradford 2020).
Several blind spots however remain in these broad expressions of European suc-
cess. The evolution of the European regulatory framework remains significantly unex-
plained. Touted as a new gold standard, the origins of the new rules set forth in the
GDPR are simply not investigated in these explanations. They seemed to be seen as
the result of purely European politics that concluded well before the United States and
the European Union had any interactions with each other. Similarly, the American pri-
vacy model generally appears to be at a standstill up until being forced to change under
European pressure. The different legal changes that occurred inside the United States
are quickly disregarded as well as their very impact on the European Union. Various
examples of the United States influencing the content of data protection rules in Europe
yet exist. Rules on data breaches that are now part of the GDPR and the ‘European
model’ supposedly exported all around the world are well-known to have been first enun-
ciated in American law. Such examples of partial integration and hybridization of both
models over time tend to be overlooked. Following a traditional ‘two-step’ logic of liberal
theories (Legro 1997; Moravcsik 1997), the national (or regional) and international are
neatly divided. Rules are first devised by domestic authorities and then clash on the
international stage where the European Union is currently succeeding in promoting its
rules due to its leadership, regulatory capacity, market size, or a combination of all of
the above. Even though private actors can sometimes be seen as creating additional
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bridges between the two jurisdictions, the process of rule formation remains primarily
looked at through a domestic lens. To put it differently, international and transnational
interactions are not themselves seen as a driving force of regulatory change.
Hereafter, I contest this idea and argue that the growing number of interactions
between public and private actors in the European Union and the United States has actu-
ally created a complex governance system that transformed the process of rule formation
in each jurisdiction (Kahler 2016; Oatley 2019; Orsini et al. 2019). Rather than having
two political systems developing their regulatory models separately, I maintain that they
evolved jointly based on their interactions over the last twenty years or so. This process
was moreover often more incremental than explosive as opposed to what the recent lit-
erature on the global influence of the European model tends to indicate. In effect, one
model’s influence was never constant over time and regulatory changes were never limited
to a specific time period. Both were continuously adapted based on decisions taken in
the other. This view highlights that the growing interdependence of national economies
does not merely create new issues to regulate or negotiate internationally, but also blurs
the line between domestic and world politics (Farrell and Newman 2014, 2016, 2019a).
As regulators operating in multiple jurisdictions increasingly interact with each other,
what would traditionally be seen as domestic regulatory processes is shaped by dynamics
that transcend domestic boundaries. Two processes, exploitation and exploration, are
in the remainder of this work investigated to better understand how the regulation of
privacy has evolved in the transatlantic area.
1.1 Why it Matters
Back in 1995, Irving Goldstein, then-director general of Intelsat1, almost prophetically
held that data “will be for the twenty-first century what oil and gas were for the beginning
of the twentieth century. It will fuel economic and political power” (cited in Powers and
Jablonski 2015: 75). A little bit more than twenty years later, the well-known journal
The Economist seemed to give him reason with one article emphatically claiming that the
“world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data” (Parkins 2017). As some rightly
pointed out (Stucke and Grunes 2016: 49), comparing data to oil has many defects. For
one, data is not a finite resource like oil (Powers and Jablonski 2015: 76). As the quote
1Intelsat was at the time an international organization in charge of satellite communications. It has
since then been privatized.
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in the epigraph notably highlights, the number of personal data collected has grown
exponentially in recent years and now even almost appear potentially “infinite”. From
the turn of the millennium where only a quarter of all information was stored digitally
(Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013: 8-9), we now live in a world where a lot of what we
do on a daily basis is digitally recorded and stored by various companies. The situation
is such that even the definition of personal data increasingly comes to encapsulate a lot
of different types of information.
Broadly construed, personal data are any information that would allow identifying
someone or that could be related to an identifiable person. This traditionally includes
information such as someone’s social security number, health details, credit history, home
address, phone number, and e-mail address. With new digital technologies that allow
private companies to track our activities to an extent never seen before, this list has
grown to include information such as our browsing history, location data, and even our
biometrical information. Even supposedly anonymized data can often be tied to someone
by combining it with other sources of information. Old pictures uploaded on social media
by a distant friend can for example be tied back to us using our biometrical information
for facial recognition purposes. Information on what we did or where we were years
ago can increasingly be found without us being always aware that such information is
available.
Apart from being potentially creepy and creating a sense of constant surveillance,
the use of personal data has real economic and political value. According to estimates
made by the McKinsey Global Institute (Manyika et al. 2011, 2016), the potential eco-
nomic value of data analytics for many industries range in the hundred billions of Amer-
ican dollars. By gaining an in-depth view of our daily lives and previous histories, most
private companies hope to successfully predict and influence our behaviour. In the case
of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, data harvested from Facebook profiles was again
used to build psychological profiles to identify swing voters and target them with tailored
political advertising. Outside of political campaigning, various private companies now
similarly use personal data in their commercial activities. Targeted advertising, price
discrimination, customer segmentation, and eligibility determinations are all examples of
recent commercial data uses (Spencer 2016).
This is not all new (Christl, Kopp and Riechert 2017: 5). Credit agencies have for
long used personal information to make eligibility and price determinations. Different
individuals are routinely offered different insurance policies and premiums depending
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on their health condition, type of employment, and reclamation history. Advertising
messages are also tailored to the medium being used and the specific audience that that
they can reach. Even prices of goods and services are regularly adapted for different
groups of customers. Discounts are sent to individuals living in specific neighbourhoods
or offered to specific categories of individuals (e.g., students, seniors, etc.). Customer
segmentation across countries is also known to be a common practice for transnational
companies. Putting aside transportation costs and national taxes, companies often see
an opportunity in adapting their prices to local markets to reap the highest benefits
possible.
The difference with what is occurring these days is the reach of these practices.
The exploitation of large databases with the help of new data analytic techniques in-
creasingly allows private companies to target single individuals that do not realize that
their personal data is being used or that they had even shared it in the first place. This
in turn contributes to create a more than ever individualized world where two persons
living in close proximity to each other might in practice experience two different realities.
They might not have access to the same news as recent election cycles have highlighted in
countries like the United States and the United Kingdom, but also Brazil to give just one
additional example that attracted a lot of international attention (Martins dos Santos
and Varon 2018). The same two individuals might neither be offered the same price for
the same goods and services. While still difficult to spot as these are controversial and po-
tentially anti-competitive practices that companies do not want to publicize, algorithms
adapting prices based on individual characteristics or previously established profiles were
already reported to be in use by both Amazon and Uber (Ezrachi and Stucke 2016; Khan
2017).
The end result is a highly unequal society in which disparities between the haves
and the have nots tend to be exacerbated. If some had hoped or argued that wider
dissemination of personal information would help fix market failures and help our eco-
nomic systems to meet our actual needs (Posner 1978; Cate 2000), the truth is that it
did not empower equivalently all economic actors. Individuals might sometimes benefit
from accessing information online allowing them to more easily compare prices, evaluate
production processes or judge the impact of public policies, but this is nowhere near to
the pool of information that private companies and governments sometimes working with
them now have access to or the means they have developed to act upon it. This should
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not be that surprising and simply highlights that technological innovations are always
political and not merely solutions to technical problems.
In this sense, though, privacy regulation is not only about protecting an abstract
individual freedom but actually balancing power relations between individuals, compa-
nies, and governments. Recognizing this, both the United States and the European Union
have acted to safeguard their citizens’ privacy. The way they decided to do so however
historically diverged with the United States continuously promoting a limited system
where data protection rules apply to governmental entities while private companies are
broadly encouraged to self-regulate themselves, and the European Union as a whole pre-
ferring to set out data protection rules for both public and private actors ever since the
adoption of its Data Directive in 1995 (Newman 2008). This difference of regulatory
approach is at the source of great tensions between the two transatlantic partners. As
many businesses nowadays interact with individuals based in both jurisdictions and data
flows are an integral part of their economic integration, the way each decides to regulate
privacy has consequences for the other. It can in effect mean more restrictions for com-
panies from one jurisdiction as well as potentially fewer guarantees for individuals in the
other.
Over the years, two international agreements, the Safe Harbor (2000) and Pri-
vacy Shield (2016), were negotiated to provide what could be a common framework and
appease these tensions between the two partners. Both agreements are now defunct fol-
lowing similar actions brought by civil activists before the European Court of Justice
and were regularly criticized for implementation failures (see for example EDRi 2019).
Any attempts at reaching a new agreement that could sustain future legal challenges
look bleak without further regulatory convergence. Understanding what could be driv-
ing them closer as well as further apart is thus key to make sense of where the regulation
of privacy is going. As an agreement on a set of rules between the United States and
the European Union has moreover the potential to reshape privacy regulations in other
countries around the world due to their joint economic size and normative influence, this
makes it not only of interest in the transatlantic area but also globally.
Outside of privacy, this research contributes to growing debates in international
political economy over the regulation of “non-traditional” issues. Not so long ago, the
study of international political economy was largely geared towards “explaining the vari-
ations in the global rules governing merchandise trade, exchange rates, and foreign direct
investment” (Drezner 2007: 8). As David Lake (2009: 221) rather puts it, it primarily
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aimed at answering one of two sets of questions with regards to the regulation of interna-
tional economic exchange: (1) why and how did countries open up to various international
flows; and (2) how did this economic openness, in turn, affect national constituents and
politics towards it. Nowadays, most researchers, however, go much further than that and
recognize the international, or more aptly global, importance of a broader array of polit-
ical economic issues, including but not limited to the environment, intellectual property,
gender, race, labour, taxation, and privacy.
This partly answers early calls by Craig Murphy and Roger Tooze (1991: 24)
to expand the “universe” of international political economy so as to move away from
“the policy concerns of the government of the United States throughout the era of U.S.
global supremacy and, especially, contemporary concerns about various challenges to
that supremacy”. At the same time, it reflects the broad recognition that economic
interdependence has elevated many regulatory issues previously seen as being of national
interest to the global stage. This is importantly made evident in the expansion of the
number of chapters in preferential trade agreements that now present many of these
regulatory debates as non-tariff barriers that need to be either removed or more closely
overseen. This expansion of the universe of international political economy topics is
thus very much a reflection of the similar expansion of the United States policy agenda.
Putting aside the question of the geography of international political economy, though,
the present study of the regulation of privacy in the transatlantic area provides insights
on how to understand and analyze new regulatory debates of global interest.
1.2 Existing Accounts of Transatlantic Privacy Regulation
The regulation of privacy has long been a hot topic in transatlantic debates. Early
on, it attracted a lot of attention in international circles where their disagreement was
seen as raising the risk of disrupting increasingly important data flows between the two
jurisdictions. The potential significance of policy decisions taken in each jurisdiction
for the other was more broadly taken as a prime example of how globalization was
putting new pressure on legal systems traditionally viewed as distinct and potentially
reshaping national politics. In turn, various scholars attempted to explain the sources
and consequences of their regulatory coordination or convergence over the years.
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For some, cultural and historical factors primarily explain the origins of the
transatlantic disagreement. Going back to their different experiences during the Second
World War and with authoritarian governments, they argue that European governments
have developed a sensibility to privacy issues that is absent in the United States (Single-
ton 2002). This would then explain why the first data protection law was adopted in the
state of Hesse in Germany in 1970 (Long and Quek 2002: 330) and why the European
Union elevated privacy to a human right in its Charter of fundamental rights adopted in
2000 while the United States continues to view the use of personal data by private compa-
nies primarily as a consumer issue. This difference of experience and the resulting views
was, in turn, argued to have made the adoption of an international regime impossible as
there was no point of agreement between them (Bessette and Haufler 2001; Haufler 2001;
Dimitrov et al. 2007). Following the same line of thought, their diametrically opposed
perspective is given as a prime reason why further harmonization of privacy regulation
was not advanced in recent trade negotiations and why a ‘digital divide’ continues to
exist between them (Aaronson 2015; Aaronson and Leblond 2018; Young 2015a). More
specifically, the European human right lens makes privacy something that should not be
seen as a trade issue and should not be negotiated as such.
According to Daniel Drezner (2007: 103-6), neither the United States nor the
European Union moreover has the capacity to unilaterally impose its preference to the
other. For him, they are the perfect example of two ‘great powers’ (i.e., political entities
overseeing large internal markets) promoting a rival standard, which will always end up in
a stalemate. In effect, none possess a sufficient bargaining advantage to push the other to
adopt its standard and both have the means to sustain the potential costs of not agreeing
on a common one. The best they can do is thus agree to disagree up until one internally
changes its position for some external reasons. Somewhat differently, Henry Farrell (2003;
2006) maintains that they can and did actually work around this stalemate through the
creation of what he calls a hybrid regime. While recognizing their mutual difference
and inability to change the position of the other, he pointed out that they had actually
worked around this stalemate by delegating regulatory tasks to private actors in the Safe
Harbor and later on Privacy Shield Agreement. Rather than promoting a joint regulatory
framework, what these agreements in effect did was to create a system allowing American
private companies to self-certify that they would certain rules when using personal data
coming from Europe. This then had the advantage to avoid any disruption of data flows
without any of them having to change their national regulation. Drezner (2007: 106)
was however dubious of the actual efficacy of these private mechanisms and the fact that
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both international agreements promoting them are now defunct partly because of their
problematic implementation certainly questions how durable hybrid solutions can be.
Meanwhile, Abraham Newman (2008) contests the idea that cultural differences
are actually the source of this transatlantic dissension. He points out that this signifi-
cantly fails to explain that not all European nations with a fascist legacy or authoritarian
experience have been prone to adopt a data protection law. In fact, countries, like Bel-
gium, Greece, Italy and Portugal, had not yet adopted one covering both the public and
private sector when the European Data Directive was adopted in 1995 (Newman 2008:
84). His own argument is that the regulatory divergence observed between the United
States and the European Union would better be understood as the result of different insti-
tutional trajectories. While the creation of data protection agencies in various European
countries allowed the emergence of a transgovernmental network to lobby the European
Commission in favour of the adoption of a comprehensive data protection law, the exis-
tence of multiple veto points in the United States (i.e., presidential veto, bicameralism,
etc.) offered multiple opportunities for private businesses to block such an outcome.
Newman moreover argues that these different institutional trajectories have rel-
evance for the regulation of privacy globally. By building up its regulatory capacity
internally, the European Union in effect gave itself the tools to leverage its internal mar-
ket and “set de facto international privacy standards” (Bach and Newman 2007: 836). It
is because the Data Directive gave European regulators the statutory authority to block
data flows from third countries lacking appropriate safeguards that it could force the
United States to adopt the hybrid regime described by Farrell. If the United States was
able to benefit from its own market size to escape further change or even entirely defend
its model as Drezner would have it, it was not able to extend it as the European Union
did by pushing 12 countries, including large industrial economies like Canada and Japan,
to reform their data protection laws to be considered as ‘adequate’ and thus allowing
data to flow freely between their jurisdictions and Europe. According to Newman, the
lack of a similar institutional mechanism in the United States and the resulting gap in
regulatory capacity explains why the European Union, not the United States, appears
to be driving the global conversation on privacy (Newman and Posner 2015).
Building on Newman’s argument, Anu Bradford (2012; 2020; see also Goldsmith
and Wu 2006) maintains that in practice the United States have already adopted Eu-
ropean data protection rules. She maintains that private companies operating in both
jurisdictions indeed apply the same set of rules originally devised in the European Union.
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According to her, the reason for this is basically that by having the most stringent rules
and the regulatory capacity to enforce them, the European Union is able to force pri-
vate companies all around the world to apply its standard even when dealing with the
personal data of non-Europeans. This kind of ‘trading up’ phenomenon (Vogel 1995) or
‘Brussels’ effect’ as she calls it is moreover made possible by two additional factors. First,
the strict European data protection rules cannot be easily circumvented by moving Eu-
ropean personal data to another jurisdiction. European authorities are indeed expecting
European personal data to be treated as such wherever it is being processed. Second, it
is either impossible or non-economically viable to maintain multiple privacy standards
for the different sets of personal data owned by a company. As such, private companies
are left with one option, which is to either keep out of the European market or use its
rules throughout its business.
While agreeing that the case of privacy does fit most, if not all, the conditions
highlighted by Bradford, legal experts Paul Schwartz (2019) and Karl-Nikolaus Peifer
(Schwartz and Peifer 2017) believe that such expression of European unilateral power
does not fully encapsulate the current trend of convergence in privacy standards around
the world. Following the work of Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004), they emphasize that
various “harmonization networks” are actually at play connecting regulators in Europe
to those in various other jurisdictions, including the United States. The success that
European data protection rules are currently experiencing is thus the result of a more
co-optive form of influence (Lavenex 2014) where European partners progressively learn
and become socialize to the European standard. The regulatory capacity developed over
the years by the European Union here is viewed as contributing to the export of its rules
based on its expertise or normative power, rather than unilateral imposition of coercion.
Focusing on the principles promoted to govern the use of personal data, Colin
Bennett (1992; 2010) contrasts with most others while maintaining that regulatory con-
vergence has actually been a reality for quite some time. If legal discrepancies do remain
and policy instruments used in both jurisdictions differ, they have indeed been contin-
uously moving towards the same set of basic principles. He believes such an outcome
is primarily due to the “common set of attitudes that developed about the technology”
(Bennett 1992: 51), which remain true today despite recent technological changes. More
recently, Kenneth Bamberger and Deirdre Mulligan (2015) also contended that on the
ground corporate practices of privacy management in the United States and Germany
also shared many similarities. In their view, one reason for this was the existence of a
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similar pressure coming from civil society organizations and other non-corporate actors
that brought “the outside in” to use their words (Bamberger and Mulligan 2015: 220).
From all these explanations, we are left with a wide variety of variables and a
relatively confusing picture of where the transatlantic regulation of privacy currently
stands. To be fair, some of the distinctions discussed are due to the focus taken in each
study. For one, Bennett sees a convergence because he focuses on broad data protection
principles and Newman sees a divergence as he focuses on the regulatory approach taken
in each jurisdiction. These are not necessarily contradictory, but the relations between
these different elements and how they influence the evolution of privacy regulation could
still be better explained.
One related blind spot to all these different analyses is their implicit choice to treat
the United States and the European Union’s regulatory framework as fundamentally
distinct. They are indeed presented as two systems that evolve separately up until
clashing with each other. This more broadly follows the widespread view of globalization
as an external shock creating a pressure for adaptation on national economies and that
fails to recognize that it is actually endogenously reshaping what used to be seen as
national politics. In effect, the European or American privacy regulations do not evolve
in isolation up until clashing with each other. They are indeed constantly informed
by decisions taken in the other due to their growing interdependence and the various
interactions that ensue from this. Recognizing this actually helps understanding how
the different levels of analysis and variables just presented influence the evolution of the
regulation of privacy as part of a coherent whole. Hereafter, I develop an argument
highlighting how the close interactions between various public and private actors in each
jurisdiction transformed their respective process of rule formation.
1.3 The Argument
The core claim that I make in this work is that the evolution of privacy regulation in
the transatlantic area since the adoption of the European Data Directive in 1995 should
not be viewed as the result of purely domestic forces nor very specific and circumscribed
moments of international negotiations. Neither is it simply the result of a clash of sys-
tems where two privacy models fight for global dominance and one straightforwardly
wins. It is rather the result of transnational interactions that shaped American and
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European domestic institutions as well as their ability to affect global outcomes. Re-
peated interactions between public and private actors active in both jurisdictions more
precisely generated multiple opportunities for influence and changed the content of the
regulations adopted in each one. The outcome is thereby not regulations that should
be viewed as being purely ‘American’ or ‘European’, but that are mixed in nature and
include elements coming from both.
This does not entirely reject all the explanations just reviewed and actually builds
on many of them. Indeed, it takes as a starting point the hybrid regime involving both
public and private actors described by Farrell (2003; 2006). Yet, rather than looking
at it as an institutional agreement solving the transatlantic relation, it approaches it as
having supported the creation of an institutional environment in which public and private
actors cooperated and interacted to shape data protection rules. By delegating regulatory
tasks to private actors, both the United States and the European Union more precisely
opened up new avenues for influence between them. In addition to direct interactions
occurring between public representatives in various forums, industry associations also act
as transnational links between the two legal systems. While both agreements that were
negotiated to support this hybrid regime are now defunct, the organizations that were
created still continue to exist and affect the content of rules promoted in each jurisdiction.
The way they do so remains importantly dependent on the regulatory approach taken by
public authorities where they are mainly active and the leeway that is accordingly given
to them (Newman 2008). Together, these public and private channels moreover form
the ‘harmonization networks’ viewed by Schwartz (2019). More than simply pushing
towards regulatory harmonization, though, they are also informing the creation of new
rules by providing additional opportunities to learn from what others did. In this sense,
they are not a simple transmission belt for the European Union to unilaterally influence
the American regulation of privacy as Bradford (2012; 2020) tends to portray it. They
actually contribute to form a complex governance system that transforms the process of
rule formation2.
The adjective complex is here significantly not understood as meaning compli-
cated. If the two terms are often conflated in popular and academic discourse, they
actually describe two very different things in the present context (Morin 1990). ‘Compli-
cated’ can be broadly defined as the quality of something that is hard to understand or
2This reflects the argument of Abraham Newman and Elliot Posner (2016a; 2016b) maintaining that
transnational institutions can create ‘second-order effects’ by changing the political landscape in the
jurisdictions that they connect to each other.
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requires a specific type of knowledge to make sense of. Meanwhile, the term ‘complex’
is here taken to describe systems that “cannot be reduced or simplified without being
strongly altered or “mutilated,” and [which] behavior is not predictable from the study
of their parts” (Orsini et al. 2019: 2). To put it differently, complex systems are char-
acterized by emergent and non-linear properties that can only be explained by looking
at them as a whole. They differ from complicated systems that can be made up of mul-
tiple components, but still can be understood by looking at them individually. Classic
examples of complicated systems include clocks or planes whose inner workings are hard
to understand for most of us but can still quite straightforwardly be disaggregated to
mechanically explain how they work. The nuts and bolts that make these machines what
they are continue to play the same role at any level of analysis or abstraction. Many
social and governance systems however do not fit this description. The addition of com-
ponents (i.e., actors, institutions, etc.) interacting with others in the system creates new
dynamics that affect their evolution in sometimes surprising and unintended ways. In the
present work, I specifically highlight two processes that shaped the regulation of privacy
in the transatlantic space: exploitation and exploration (Duit and Galaz 2008; March
1991; Morin, Pauwelyn and Hollway 2017).
Exploitation refers to the tendency to make use of preexisting resources (March
1991: 71). In a regulatory context, this notably means using the rules that other actors
have already spent time developing. The choice over which rules to exploit is however
not random and is based on the actors with whom they had interactions in the past.
If one can learn and be influenced by what others do very far from them without ever
directly being in contact with them, this is generally less likely to occur than when two
people directly exchange with each other. This is obviously the same for regulators.
They indeed tend to use what they have been in direct contact with and this is reflected
in the content of the regulations that they promote. This in turn allows them to save
time, energy, and valuable resources, while also reducing the risks for potential errors or
mistakes. Exploration meanwhile describes the broad process that leads to the creation
of new resources (March 1991: 71). As the world changes, various actors regularly need
to innovate and adapt themselves. For regulators, this means creating new rules to deal
with new problems or new information that they are faced with. The way they do so
is again importantly dependent on their previous interactions that shape their realm
of possibilities. In effect, nothing is ever created out of thin air and what appears as
being new is constantly the result of the combination of what already exists. Just as
new technical devices are made of preexisting technical components, new rules are in
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effect constructed from preexisting rules. In other words, the act of innovation is one of
recombination.
Together, these two processes animate the evolution of complex governance sys-
tems in ways that cannot be comprehended by merely looking at their individual parts.
In the present case, why the GDPR looks like what it is today cannot be understood
without replacing it in the broader regulatory system that it is part of. As a whole,
the current state of the regulation of privacy in the transatlantic space can also only be
explained by looking at how the various interactions between the actors that promoted
data protection rules shaped their regulations over time. This is notably because they are
not moving towards one clear equilibrium or regulatory model, but instead following a
changing regulatory framework. If exploitation can give the impression that in the short
run different actors are moving towards one common set of rules and bringing order to
the system, exploration introduces variations and constantly changes what the regulation
of privacy will look like in the future. New rules explored at t=1 and exploited at t=2
become the source of new ones at t=3 and so on. Understanding who interacts with
whom is thus essential to understand the direction that the transatlantic regulation of
privacy and other complex governance systems are taking. This specifically embraces
the concept of homeorhesis in biology, which describes systems that evolve following a
trajectory as opposed to systems that continuously go back to the same single outcome
or state of homeostasis (Haas 1982: 217).
From this broad theoretical argument, I draw two more specific conclusions in my
empirical analysis. First, industry associations creating codes of conduct, and certifica-
tion schemes supported a process of regulatory convergence by which the rules promoted
in the United States and the European Union became increasingly similar over time
(Drezner 2001; Knill 2005). Through their interactions, private associations active in
both jurisdictions were more specifically encouraged to exploit rules coming from the
other and in turn prompted businesses following their private forms of regulation to ap-
ply a similar set of rules. This did not occur suddenly but was part of an incremental
process where rules from one jurisdiction made their way to the other as private associ-
ations that had incorporated the rules of their main jurisdiction of activity progressively
created links between associations in the other.
This has meant that although the United States and the European Union still
follow different approaches to the regulation of privacy, on the ground the rules being
applied are closer than often assumed. By the time the state of California adopted the
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first comprehensive privacy law in the United States, many companies were in effect
already applying rules put forward by European authorities. Yet, this convergence was
not only the result of a transfer or export of ‘European’ rules to the United States. Private
associations in the European Union were also likely to exploit rules that were first devised
in the United States following their interactions with their counterparts based there.
Throughout this process, private actors importantly ended up extending the influence of
American and European public authorities by providing them a “new institutional avenue
to diffuse [their] rules” (Green and Auld 2017: 261). As the rules that they were sharing
were partly those that they had first taken from their host jurisdiction, they sometimes
became kind of private promoters of public rules. This was even reinforced when public
actors, and in that regard especially the European Union, actively tried to shape their
interactions.
Second, I highlight that private associations have more than only exploited data
protection rules created by public authorities, they also explored and experimented with
new ones. By combining rules that they had incorporated based on their previous inter-
actions, they were indeed able to create rules that no other public or private actors had
until then promoted. In doing so, they contributed to make the regulation of privacy
more flexible as some scholars had previously argued (Abbott, Green and Keohane 2016;
De Búrca, Keohane and Sabel 2014; Green and Auld 2017; Overdevest and Zeitlin 2014).
At the same time, I find that this contribution of private associations was not as signif-
icant as it could have been expected. The exploration of rules was done by a relatively
small number of private actors and in a very limited time span. Public involvement was
moreover almost always needed to actually push these private associations to go “beyond
compliance” (Bartley 2011, 2014; Prakash and Potoski 2012). It is really not as if private
forms of regulation had proven to be so much more adaptive to a quickly evolving set of
issues raised by the growing use of personal data.
By creating fragmentation, it stands out that the multiplication of industry as-
sociations reduced the signalling value that private companies could gain from exploring
new rules and created “second-order information asymmetries” (Renckens 2020: 41). As
the number of private regulations supposed to provide privacy guarantees rose, it be-
came particularly hard for most users to distinguish them and know which ones were
more or less stringent. Instead of resolving information asymmetries as private forms
of regulation traditionally hope to achieve, they created more confusion by making it
unclear what rules were applied. This acted as a disincentive for private associations to
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add more requirements than they were legally required to. This is especially as these
programs remain voluntary and need to prove their value to private companies using
them and that often do not want to make their life more difficult than necessary. In
this context, I show that codes of conduct or certifications even hindered the adoption of
more substantive regulation by public authorities and appeared to act as a kind of regu-
latory decoys. While maintaining that they could supplement public rules, they actually
sometimes helped private companies escape their obligations. This sub-optimal outcome,
where private regulations attempt to capture the regulatory process, can importantly be
overcome by greater public participation in their development.
1.4 Empirical and Theoretical Contributions
Throughout this work, I make both empirical and theoretical contributions to the lit-
erature on privacy, private authority, and global regulation. Empirically, I first provide
the most comprehensive overview of how the regulation of privacy has evolved in the
United States and the European Union since the adoption of the European Data Direc-
tive. I do so by notably building an original database (see section 4.2) that highlights
when and how new data protection principles and rules have been integrated in both
jurisdictions. This goes much further than the previous literature that focused on the
different European and American regulatory approach to privacy (Newman 2008) and
broad data protection principles (Bennett 1992). It also offers a more detailed picture
than more recent work that only focused on a limited number of new public laws, like
the GDPR and the California Consumer Privacy Act (Chander, Kaminski and McGev-
eran 2020; Schwartz and Peifer 2017). It finally allows me to delve deeper into the role
that private actors have played in the regulation of privacy than the literature arguing
for the existence of a ‘Brussels’ effect’ (Bradford 2012, 2020). In addition to not taking
for granted self-indication from American companies that they abide by the GDPR and
actually looking at what rules are being promoted by private actors, I show when they
also tended to go further than their legal obligations and when rules first devised in the
United States had an influence in Europe.
My empirical work moreover brings light to the role of a specific type of pri-
vate actors: industry associations and certification companies devising codes of conduct,
guidelines, certification schemes, and other private forms of regulation that other compa-
nies are expected to abide by. Despite an early recognition that they could play a “public
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role” in the regulation of privacy (Haufler 2001), they were up to now mostly analyzed
for their role in the implementation of the Safe Harbor or Privacy Shield Agreements
(Farrell 2003, 2006; Drezner 2007). In addition to excluding those active in Europe, this
failed to account for cases where private actors contributed to privacy regulation without
a clear delegation of authority from public actors. In the rest of this work, I highlight
that they offered an additional avenue for the exploitation of data protection rules in
both jurisdictions and actively contributed to the exploration of new rules.
Theoretically speaking, I answer recent calls to give more attention to the inter-
actions between public and private forms of authority (Eberlein et al. 2014; Gulbrandsen
2014). Rather than looking at what these private associations and certification compa-
nies have been doing separately, I question how they are being layered on top of public
rules and being actively shaped by public authorities. I notably end up showing that
the different regulatory approaches taken in the United States and the European Union
significantly changed how these private actors ended up contributing to the regulation of
privacy. While in the United States they were more active in creating new data protec-
tion rules, those based in Europe were significantly less likely to do so. This reflects the
view in Europe that they should not be left alone to regulate and where they were mostly
expected to help in the process of harmonizing data protection rules in the European
single market. In highlighting this difference, I go further than previous work on private
authority focused on explaining its emergence (Cashore, Newsom and Auld 2004; Green
2013b; Mattli and Woods 2009) and question how public interventions in private forms of
regulation can change their very content and future development. In doing so, I extend
previous arguments that had linked different types of regulatory state to different forms
of self-regulation by also highlighting how the different involvement of public authorities
affect the process of exploring new data protection rules by private actors (Newman and
Bach 2004).
The complex system approach that serves as the main theoretical foil for this
work finally offers a renewed understanding of how cross-border rules emerge among in-
terdependent economies. In recent years, complexity ideas have increasingly made their
way in international relations and international political economy debates. The litera-
ture on regime complexes has for one been keen on highlighting how the proliferation of
international institutions was creating new power dynamics and pathways for influence
(Abbott 2012; Alter and Meunier 2009; Betts 2009; Davis 2009; Drezner 2009; Kellow
2012; Keohane and Victor 2011; Orsini, Morin and Young 2013; Raustiala and Victor
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2004). Others have also shown how complex dynamics are also important among insti-
tutions forming what could be seen as single regimes or issue-areas (Kim 2013; Morin,
Pauwelyn and Hollway 2017; Pauwelyn 2014). In this work, I introduce yet another form
of complexity. Instead of focusing on the multiplication of formal international insti-
tutions, I highlight how economic interdependence between various jurisdictions opened
up new channels of influence between private actors and in turn contributed to create a
complex governance system where decisions taken in one jurisdiction can often affect the
other without necessarily having to go through international negotiations.
Here, I partly build on the recent work by Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman
developing a new interdependence approach and attempting to endogenize the effects
of transnational interactions in domestic policy-making (2014; 2016; 2019a). Instead of
focusing on how these interactions affect the strategies taken by public and private actors
to advance or block institutional change, I, however, focus on their impact on the process
of rule formation and more specifically how previous interactions between public and
private actors affect the adoption and creation of data protection rules. This offers a
picture where distinctions drawn between the ‘international’ and ‘national’ realms often
become blurry. Rule-making is indeed not presented as being purely national. As such,
I go much further than the traditional “second-image reversed” argument (Gourevitch
1978) according to which the international system also shapes domestic politics and
present an analysis where the two are often merged together. The point here is not to say
the United States and European Union have become a single coherent legal jurisdiction,
which clearly is not the case. Yet, their regulatory processes are neither fully separate
from each other.
1.5 Case, Data and Methodology
As already indicated multiple times now, the present work focuses on the regulation of
privacy in the transatlantic area and more specifically between the United States and
the European Union. The choice of limiting myself to this specific geographical area has
many reasons. One is very simply their broad importance for the global economy. As
Drezner (2007) rightly pointed out, they oversee the two largest internal markets and
are in that sense two ‘great powers’, which decisions matter for the rest of the world. If
they cannot unilaterally impose their regulatory preferences to the other, they can often
do so for smaller third countries. This is notably the case with regards to the regulation
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of privacy. On one side, the European Union has established an ‘adequacy decision’
mechanism to certify that third countries have an equivalent privacy system and allow
data to flow freely between them. This has pushed many countries, including Canada
and most recently Japan, to revise their own laws. On the other side, the United States
has been active in promoting its regulatory model and set of data protection rules by
negotiating the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Privacy Framework. If the
two jurisdictions often appear as competing with each other, any agreement between the
two would have the potential to reset the global regulation of privacy.
Two further reasons explain the choice of limiting this research to the transatlantic
area. First, the present work follows the evolution of the regulation of privacy since 1995,
a time where both jurisdictions were largely driving the global discussion on this question.
As the goal of this research is to understand how we got to the set of data protection
rules promoted today in the United States and the European Union, no other country or
international organization appeared to have had a significant influence on their respective
regulatory approach to data privacy. In recent years, China is often presented as a third
“data realm” promoting its own model of privacy regulation and digital regulation. As
the “world’s largest digital market, with 731 million internet users, [and which] accounts
for more than 40% of global e-commerce transactions” (Aaronson and Leblond 2018:
262), it could well have an important say in how privacy regulations evolve in the future.
It was however not the case up until recently. If there were early indications that China
was contributing to shape technical standards (Bach, Newman and Weber 2006), it only
adopted its first significant law dealing with privacy issues in 2012 and did not actively
contribute to global privacy debates until then (Geller 2020; UNCTAD 2020).
Second, the whole argument developed in this research, according to which the
United States and European Union can be viewed as a complex governance system, is
based on the fact that these two jurisdictions are in a close relation of interdependence
and that as such their domestic decision-making process became intertwined (Lütz 2011).
In effect, it considers that their “relationship is [...] a microcosm of globalization, with
high levels of interaction and exchange between” the two (Farrell and Newman 2018). In
the present case, this close interconnection is reinforced by the philosophical root shared
by the concept of privacy in the United States and the European Union. While it is
regulated differently, they indeed have a common history, as chapter 3 will highlight. It
is notably because of this that the processes of exploitation and exploration could emerge
between actors based in both geographical areas. There is clearly not the same level of
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interactions nor shared understanding of the concept of privacy between China and both
transatlantic partners. The same opportunities for influence thus did not emerge between
them and it was excluded from this research. This is not to say that regulatory decisions
taken in China never had any impact on the United States or the European Union,
but if so it was significantly less than among these two jurisdictions. In that regard,
the choice of excluding China as well as other countries aims to emphasize their close
interconnection and thus serves both descriptive and analytical purposes (Cilliers 2001).
While focusing on the evolution of the transatlantic privacy system, I more specif-
ically look at changes and interactions occurring at the American federal, European, or
international level. This means that regulatory change in one American federal state, like
California, or in one European member state, like France or Germany, as well as potential
interactions between them, are not part of the main analysis. As two ‘multilevel systems’
(Lütz 2011), there are in effect many different actors active at many different levels in
the United States and the European Union that can interact and shape the evolution
of data protection rules. Including all of them would have however been too much and
the analysis was thus limited to the interactions between actors at the highest level in
both the United States and the European Union3. This reflects the fact that they are
the ones that are most likely to have had repeated direct exchanges with each other. If
sub-national (or national in Europe) can also have an important say in the set of final
rules applied in many issue-areas, decisions taken by American federal or European au-
thorities can often have a broader impact by forcing regulatory convergence inside their
respective jurisdictions.
I use a mix of content and network analyses to understand how interactions be-
tween public and private actors active at these levels in the United States and the Eu-
ropean Union shaped the evolution of their respective data protection rules. The man-
ual coding of 126 regulations dealing with privacy issues more precisely serve to trace
changes in the set of data protection rules promoted by different actors over time, which
in this case represents the dependent variable. These 126 regulations include sectoral
laws adopted by the federal government in the United States, European Directives and
regulations, and private forms of regulations adopted by private associations or firms to
3As Farrell and Newman point out, there “is a controversy over whether the European Union should
be considered a state” (2019a: footnote 21, ch. 1). In fact, viewing the European Union as a traditional
foreign actor or a governance system can lead to different analyses and findings (Lavenex 2014). It is
still considered that the importance of European politics for global regulatory debates combined with
its relatively high level of independence from European national politics allows to view the European
Union as a polity like other sovereign states.
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regulate the behaviour of private companies. The full list of regulations was identified
using previous research (Cavoukian and Crompton 2000; European Commission 2001a,
2012b; European Parliament 2012; Rodrigues and Papkonstantinou 2018; Trzaskowski
2006) and is listed in Appendix B. A network analysis and the broader structure of in-
teractions between private associations then serve as the independent variables to explain
how previous exchanges between them affected their exploitation and exploration over
time. Data on their interactions were collected on the website of all private organizations.
Two actors were considered to have interacted when one publicly reported having worked
or be working with another.
I finally draw on 36 semistructured interviews to complete my analysis with rep-
resentatives from American federal agencies (i.e., Federal Trade Commission & Departe-
ment of Commerce), European Commission directorate-generals (i.e., DG Justice & DG
Connect), European institutions (i.e., European Data Protection Board, European Data
Protection Supervisor), private associations (i.e., TrustArc, FEDMA, etc.) and civil soci-
ety groups (i.e., BEUC). All interviewees were identified based on their work experience
and affiliation. In fact, they worked at most of the public and private organizations
looked at in this research. The full list of interviewees is reported in Appendix A. All
interviews lasted more or less an hour and a third of them were conducted in person
while doing a research stay in Brussels. The other two-thirds were done on the phone.
Throughout this research, interview data is used in an “integrative” and “interactive”
way with the other methods used (Bowen 2009; Seawright 2016). Rather than aiming
to produce a different causal explanation, it serves to confirm the evidence coming from
the content and network analyses. Interview quotes are inserted throughout the text to
provide an additional layer of commentary. For confidentiality reasons, quotes are never
associated with a specific interviewee. Interviews were moreover used to double-check
the quality of the data collected from other sources. All interviewees were notably asked
with which organizations apart from the one they worked at did they have contact over
the years to verify the information collected online and used for the network analysis.
They were also asked which other organizations did they consider to be the most im-
portant actors in the regulation of privacy to confirm that the population identified for
this research was exhaustive. The content and network analyses were, in turn, used to
generate interview questions and sometimes challenge interviewees on their answers when
it did not necessarily fit the evidence that had come out from these two other methods.
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1.6 Roadmap of the Thesis
The remainder of this work is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 begins by building my
theoretical framework and explaining how complexity theory can be used to comprehend
the evolution of data protection rules in the transatlantic space. It details the episte-
mological and ontological shift that it suggests to study increasingly interdependent and
interconnected economies. It does so by previously reviewing how the formation of rules
was previously theorized in international political economy and notably in the literature
specialized on private authority. It finally introduces the two main processes, exploitation
and exploration, analyzed thereafter.
The theoretical framework in place, chapter 3 describes how the American and
European privacy systems can be conceptualized as two closely interacting units instead
of two competing legal systems as they traditionally are. In doing so, it traces the
origins of the concept of privacy in both jurisdictions and how they compare to each
other. It points out that while both start from a liberal root, the American approach
has embraced a more ‘market-based’ approach and the European Union follows a more
‘rights-based’ approach. It then presents how these differences relate to their respective
regulatory approaches. As opposed to most previous work on the topic, though, it ends
up highlighting that from these broad differences they actually have a lot in common,
and both in practice adopt a hybrid form of regulation rather than one of the ideal-type
generally ascribed to them.
Chapter 4 builds on this finding to explain how the transatlantic privacy system
actually forms a complex governance system and offers a broad overview of how it evolved
since 1995. After detailing how the database used for this research was created, it
showcases how the content of the rules promoted by American and European authorities
differed early on. It subsequently indicates how this changed over time following the
tendency of public and private actors to exploit and explore data protection rules based
on their previous interactions. It finally points out that while the exploitation of rules
has pushed them closer than ever to each other, the exploration of new ones has also
spurred greater divergence and impeded them from ever becoming alike.
Chapter 5 gives a closer look at the process of exploitation and how private ac-
tors specifically supported a regulatory convergence between the United States and the
European Union. It does so through a careful longitudinal analysis of the evolution of
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interactions between public and private actors and the content of the rules that they
included in their respective codes of conduct, certification schemes, and other forms of
private regulation. The analysis follows a number of specific events that led to the de-
velopment of new interactions and supported the exploitation of rules between American
and European actors. It finally emphasizes how while doing so, they often ended up
extending the influence of public authorities that had first devised these rules.
Chapter 6 turns its attention to the second main process, the exploration of new
rules, animating the evolution of the transatlantic privacy system, and examines how
private actors have contributed to it. While chapter 5 shows that private actors often
ended up acting as a kind of transmission belt for public rules, this chapter questions
to what extent do they also contribute to the creation of new rules. It first shows that
they did create new rules by assembling previous ones that they came to include based
on their previous interactions. Yet, it then highlights that it was never as significant
as it was sometimes touted or expected. While providing an essential source of learn-
ing, the multiplication of sources of regulation indeed created fragmentation and limited
the interest of many private actors to take risks and innovate. As such, they did not
provide as much flexibility and even lead to a form of regulatory capture. It is finally
emphasized that this sub-optimal outcome for states and consumers can be overcome by
greater involvement of public actors in the process leading to the creation of industry
self-regulations.
Chapter 7 concludes this research. In addition to summarizing its findings, it
reiterates the value of adopting a complexity approach to study the evolution of global
regulatory issues and what it can more broadly offer in the study of international relations
and international political economy. It finally discusses some practical implications and
avenues for future research.
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Chapter 2
Regulating in a Complex World
If things were simple, word would
have gotten around.
Jacques Derrida, 1977
There are few more central concepts in our modern societies than the one of rule.
As we go about our daily lives, we are constantly faced with all sorts of rules. From
very abstract constitutional ones that set the basic framework of our political systems
to food standards that determine what we can eat, most of what we do is regulated in
one form or another. Broadly defined, rules are “specific prescriptions or proscriptions
for action” (Krasner 1982: 186) that in turn shape our realm of possibilities1. These
obviously include legal rules that are enforced by public authorities, but these are just
one part of it. As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite aptly point out rules “do not have
to be incorporated into state law or international law to have significance” (2000: 10).
Many non-state actors regulate their own activities as well as those of others through
1As this definition should make clear, the concept of rule is closely associated with the one of insti-
tution and most definitions of an institution indeed refer to the concept of rule. Douglass North quite
straightforwardly define institutions as the “rules of the game in a society” (North 1990: 3; emphasis
added). While outlining the institutional standpoint in international relations, Keohane similarly talks
of “students of institutions and rules” joining them as almost one and the same entity (Keohane 1984: 8).
If one needed to make an absolute distinction between the two concepts, it would mainly be one of degree
where institutions mostly represent a collection of rules and rules being the constitutive units of insti-
tutions. As this work is especially interested in what standards of behaviour are specifically promoted,
the concept of rule was seen as more appropriate but the two could almost be used interchangeably.
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the adoption of internal policies, codes of conduct, guidelines, and other forms of private
regulation (Vogel 2008). The relatively recent rise of an entire certification industry
aimed at promoting sustainable production processes in various global value-chains is one
prominent example that attracted a lot of interest over the years (Auld 2014; Cashore,
Newsom and Auld 2004; Grabs 2020; Renckens 2020). Not all cases of private rules are
however as visible and many businesses make choices that set the boundaries for our
future actions before we even become aware of it. Through technical design and various
policy decisions, internet companies notably control what information we can access,
with whom we can interact, how value can be exchanged online, and how personal data
can be collected and used (Benkler 2011; DeNardis 2009; Tusikov 2016).
Despite years of neoliberal economic policies pushing for deregulation, we are
thus still very far from living in an unregulated or even lightly regulated environment.
Evidence indeed suggests that the widespread privatization of economic activities that
occurred since the 1980s in many countries around the world was never associated with
“an end to all regulation” (Majone 1994: 80; see also Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005a).
The concept of deregulation is actually based on a wrongful dichotomy drawn between
markets and rules. Following on the work of Hayek (1984), many economists and political
scientists tended to see markets as a form of ‘spontaneous order’ that followed a different
logic than the one promoted by regulations. The latter were then closely associated with
an intervention of the state going against the supposedly natural ordering of markets and
that should thus be kept to a minimum (Scott 2003: 148). In reality, though, rules are
central to the good functioning and even constitution of markets (Levi-Faur 2017; Scott
2003; Shearing 1993). They set expectations and determine how actors are supposed
to interact together. What changed in recent years, though, is who sets them. Rather
than states being the sole or main source of rules, non-state actors nowadays also play
an increasingly important role in the regulatory process and notably in the formation of
new rules. As such, the whole deregulation discourse could really “better be described as
“reregulation,” but in a different form than before” (Renckens 2020: 15).
Non-state actors acting as regulators is not entirely new (Braithwaite and Dra-
hos 2000; Cutler 2002). There is, however, a broad consensus that their importance has
risen in recent years (Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010; Cashore 2002; Cashore, Newsom
and Auld 2004; Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999; Haufler 2001; Green 2013b; Mattli and
Woods 2009). What caused this is still debated (Büthe 2010). For some, it is “the scale
and structure of contemporary global production [that] challenge the capacity of even
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highly developed states to regulate activities that extend beyond their borders” (Abbott
and Snidal 2009a: 44). Others argued that by challenging traditional geographical and
jurisdictional boundaries new technologies are forcing a “retreat of the state” (Kobrin
1998, 2004; Spar 1999). While it is increasingly recognized that digital technologies did
not really impede states from regulating the online world as some early technological en-
thusiasts perhaps hoped for, it is generally agreed that they did force states to collaborate
more with new private intermediaries (Goldsmith and Wu 2006; DeNardis 2009). For
yet others, this is all part of a broader transformation of capitalism and reconstitution of
the public sphere on the global scene (Braithwaite 2008; Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005a;
Levi-Faur 2017; Ruggie 2004). Despite obvious differences, all these explanations are
united in their recognition that structural changes are reshaping the global economy and
making it, for better or worse, more transnational than ever. What they all fail to grasp,
though, is that more than simply allowing the emergence of new sources of authority and
rules these structural changes have also altered the process of rule formation itself.
In the present work, I argue that the growing interaction between state and non-
state actors developing rules in multiple jurisdictions can be viewed as a complex gover-
nance system that changes how global rules emerge (Kahler 2016; Farrell and Newman
2019a; Oatley 2019; Orsini et al. 2019). In the remainder of this chapter, I review some
of the recent strands of literature that have addressed this question and introduce the
theoretical framework that I will then use to analyze the formation of data protection
rules in the transatlantic area since 1995. I start by highlighting the extent to which
regulatory systems are now interdependent and what this means for regulatory debates.
I then review how the ‘market power explanation’ has been used to explain the emer-
gence global rules are formed and point out some of its limitations. I notably argue that
it failed to pay sufficient attention to the role of private actors in the regulation of the
global economy and I contrast it with the recent literature on private authority. Follow-
ing on these points, I discuss how the literature on policy diffusion has made a first step
at recognizing the interdependence of policy processes. I finally elaborate on the value
and meaning of using a complex system approach to study global regulatory processes.
2.1 Global Rules for a Global Economy
In today’s world, national markets are built on regulations developed in multiple jurisdic-
tions and by multiple actors. As states open up their national economies, notably through
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the negotiation of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, rules that once had a lim-
ited geographical scope of application end up having effects outside of the jurisdiction
where they were originally adopted (Bach and Newman 2007; Farrell and Newman 2010).
Most companies nowadays have to consider how various jurisdictions regulate their activ-
ities before starting to produce their goods and services. Even when private companies
do not realize it, they are more often than not influenced by rules adopted in multiple
jurisdictions. If they are importing raw materials or part of their production processes is
taking place in another country, their end products will most certainly have been shaped
by rules not set by their national governments. This is assuming that it is easy to identify
their nationality. Following the liberalization of financial flows in the last few decades,
private companies are now regularly tied to multiple jurisdictions. While their head-office
may be in one country, they will often have made or received foreign investments, which
can force them to consider the financial rules of foreign countries.
The increasing use of extraterritoriality is yet another situation where private
companies might be compelled to deal with rules from another jurisdiction even when
they are not directly active there (Putnam 2009; Raustiala 2009). Based on this legal
concept originally developed in the United States, many states now consider that they
have legal authority over activities happening outside their jurisdiction if they have an
‘effect’ on their territory or citizens. With the advent of the Internet and the collapse of
spatial distances (Der Derian 2003; Rosenau 2003; Ruggie 1975), the number of acts taken
in one jurisdiction that can have an effect in another jurisdiction has risen considerably
and increasingly lead public regulators to use extraterritorial measures. The General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in that regards continues the practice set out in the
European Data Directive in specifying that it applies to the processing of personal data
of Europeans wherever it occurs in the world (Art. 3). A non-European firm that could
have never intended to be physically active in Europe will thus have to respect European
data protection rules when dealing with the personal information of individuals from
there.
The globalization of the economy has in short not only allowed the exchange
of goods and services but also made national legal systems interact with each other.
As opposed to “the ruleless space of anarchy” often assumed in international politics,
market actors are faced with a world of overlapping rules and institutions (Farrell and
Newman 2019a: 27). This is not without costs. Having to deal with multiple rules
can be a daunting task for private companies, and especially smaller ones that do not
28
have the means to pay a legal team dedicated to ensuring that they respect all their
legal requirements. In some cases, it might even be that complying with the rules of
one jurisdiction will mean violating rules in others (Farrell and Newman 2019a: 27).
A request from enforcement authorities in one jurisdiction to provide personal data for
a criminal investigation could notably end up violating data privacy laws where the
personal data is currently located or originally coming from. This was precisely the
topic of a hotly debated case in the United States as Microsoft was requested to produce
emails saved on servers located in Ireland by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In
the view of Microsoft and the European Parliament, which filed an amicus curiae in
this case, fulfilling this request was however in violation of European privacy law. The
case was since then vacated by the adoption of the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use
of Data Act (CLOUD Act) in 2018 specifying that law enforcement could require to
have access to data located outside the United States. Far from solving the broader
legal conundrum, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) and the European Data
Protection Supervisor (EDPS), the two main European privacy watchdogs, indicated
that this new law could be in conflict with the application of GDPR. Other cases where
private companies will have to deal with conflicting legal requirements are thus to be
expected.
In addition to potential economic costs, the growing interdependence of national
economies often raises normative issues. As products and services cross national frontiers,
legal systems and rules also clash because of the different values that underpin them.
For example, conflicts over food standards are not merely about economic gains but
also cultural preferences over how what we eat should be produced. If the European
Union has been constantly more wary of supposed proofs of the safety of genetically
modified organisms, it is in part because it does not view it as being a purely scientific
issue (Young 2003: 464-5). It is also a social issue that questions what individuals are
ready to consume. Such normative clashes are present in a wide variety of other issue-
areas, including privacy. While the latter is officially enshrined as a fundamental right in
Europe, it is often seen as a consumer issue in the United States. How companies manage
personal data in the transatlantic area thus necessarily tend to encroach on normative
preferences (Schwartz and Peifer 2017). In the most extreme scenario, this divergence
could lead to a simple end to personal data flows as feared by some businesses in what
would not be too different from the current outcome in the case of genetically modified
organisms.
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In this context, both public and private actors thus have an interest in promoting
global rules to ease these various tensions and ensure the proper functioning of a global
economy. In the specific case of privacy, ever since the adoption of the Data Directive in
1995 the European Commission has in effect continuously attempted to ensure European
rights were guaranteed wherever their data is processed and to simultaneously ensure a
fair level playing field for its companies. The American government has similarly been
prone to engage with its European, but also Asian, counterparts to ensure that data
flows would not be disrupted. In both jurisdictions, private actors were also interested
and sometimes even encouraged to adopt regulatory documents detailing how they would
protect personal data. How global rules emerge in this complex environment is a key
question for students of global economic governance.
2.2 The Market Power Explanation
Following on the work of Daniel Drezner, a leading answer has been that ‘great powers’ –
here understood as “governments that oversee large internal market” – are the ones setting
the rules of the game (2007: 5). More precisely, when the United States and the European
Union have similar regulatory preferences, coordination will be successful. In the absence
of “great power concert”, any “coordination will [however] be incomplete, and nonstate
attempts will prove to be a poor substitute” (2007: 5). The concept of ‘coordination’ is
significantly used by Drezner to highlight that it is an agent-driven process and that the
dependent variable does not necessarily have to take the form of regulatory convergence.
Coordination could indeed result in an agreement “on the acceptable bounds of regulatory
policies” and still not promote “identical rules or regulations” (Drezner 2001: 57).
While compelling, this ‘market power’ explanation leaves many questions unan-
swered. For one, it does not explain why the European Union, not the United States is
broadly viewed as the new regulatory power (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009; New-
man and Posner 2015; Vogel 2012; Young 2015b). Even outside of academia, widely-
read American newspapers have for quite some time now pointed out that Brussels has
replaced Washington as the most important city for American lobbyists (Lipton and
Hapkim 2013; Mitchener 2002). One answer to this is that the market explanation is
a necessary, but not sufficient condition to explain a jurisdiction’s global influence. Ac-
cording to Bach and Newman, the missing link is what they label as ‘regulatory capacity’
(2007). In short, a jurisdiction not only needs a large market, but also the capacity “to
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formulate, monitor, and enforce a set of market rules” (Bach and Newman 2007: 831; see
also Damro 2015) if it wishes to have any say on which rules are applied globally. The
case of privacy is a particularly good example to see how.
Despite having limited results in unifying privacy regulations in Europe (Bam-
berger and Mulligan 2015: 9), the European Data Protection Directive of 1995 at the
very least unified market access decisions to the European ‘data economy’ (Bach and
Newman 2007). Following the adoption of the Directive, European regulators were in
charge of allowing foreign companies to use personal data of European citizens, mainly
through adequacy decisions2 or binding corporate rules3. These powers were moreover
consolidated with the creation of transgovernmenal institution, the Article 29 Working
Party4, which was tasked to advise the European Commission on the application of
the Data Directive. Meanwhile, the American legal privacy system remains to this day
fragmented and no single agency has the sole authority over privacy issues (Bach and
Newman 2007: 836).
This important regulatory capacity combined with the importance of the Euro-
pean single market are essential elements to understand why the European Union has
such an influence over the global regulation of privacy and why multiple countries, like
Canada, Japan, India, Brazil, and most recently Nigeria, adopted laws seen as inspired
by the European privacy rulebook (Chander, Kaminski and McGeveran 2020; Gordon
and Ram 2018; Satariano 2018). It would also explain why the European Union was
able to bring the United States to negotiate the Safe Harbor (2000) and then the Pri-
vacy Shield (2016) agreements setting out sui generis frameworks to govern the use of
European personal data by American companies. These two agreements in effect aimed
to replace an adequacy decision, which the United States could not get in the absence of
a comprehensive privacy law at the federal level, by relying on ‘enforced self-regulation’.
In short, private companies were expected to self-certify their compliance with privacy
principles listed in these two international agreements, which the Federal Trade Com-
mission could enforce if violations were found. Again, for Drezner (see p. 9 above), this
outcome was not considered to be a real example of coordination due to the multiple
2Adequacy decisions is a mechanism by which the European Union indicates that another country’s
privacy regulations are equivalent to its own and its companies may deal with the personal data of
Europeans just like if they were in Europe.
3Binding corporate rules are rules that a company builds to allow for personal data of Europeans to
be transferred to a country with no adequacy decisions. These rules need to be approved by national
data protection authorities under an EU cooperation agreement.
4The Article 29 Working Party has now been replaced by the European Data Protection Board in
the GDPR.
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compliance failures that were notably at the heart of the demise of both agreements.
At the same time, the United States did have to change its position to fit European
preferences (Farrell 2003). While not being a complete reversal, it did show some form
of coordination that seems hard to imagine if the European Union had not unified its
market access and built up its regulatory capacity. It can moreover help explain why the
United States was able to push back European privacy demands in the very specific cases
of the use of personal data for law enforcement purposes (e.g., access to airline passenger
data or financial transactions data), a policy area where the United States itself holds
an important regulatory capacity (Bach and Newman 2007; de Goede 2012).
Still, this ‘regulatory capacity’ or somewhat updated version of the market power
explanation has its own shortcomings. To go back to Drezner’s point, it is striking that
the European influence appears to have had a relatively limited direct impact in the
United States. In addition to not bringing any regulatory change, there were not even
that many private companies that self-certified to the EU-US Safe Harbor or Privacy
Shield Agreements. According to the Department of Commerce’s own report, there was
just a little bit over 5000 by its demise in 20165. Approximately, the same number of
companies had also self-certified under the Privacy Shield6. If this could be taken to mean
that the United States was actually successful in blocking any real change, it certainly
does not explain why on the ground researcher find that American and European private
companies follow similar practices when dealing with personal data (Bamberger and
Mulligan 2015: 12). It also does not explain why rules that were first devised in the
United States, including for the protection of children’s data, the passive collection of
personal data, or data breaches, are now part of the GDPR and the ‘European’ rulebook.
This goes against the seemingly unilateral way that regulatory coordination is supposed
to function according to the market power explanation.
Another important lacuna of this specific explanation is that it takes any regula-
tory outcome, like the Data Directive or more recently the GDPR, as a stable equilibrium.
Following the adoption of the Data Directive, it is almost as if the European and Ameri-
can regulatory system did not change up until the adoption of the GDPR in 2016. As it
will be discussed in chapter 3, both the European Union and the United States’ privacy
frameworks have however been continuously evolving in the last twenty years. In addition
to legal changes, private companies even had the opportunity to build on the regulations
adopted in both jurisdictions. According to interviews done by Kenneth Bamberger and
5The full list of companies is available online at: https://www.export.gov/safeharbor_eu.
6The full list of companies is available online at: https://www.privacyshield.gov/list.
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Deirdre Mulligan with data supervisors in American companies (2015: 61-66), legal com-
pliance with American or European rules was only a small part of their privacy practices,
which are increasingly codified in codes of conduct or other soft law documents. This
again points to the importance of giving more attention to the role of private actors to un-
derstand how the regulation of privacy has evolved in the last twenty years. Just as in so
many other issue-areas, they are not merely implementing rules devised by governments
or international organizations, but active regulators in themselves.
2.3 From Public to Hybrid Rule-Making
Despite early calls to look at the role of transnational actors in world politics (Nye
and Keohane 1971; Strange 1994), the state-centric paradigm has dominated academic
debates in international political economy since the early 1970s. In effect, the first
outgrowth of the work on transnationalism of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1971;
1977) has not been a greater recognition of non-state actors as a key unit of analysis, but
a new focus on how states could achieve cooperation in face of the growing issues of living
in an interdependent world. Over the years, regime theory and, more broadly, the study
of international institutions (Haas 1980; Haggard and Simmons 1987; Keohane 1984;
Krasner 1982; Young 1980) that resulted from this new research interest quickly became
as state-centric as previous theories of international politics. The rise of transnationalism
and interdependence thus became seen as an exogenous shock on international politics,
rather than an independent or dependent variable.
Since the mid-’90s, there is however a revival of interest in the role of non-state
actors (Risse-Kappen 1995). While early concepts like ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas
1992), ‘transnational coalitions’ (Risse-Kappen 1995) and ‘transnational advocacy net-
works’ (Keck and Sikkink 1999) emphasized the impact of non-state actors on domestic
or international policy-making, many scholars were quick to point out that non-state
actors, and chiefly private companies, could also act as regulators in their own right
(Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999; Cutler 2002). For some,
this was taken to be an indication that states had lost their lost their “monopoly position
in the production of public goods” (Grande and Pauly 2005: 288). In reality, it can be
questioned if states ever had such a monopoly position. Since medieval times, merchants
have been key players of global governance and have regularly developed their own legal
practices or lex mercatoria (See Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: 54 or Cutler, Haufler and
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Porter 1999: 4). Having said that, private authority is now the source of a thriving schol-
arship and it is widely recognized that private actors can also act as rule-makers (See
inter alia Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010; Bartley 2018; Graz and Nölke 2008; Green
2010, 2013b; Mattli and Büthe 2003, 2005; Mattli and Woods 2009; Spruyt 2001; Vogel
2005).
In a relatively recent contribution, Burkard Eberlein and his colleagues (2014)
built an analytical framework highlighting the different governance tasks where transna-
tional businesses regularly interact with public actors. These are summarized in table
2.1 below. While each governance tasks has its own relevance, rule formation is the focus
of this research and is defined as the interactive process through which rules are devised
and institutionalized in formal documents at the national, transnational, and interna-
tional level. In line with Eberlein et al. (2014), this process is taken to involve both
governments and businesses. Other actors, like formal intergovernmental organizations
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), are also significant and should not be dis-
carded easily (Abbott and Snidal 2009b, 2010; Raymond and DeNardis 2015). Yet, it
appears that governments and businesses have had the last word in making the rules for
the regulation of data protection and privacy.
Table 2.1: Transnational Business Governance’s Regulatory tasks (Adapted from Eberlein et al.
2014: 7)
Regulatory tasks Definition
Goal/agenda setting Define the regulatory objectives to achieve
Rule formation Set up the rules to be applied
Implementation Apply the rules to a specific issue-area
Monitoring and information gathering Oversee the application and gather information on it
Compliance promotion and enforcement Encourage the respect of the rules and apply sanctions
Evaluation and review Provide feedback on regulatory implementation
In the case of international organizations, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and
Council of Europe have all been important forums where privacy rules have been formu-
lated. As a matter of fact, the OECD privacy framework of 1980 and its revision of 2013
are still the closest thing we have to a global standard for privacy regulation. Mean-
while, the APEC privacy framework of 2005 and the Convention 108 of the Council of
Europe are two additional forums where the United States and the European Union have
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respectively pushed their regulatory agenda on the global stage. All three international
organizations were thus significant, but not so much as agents of change themselves, but
rather as forums where rules were formulated by governments and businesses. In all three
cases, the rules formulated were the result of the work of a group of experts (OECD) or an
international negotiation (APEC and Council of Europe) where the primary input came
from government officials and non-state representatives. While it is not assumed that it
could not be different in other issue-areas, international organizations are thus seen as
the locus of rule-making, but not rule-makers themselves for the rest of this research.
As for NGOs, they also played a crucial role in the evolution of privacy rules
in the last twenty years and it would be foolish to dismiss them too quickly. This is
especially the case in Europe where the GDPR has been one of the most lobbied Euro-
pean regulation (Atikcan and Chalmers 2019). Private businesses or their associations
were obviously behind a large chunk of this activity as it was well documented7. Yet,
important civil society groups like The European Consumer Organisation (BEUC) and
European Digital Rights (EDRi) were also quite active and were able to advance their
propositions at multiple points in time. As opposed to private businesses, civil society
advocates however largely did not themselves create rules. In effect, they mostly stuck
with their advocacy role, rather than taking the one of rule-maker8. Many reasons, in-
cluding financial ones, explain this, but it is noteworthy that civil society representatives
do not seem to believe that it is their role to be rule-makers. According to one represen-
tative of a civil society organization interviewed for this research: “We don’t pay much
attention [to the development of private rules] because we focus on the actual law and
implementation of it. [...] It is mostly a tool for companies, not for [us].” (Interview E13,
done on February 14th, 2019). In an informal discussion, another similarly held that it
was not their role to set the rules for private companies. In this context, this research
will consider civil society groups as actors influencing the process of rule formation but
who are not rule-makers themselves.
It must finally be emphasized that governments and businesses are not seen as
equal actors in the process of rule formation. If both can be considered as rule-makers,
their different source of authority has implications for their capacity to act as such.
Studying the emergence of private authority, Jessica Green (2013b) differentiates be-
7For a good analysis of the influence of lobby demands on the regulation, see the following website:
https://lobbyplag.eu/lp.
8One notable exception was the development of a trustmark by a network of consumer organization
led by the British one named Which?.
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tween a delegated and entrepreneurial form. While the former represents a “traditional
principal-agent relationship, where the agent’s authority stems from explicit transfer of
authority from state [actors]”, the latter describes a situation where “authority accrues
through a process that culminates in the governed deferring to the governors” (Green
2013b: 33-34). This opposes a form of de jure to de facto authority and is at the heart of
the difference between public and private regulators. Even though national governments
cannot make any claims of legitimacy to devise global rules, they still are a source of legal
authority. When they agree with each other, they can force private actors to respect the
rules they want. At the domestic level, they also remain sovereign and can force private
actors to adopt a specific behaviour in respect of their international obligations.
Meanwhile, without any delegation, private businesses only have authority insofar
as the governed (themselves, but also governments) accept it. This importantly means
that they cannot go against the will of public authorities. This would be counterpro-
ductive as they would only risk losing their authority. To put it differently, private rules
are of use if they can “lower transaction costs, increase reliability, and generally achieve
efficiency gains” (Büthe 2010: 10; see also Green 2013b: 41), which simply cannot be
achieved by promoting rules going against the ones put forward by public authorities.
What private businesses can however do is support additional rules. These can either
be by specifying or adding new requirements, but they cannot really limit or undermine
preexisting ones established by public authorities. What will thus often occur is not that
public and private rules will challenge each other, but that they will be layered one on
other (Bartley 2011; Green 2013a).
Even in cases of ‘entrepreneurial private authority’, private regulators will often
try to link themselves to public rules to increase their legitimacy. In many ways, pub-
lic rules can actually play a “coral reef function, attracting private rule makers” and
catalyzing their rule-making activities (Green 2013a: 2). This specific nature of public
regulators and their regulations will be key to understand the evolution of private rules.
At the same time, both delegated and entrepreneurial forms of private authority can
also influence public regulators. They can notably promote new rules, reformulate the
problems at hand, diffuse public rules across jurisdictions, and help rule harmonization
(Green and Auld 2017: 261). The distinction drawn between the ‘delegated’ and ‘en-
trepreneurial’ form of private authority can even collapse as public actors get involved in
the regulatory processes of private actors (Renckens 2020: 6). Public actors can in effect
attempt to support or limit the development of rules by private actors to which it did not
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beforehand delegate any regulatory task (Cashore, Newsom and Auld 2004; Gulbrandsen
2014). Rule formation should thus be seen as an interactive process between both public
and private regulators as highlighted in the aforementioned definition.
This interactive process of rule formation importantly also runs across national
boundaries. As previously mentioned, the globalization of the economy has also meant
that firms and governments increasingly have to consider rules adopted in other jurisdic-
tions. This is moreover true both in terms of compliance and rule formation. In effect,
the process of formulating rules and institutionalizing them is not happening in a vac-
uum. One of the main factors behind the adoption of a specific rule is what will already
be out there. Just as international “negotiations do not start on a blank slate” (Meunier
and Morin 2015: 146; see also Pauwelyn 2014), rule formation at both the national and
transnational level always occurs in the backdrop of existing rules and institutions devel-
oped in multiple jurisdictions at the same time. How these actually affect the process of
rule formation is the key argument of this research and will be further developed in the
following sections.
2.4 Policy Diffusion: A Limited Approach to Study Inter-
dependence
The literature on policy diffusion has probably been the first to explicitly recognize the
interdependent nature of policy processes in international studies (Dobbin, Simmons
and Garrett 2007; Elkins and Simmons 2005; Elkins, Guzman and Simmons 2006; Lazer
2005; Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005b; Meseguer 2005; Meseguer and Gilardi 2009; Meseguer
2009). As Gilardi (2012) recalls, this is however something that had long been recognized
in other social sciences. Since the formulation of the “Galton Problem”, named after the
British statistician who originally enunciated it, it had been widely recognized that rules,
customs or other practices in specific geographical areas can often come “from a com-
mon source, so that they are duplicate copies of the same original” (Gilardi 2012: 457).
Building on this, the policy diffusion literature has over time identified four mechanisms
through which it can occur: coercion, competition, learning, and emulation (Dobbin,
Simmons and Garrett 2007). As summarized in figure 2.2, they all function according to
different resources and forms of interactions.
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Table 2.2: Different pathways for rule diffusion (inspired by Drezner 2007 & Lavenex 2014)





Coercion refers to a situation where an actor can use its material resources to
directly force another to adopt its policy. The use of conditionality by the European
Union is one common example (Lavenex 2014: 889). As other countries want to join its
single market, they are required to adopt European rules. The promise by the United
States to lower tariffs in exchange for policy reforms is a quite similar form of coercion
(Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett 2007: 454). The use of structural adjustment programs
by the International Monetary Fund is another case where specific states are hard-pressed
to apply specific policies. Faced with the need to get financial help, many developing
countries have in effect been forced to implement economic reforms following a neoliberal
agenda elaborated in Washington (Gilardi 2012: 466).
While also based on the use of material resources, competition works indirectly. It
occurs when policies in one jurisdiction risk to create externalities in another and force it
to change its policy accordingly. For example, Beth Simmons and Zachary Elkins (2004)
maintains that the adoption of financial liberalization policies in one developing countries
can lead its neighbours to adopt a similar policy for fear of losing out international
investments9. A similar, but perhaps more positive, logic is at play with the now famous
“trading-up” phenomenon described by David Vogel (1995). According to it, private firms
often end up applying regulations of big markets as they prefer to follow one set of rules.
Originally developed to discuss the impact of California laws on other American states,
it is now often used to qualify the normative power of the European Union and dubbed
the ‘Brussels’ effect’ (Bradford 2012, 2020; Damro 2015). It is here worthwhile to note
that competition has also been seen as pushing towards greater divergence rather than
convergence in the organizational literature. Michael Hannan and John Freeman (1977;
1989) most famously pointed out that organizations often aimed to ‘survive’ by finding
‘niches’ and differentiating themselves from others.
9As discussed extensively by Lauge Poulsen (2016), this is a particularly good example of bounded
rationality as policy officials in many countries were blind to the high risks that these liberalization
policies entailed.
38
As opposed to both coercion and competition, learning is an ideational process by
which someone directly learns new evidence and change his belief accordingly (Dobbin,
Simmons and Garrett 2007: 460). It can both take the form of a rational bayesian or
socialization process. According to the first one, an actor will update his knowledge
based on someone else’s actions (also called vicarious learning). States can, for example,
evaluate the results from the adoption of a specific policy in another jurisdiction. As
Frank Dobbin and his colleagues (2007) point out, Tatcherism can be seen as a natural
experiment on the impact of privatization of public institutions. Meanwhile, socialization
“is less choice-driven” than what is portrayed in a Bayesian model of learning (Lavenex
2014: 890). Following the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (see Checkel 2005), it is considered
that as actors get more information about a specific policy, they learn more about its
normative value and decide to implement it for this reason. Nongovernmental channels,
like advocacy networks and epistemic communities, are often recognized as important
actors in such a process.
Finally, emulation is both an ideational and indirect process. Here, I slightly
diverge in my definition of this mechanism than other prominent scholars that define it
in very similar terms to the process of socialization just mentioned. Sandra Lavenex for
example distinguishes emulation from socialization by the actors involved. Socialization
occurs when states representatives are directly involved, while emulation is an indirect
process that occurs when non-governmental actors are involved (2014: 891-2). For his
part, Fabrizio Gilardi (2012) defines emulation exactly as Lavenex defines socialization
and dissociates the latter from a learning process. Meanwhile, Frank Dobbin and his
colleagues (2007: 450) largely subsume socialization and emulation together as being
part of a constructivist approach to diffusion. These discrepancies importantly illustrate
that both socialization and emulation are driven by ideational factors and not material
ones. The difference that I draw between the two is however around the absence of direct
or “point-to-point” interactions between the actors that are behind the diffusion (Meyer
and Strang 1993; Meyer 2000). While socialization implies a direct relation, emulation
describes a situation where an actor simply decides to adopt the policies promoted in
another jurisdiction because of cultural linkages, close normative proximity, or similar
economic circumstances. The institutionalization of similar theories or analytical cat-
egories can similarly support the emulation or “isomorphism” of the policies adopted
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). By its very nature, this mechanism is hard to verify empir-
ically as it is supposed to occur without having any apparent or visible link. It has thus
been often used to explain diffusion when other mechanisms do not seem to hold. David
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Strang and John Meyer precisely justify this approach by arguing that the diffusion of
many important policies (e.g., Keynesian economic planning or privatization) need to be
understood in light of “levels of international interaction and interdependence [that] are
not self-evidently high, relative to national or local settings” (1993: 490).
Altogether, the diffusion literature has been particularly good at identifying mech-
anisms playing a role in the diffusion of policies across borders. Here presented separately,
it should be noted that they often coexist and this has often meant that each mechanism
has been quite difficult to disentangle from the others, with some negatively concluding
that different scholars often ended “attributing identical phenomena to different mech-
anisms” (Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett 2007: 462) or stating that “empirical evidence
usually is ambiguous and unable to discriminate convincingly among these different ex-
planations” (Gilardi 2010: 650). Rather than viewing them as competing hypotheses,
they can however also be seen as mechanisms that reinforce each other, both simulta-
neously and over time. Paul Dimaggio and Walter Powell (1983) for example talk of
“coercive isomorphism” to highlight that similar ideas institutionalized at the state or
dominant organizations-level can then be directly imposed on others. Putting aside the
difficult question of integration and development of cumulative knowledge, the diffusion
literature was an important step in the study of policy interdependence. It notably
goes further than the market power explanation by highlighting the existence of multiple
pathways of influence working both through public and private actors. Most concepts
associated with the four mechanisms just reviewed will actually be used throughout this
research. At the same time, it did not succeed in fully integrating what interdependence
has meant for the process of rule formation in different jurisdictions.
There was first a tendency to focus on the diffusion of large policies (Lütz 2011).
Many diffusion studies looked at how regulatory capitalism, privatization policies, or
models of bilateral investment agreements were spreading across the world (Elkins, Guz-
man and Simmons 2006; Jordana and Levi-Faur 2005; Simmons and Elkins 2004). This
tends to obfuscate the fact that interactions now occur at many regulatory levels and that
diffusion does not have to be limited to such broad policies. Similar rules can actually
be adopted by regulators following different regulatory approaches. This is notably what
will be seen in chapter 5 while discussing at greater length the case of privacy regula-
tion. The time factor is also quickly brushed aside in many diffusion studies. The main
argument concerning time is that diffusion will often take an S-shaped form with few
adopters in the early days of an innovation followed by a significant rise in their numbers
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and a few late adopters (Gray 1973). In most diffusion studies, the specific period of
time where policies are quickly spreading is the dependent variable. How the patterns of
influence and interactions themselves evolve throughout time are often not considered.
Concomitantly, the relation between specific agents and the structure of interac-
tions is taken to be fixed. You either have one actor influencing another through a given
structure of interaction or the broader structure influencing one given actor at a specific
point in time. How they each influence their evolution is disregarded. This is linked
with the most important blind spot of this literature, which is that it tends to present
a unidirectional picture. Feedback situations where one actor would be influenced and
later on be the ‘influencer’ are rarely if ever discussed. Similarly, how the diffusion of
certain policies would affect the development of future policies is also outside their an-
alytical framework. Only quite recently, research in this field has started to question
how institutional or organizational novelty emerge (Padgett and Powell 2012). All of
this reflects the conscious effort to simplify the real world and build a simple account of
how interdependence affects the adoption of policies worldwide. This is in line with the
traditional ‘Newtonian approach’ of science, which has come to dominate both natural
and social sciences. As I will now argue, adopting a complex system approach would
allow us to overcome these limitations and offer a more complete understanding of how
interdependence affects the process of rule formation.
2.5 Taking Interdependence Seriously: A Complex System
Approach
Following in the footsteps of economists (Ma 2007; Varoufakis 1998), students of world
politics and international political economy have for quite some time adopted a ‘Newto-
nian’ or classical mechanic model. According to the latter, the world is akin to a clocklike
machine that can be torn apart for analytical purposes (Bousquet and Curtis 2011). The
‘clock metaphor’ is significant. A clock is not a simple object and many people would
have a hard time building or repairing one. However, it can be relatively easily split up
into individual parts and the effect of one part on the other is linear (i.e., proportionate
and constant). A clock is also (in theory) a closed environment, which means that its
inner working is not affected by the outside world. Following this view, the study of
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political systems traditionally aims to explain deterministic or probabilistic laws, which
can be uncovered by looking at the relation between discrete elements (or variables).
Among international scholars, Kenneth Waltz probably most forcefully made the
case for such an approach. In his seminal work Theory of International Politics (1979),
he argued that any rigorous and scientific theory should explain laws. Just as the natu-
ral world, he viewed the social world as operating according to permanent regularities.
According to him, theories should thus have “predictive power” (Waltz 1979: 69) as
they fundamentally describe relations that should continuously repeat themselves. With
that in mind, Waltz interestingly recognized that his theory should not be expected to
successfully explain why state X chooses foreign policy Y at a specific point in time.
According to him, this would be akin to ask the theory of gravitation to explain the
fall of a leaf, which simply do not operate at the same level of generality (Waltz 1979:
121). As abstract constructs, theories should be able to explain and predict broad trends
but not necessarily specific cases. This is a fair point. At the same time, his metaphor
of the falling leaf highlights yet another issue of expecting theories to have a predictive
capacity: the open nature of both natural and social systems. The falling leaf does not
fall to the ground at the time predicted by the theory of gravitation found in a laboratory
as other factors affect it (e.g., the wind). The same is true in social systems. Some could
argue that this only means that more variables need to be accounted for, but this would
actually mean mapping out how different variables interact together and form a system
that shapes the outcome as this research precisely argues.
The market power explanation previously reviewed is a more recent example of
the adoption of this ‘Newtonian’ or mechanic view. To understand how global rules are
formed, it models a world where powerful actors – again, jurisdictions with large internal
markets – can mechanically force others to adopt their policy preferences. The market
size of country A thus has the same effect on country B or C. Moreover, the decision of
country B to adopt the policy preference of country A is considered to have no impact on
the choice of country C. The time at which country B or C decide to adopt their policy
is similarly viewed as irrelevant. These reflect two important assumptions embedded
in the use of a linear model in the market power explanation: unit homogeneity and
independence (Hoffmann and Riley Jr. 2002: 307). The former means that the effect of
a variable will be constant in different contexts and over time, and the latter that the
dependent variables do not affect each other or the independent variable.
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This does not reflect the fact that international governance systems are increas-
ingly “complex governance systems” (Kahler 2016: 827). Amandine Orsini and her col-
leagues define complex systems as “open systems - that is, [they exchange] information
with their environment - that include multiple elements (units) of various types intricately
interconnected with one another and operating at various levels” (2019: 3). As opposed
to the ‘clockwork metaphor’, this characterization emphasizes the dynamic and evolutive
nature of global governance systems. Rather than being in a steady-state at any point
in time, they are always changing according to the interactions between their constitu-
tive elements and their environment. Without labeling it a complex system approach,
James Rosenau (1990; 1995; 1997; 2005) was among the first to adopt it in international
studies. In his work, he notably coined the term ‘fragmegration’ to indicate that global
governance was in a constant process of becoming more fragmented and integrated all at
the same time. He considered that the multiplication of actors, rules, institutions, and
decision-making procedures were pushing for more fragmentation, but that their growing
number of interactions also made the world more integrated than ever.
While most would probably agree that viewing global governance systems in this
light is probably closer to reality than viewing them as mechanical machines, it is gen-
erally maintained that it is counterproductive to do so. As a leading proponent of this
view, Richard Baldwin bluntly holds “that taking account of everything lets you under-
stand nothing... [simplification] is all in the good cause of allowing a careful and complete
examination of the main economic logic that links principal factors ” (2016: 177). This is
actually a reformulation of Bonini’s paradox, sometimes also called the map paradox10,
which states that “as a model grows more realistic, it also becomes just as difficult to
understand as the real-world processes it represents” (Dutton and Starbuck 1971: 4).
Following this line of thought, many indeed argued that simple explanations should al-
ways be preferred to more complicated ones. In their seminal contribution, Gary King,
Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba maintain that “we should attempt to formulate the-
ories that explain as much possible with as little as possible” (1994: 104). These ideas
are notably at the core of many rational choice theories that can sometimes even end up
promoting simplification over accuracy (Green and Shapiro 1996: 191).
10This second denomination is based on the Lewis Caroll’s character Mein Herr in his novel Sylvie and
Bruno who bragged about making a map of the size of the world and yet is forced to admit that it is
never used as farmers complaint it would hide the sun. In the end, he says that they now use the world
as the map itself and that it works just as well.
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A complex system approach importantly does not entirely reject the need for
simplification. Despite its name and obvious intent to capture a greater part of the
world complexities, a complexity-based approach “simplifies too [and it] has to, because
it is a product of the simplifying human mind” (Morçöl 2012: 7). Building a model that
would include all aspects of world politics is in effect both impossible and useless. To be
fair, it is partly why Rosenau’s original work was not taken up by more researchers. His
embrace of the complex nature of global governance was often so broad that his readers
were often left with the idea that every society was interpenetrated by multiple channels
of interactions, but it was not always clear how this, in turn, affected global politics. Here,
an important distinction should be drawn between simple and parsimonious explanations.
While parsimony is sometimes understood as synonymous to simplicity, it is actually
better to see it as describing “explanatory models that are no more complicated than they
need to be” (Elman and Elman 2003: 236; emphasis added). In that regard, complexity
approaches are actually not antinomic to parsimony.
Scholars adopting a complex system approach to study the evolution of legal
systems indeed do not attempt to integrate every factors that can be playing a role (Kim
2013; Morin, Pauwelyn and Hollway 2017; Pauwelyn 2014; Puig 2014; Ruhl, Katz and
Bommarito 2017). The main insight that they share is that complex systems display
properties that can only be understood when looked as a whole. The idea famously
encapsulated in the dictum “the whole is different than the sum of its parts”11 is that
“patterns, processes, or properties arise from interactions among the elements of the
system” (Orsini et al. 2019: 3). In other words, there are emergent properties that can
only be understood by considering the interactions that tie a system together. The point
is thus not to incorporate the full complexity of the world, but to recognize the dynamic
and interactive nature of many social processes.
The new interdependence approach developed by Henry Farrell and Abraham
Newman (2014; 2016; 2019a) is a prominent and recent example of how such complexity
thinking can be applied in international political economy. As indicated by Thomas
Oatley, their approach aims to endogenize “the evolution of global rules as a function of
the interaction between globalization and domestic politics” (2019: 10). In their work,
they more precisely distantiate themselves from the previous interdependence literature
(Keohane and Nye 1974; Nye and Keohane 1971), which progressively came to see the
11The expression ‘the whole is greater (or more) than the sum of its parts’ has more often been
used, but it actually came from an erroneous translation of the original German expression, which can
wrongfully “call up images of metaphysical holism” (Jervis 1997: 12-13).
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concept of interdependence as an external shock needing to be managed. Instead, they
“begin from the assumption that increasing globalization [...] creates a condition of rule
overlap” (Farrell and Newman 2019a: 27; emphasis in the original). From this specific
condition of rule overlap emerges opportunity structures – that is, institutions allowing
actors to collaborate and advance their interests – that allow both state and non-state
actors to promote their preferred rules on the global stage. Based on the access that
specific actors have to transnational forums and their preferences toward their domestic
institutions, Farrell and Newman differentiate four strategies (Defend and extend; Cross-
national layering; Insulate; and Challenge) that public and private actors can adopt.
The present research largely agrees with the new interdependence approach. Just
like the latter, it sees globalization as creating a situation of rule overlap that acts as a
structure conditioning the adoption of global rules. It also appreciates the focus on how
this specific structure changes the strategies of state and non-state actors. The proximity
of complexity-based approaches with ecological and organic metaphors can sometimes
lead to losing sight of who are the agents and what do they want. In his presentation of
a political economy of complex interdependence, Oatley (2019) rightfully mentions that
the main scientific metaphor of complexity-based approaches is evolutionary biology. This
however leads him to argue that the main unit of analysis is the system itself. Previous
complexity scholars have however emphasized that complexity approaches actually want
to “comprehend the relations between the whole and the parts” (Morin 2007: 10). It is
neither the system nor the actors that are the main unit of analysis, but their interactions.
Having said that, the new interdependence approach does not achieve everything
it aims to. First of all, it does not actually explain the evolution of global rules as
Oatley holds (2019: 10). In reality, what it explains is how various actors choose differ-
ent strategies to advance or block institutional change in an interdependent world. The
explanation of how rules are created or adopted is outside the scope of their research.
Moreover, and contrary to what Farrell and Newman originally claim, the context of
rule overlap created by the globalization of the world economy is to a large extent taken
as exogenous. In effect, the main independent variable is not the structure created by
globalization, but an actor’s access to transnational forums and institutional preferences.
While they maintain that this structure is not fixed or in equilibrium, they do not ex-
plain how it evolves or how actors interact with it over time, and it quickly becomes a
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contextual factor. Their research also ends up being relatively static12 as they look at
how opportunity structures at one specific point in time are mobilized by specific actors.
By looking specifically into the process of rule formation, this research intends to
complement the new interdependence approach by providing a better understanding of
how rules are created in the first place. The institutional overlap identified by Farrell and
Newman is hereafter considered to be equivalent to a structure enabling and constraining
public and private regulators creating and adopting rules. This structure is just as in
Farrell and Newman’s work not considered to be permanent. It is persistent, as it does not
evolve rapidly (Oatley 2019: 3), but it is never in a static equilibrium. In addition, this
research will particularly emphasize that while different, the structure and the agents
are not distinct from each other (Cudworth and Hobden 2015). They co-constitute
themselves. By creating new relations, public and private actors actively shape the
structure of interactions that in turn influence their own regulatory decisions. To ensure
that this research does not become indeterminate, though, their effect on each other will
be analyzed separately and time will constantly be used as a kind of control variable.
Hereafter, I follow John Padgett and Walter Powell’s view that: “In the short run, actors
create relations; in the long run, relations create actors.” (2012: 2).
I more specifically argue that the relations or social interactions between public
and private actors adopting privacy regulations create two joint processes that influence
their regulatory decisions: “exploitation” and “exploration” (Duit and Galaz 2008; March
1991; Morin, Pauwelyn and Hollway 2017). These two processes first enunciated in
organizational studies hold that organizations will tend to adapt to their environment by
either exploiting “old certainties” or exploring “new possibilities” based on their previous
interactions (March 1991: 71). These two concepts closely reflect those of selection
and variation traditionally found in evolutionary studies according to which survival
is determined by selecting existing practices or slight adaptation to new circumstances
(Ashby 1960; Hannan and Freeman 1977, 1989). The terms exploitation and exploration
are hereafter preferred as they tend to give a more active role to individual actors. While
always influenced by their social interactions and the broader structure that they are part
of, they are the ones that decide to ‘exploit’ preexisting resources or ‘explore’ new ones.
The evolutionary terminology can otherwise introduce a “passive-voice functionalism”
that can often come up in system and structural analyses (Kahler 2016: 828).
12To be fair, they do discuss how specific opportunity structures come to be, but it’s largely a historical
account that is external to their main argument.
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In the context of this research, these two emergent processes more specifically
mean that public and private actors adopting privacy regulations will decide to either
use the same rules as the actors with which they have had previous interactions or to use
these exchanges to develop new ones. The process of adopting or creating rules is always
understood in relational terms. Importantly, this means that the dependent variable for
this research is the content or the characteristics of the rules ending up being adopted.
This contrasts with the diffusion literature for which the dependent variable was the
mechanism through which rules were diffused, not their characteristics (Knill 2005). On
this point, it is thus closer to the literature on policy convergence (Bennett 1992), which
aimed to explain the growing similarity in policies adopted in various jurisdictions. Yet,
instead of only focusing on the growing similarity between policies, it also looks at what
creates more diversity by also looking at the process of exploration. Both the exploitation
and exploration processes will be further developed in chapter 4 before being individually
reviewed to explain the evolution of privacy regulation in the transatlantic space over
the last 20 years in chapter 5 and 6.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I argued that the process of rule formation is not merely driven by public
actors nor purely national. Up to now, these assumptions were however, to different
degrees, at the heart of the dominant explanations looking at this question. This was
most specifically seen when reviewing the ‘market power explanation’ (Drezner 2007),
which basically maintains that countries with large internal markets will succeed in uni-
laterally exporting their regulatory standards when interacting with smaller states, but
not when faced with other great economic power. This largely fails to explain why as this
research will hereafter highlight data protection rules in the United States and the Euro-
pean Union grew increasingly similar over the years. It moreover does not consider how
their respective regulatory frameworks evolved through their interactions. This reflects
the theoretical choice behind the market power explanation of significantly minimizing
the role of private actors in regulatory debates as well as disregarding the significantly
transnational interactions that may connect two jurisdictions.
Discussing the literature on private authority and policy diffusion, I pointed out
how previous contributions have already made important headways in taking better ac-
count of these variables. Looking first at the literature on private authority, I emphasized
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that there is now a flurry of evidence in support of the argument that private actors con-
tribute to the regulation of various issue-areas. In addition to help implement public
rules, they often work to devise their own set of rules. Yet, it is not like states had
disappeared or were even in retreat (Strange 1996). Even when private actors act in an
‘entrepreneurial’ fashion to use Jessica Green’s (2013b) terminology, they will often, if
not always, build on public rules and requirements. Such regulatory layering (Bartley
2011) and the interactions between public and private regulators that support it (Eber-
lein et al. 2014; Gulbrandsen 2014) are in turn key to understand the process of how rules
are formed and evolve through time, which is what I will aim to explain in the remainder
of this research.
I subsequently reviewed how the literature on policy diffusion had up to now
tried to explain the impact of international interactions on national policies. After hav-
ing discussed the different mechanisms that had been put forward in this literature, I
maintained that it did not consider how their interactions were transforming national
regulatory systems over time. Diffusion mechanisms were more specifically presented as
creating an external pressure at a very specific point in time and in a linear fashion.
They were yet not seen as creating a broader structure shaping the process of rule for-
mation in an interactive fashion as it itself evolves. This generally led diffusion studies to
focus on explosive moments where policies quickly spread rather than on the incremental
changes pushing towards greater convergence. It also means that they did not consider
how interactions between actors in different jurisdictions could also become a source of
further regulatory change and novelty.
Taking stock of these discussions, I argued in favour of adopting a complex sys-
tem approach to understand how rules are formed between interdependent jurisdictions.
The latter starts from the assumption that interactions between the different parts of a
system create patterns that can only be understood when looking at them as a whole.
In the context of the regulation of privacy in the United States and studied here, this
means that the interactions between public and private actors in the two jurisdictions
will influence their respective process of rule formation through two joint processes: ‘ex-
ploitation’ and ‘exploration’. The former emphasizes that privacy regulators will gener-
ally tend to exploit the data protection rules of those with whom they previously had
direct interactions. Meanwhile, the latter highlights that when preexisting rules prove
to be insufficient, privacy regulators will explore new ones based on their very same in-
teractions and relation to the broader system. This moves beyond the traditional ‘clash
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of systems’ that is often at the heart of global regulatory debates and posits that the
multiple ties and connections between different legal systems are a source of regulatory
change, rather than a mere contest for influence.
In the next chapters, I will now use this theoretical framework to explain how
data protection rules have evolved in the United States and the European Union since
1995. I start by sketching how these two joint processes have supported two seemingly
contradicting trends. As public and private actors have tended to exploit the same data
protection rules, I point out that it supported a process of regulatory convergence by
which both jurisdictions grew more alike in terms of the rules that they each promote.
At the same time, I show that the exploration of new data protection rules limited this
very trend and actually contributed to create more divergence over the years. While
partly offsetting each other, I importantly emphasize that these dual processes built on
each other and were both essential to ensure that the regulation of privacy continued to
evolve over time. I also highlight the significant influence that private actors have come
to have through these two joint processes. But before going there, the next section will
review the origins of the regulation of privacy in both jurisdictions and discuss how they
relate to each other. This first essential step will then allow me to justify the use of




The Transatlantic Privacy System:
A Tale of Two Opposites?
Privacy is doomed... Get used to it!
The Economist, 1999
Debates over privacy have long roots in western societies. Despite regular com-
ments to the effect that the United States still lacks a “comprehensive system” (Newman
2008: 32) or an “omnibus law” (Solove and Schwartz 2011: 1062) to regulate privacy like
the European Union does, the American legal system has provided privacy protections
to its citizens for years. As a matter of fact, the earliest enunciation of a right to privacy
came not from Europe, but from the United States. Back in 1890, legal scholar Samuel
Warren and later-Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis famously published an article
arguing that all American citizens had a natural “right to be let alone”.
Since this first formulation, the concept of privacy has dramatically evolved both
in the United States and Europe. A key element to emphasize is that this evolution
obviously did not happen in a vacuum and was “deeply intertwined with the history of
technology” (Gasser 2016: 61). As new information technologies were developed, social
perceptions of what the private sphere should look like have fluctuated. Calls to the
effect that privacy will or should disappear as the one formulated by the well-known
journal The Economist cited in epigraph to this chapter are not new. At the time of
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writing their article in 1890, Warren and Brandeis were precisely aiming to safeguard
“the sacred precincts of private and domestic life” which they saw as being endangered
by “recent inventions and business methods” (Warren and Brandeis 1890: 195). The
development of instantaneous photography and “yellow press”1 were particularly seen as
allowing the distribution of information like never before and thereby raising the risk to
“make good the prediction that what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from
the house-tops” (Warren and Brandeis 1890: 195).
In recent decades, new information technologies have continuously challenged our
conception of privacy. In the 60s, the rising use of computers by governments questioned
the ability of individuals to control how their information was used and shared by public
agencies (Solove 2004). In the 90s, the commercialization of the Internet then made clear
that privacy discussions needed to look more at the role of private companies, which were
at the time starting to collect “[p]ersonal information about on-line consumers, such as
buying habits and web-surfing preferences” (Haufler 2001: 87). And now, the devel-
opment of algorithms and new data analytics’ methods is pushing this last trend even
further. The capacity to recombine multiple types of information coming from multiple
sources makes it more and more difficult to distinguish what is or not personal informa-
tion. One data point that could in the past be considered non-personal or anonymized
can in effect be used to “map so-called patterns of life” (Amoore 2014: 109). A recent
New York Times investigation specifically showed how the daily collection of hundreds
of supposedly anonymized location data points by applications on our cellphones allowed
various companies to easily identify us and get an extremely accurate picture of our lives
(Valentino-Devries et al. 2018).
As all these innovative technologies were appearing, privacy rules did not stand
still. Regulators in both the European Union and the United States worked hard to
ensure that their citizens keep a minimal level of protection against intrusions in their
private life. Importantly, these regulations should not be viewed as merely responding
to the periodic apparition of new ‘technological threats’. In many ways, they determine
the nature of future technological innovations and the potential problems they will raise
by allowing or limiting different types of activity. As one interviewee for this research
pointed out, the exponential growth of web-based data collection methods is a direct
product of policy choices that were made in the early days of the Internet:
1A form of journalism criticized for aiming to be sensationalist rather than factual that came to
prominence with the diminution of printing costs.
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They [web-based data collection methods] are based on a policy mistake made years
ago. In the 1990s, there was a sense that things needed to be more interactive and
with the creation of personal web browsers almost immediately came the concept of
cookie. The idea was that the Internet would be free with advertising, but as soon
as you advertise you need to know who you are advertising to and thus the need for
the development of third-party cookies. (Interview E37, done on May 6th, 2019)
Since the mid-1990s, the way that both the United States and the European
Union decided to regulate privacy has significantly diverged. As mentioned, the United
States is often criticized for its continuous “lack of [a] comprehensive baseline privacy
legislation” at the federal level (O’Connor, Lange and Lange 2015: 22). As of now, it
still relies on a number of laws that offer privacy guarantees to specific economic sectors
(e.g., finance and health) or vulnerable individuals (e.g., children). In contrast, since the
adoption of the Data Directive in 1995, the European Union has had a clear set of rules
protecting the privacy of its citizens with regards to data collection and processing by
both public and private actors2.
Because of this, the United States is generally seen as lagging behind Europe in
terms of privacy regulation. It is assumed that the United States will one day have to
adopt a European-like comprehensive legislation. Instead of focusing on the questions of
which regulatory system is normatively superior to the other, this research again aims
to understand how their interactions have affected the development of data protection
rules in both jurisdictions. Adopting the view that the European Union and the United
States represent two privacy systems fundamentally opposed to each other, previous
contributions have tended to question the capacity of one to export its regulatory model
to the other (Bessette and Haufler 2001; Long and Quek 2002; Drezner 2007; Newman
and Posner 2015). While disagreeing on the success of this effort, their analytical choice
to describe them as two ideal-types of privacy regulation made them largely fail to see
how both jurisdictions have continuously influenced each other.
In this chapter, I start to depart from these ‘clash of systems’ arguments and
highlight that both the European and American privacy models are based on a common
liberal paradigm. While their conceptions of privacy do differ, they basically agree that
what they aim to protect is an individual’s capacity to control the use of his or her
personal information. This importantly means that at their heart they are not “two
fundamentally incompatible [privacy] frameworks” (Chander, Kaminski and McGeveran
2Before 1995, several European countries had already adopted this comprehensive approach as it is
well described by Newman (2008).
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2020: 24) and that they can exchange and influence each other as they notably share a
common background and language to do so. This is an essential condition for the complex
system approach that I introduced in chapter 2 and that will be further developed in
chapter 4 onward. Indeed, if there was absolutely no point of agreement between them
they would more closely approximate the two rivals as often depicted in the literature.
In the next section, I begin by introducing the liberal paradigm and basic concept of
privacy followed by regulators in the United States and the European Union. From there,
I review how the American came to be seen as promoting a market-based approach and
the European Union a rights-based approach. I then show how in practice neither reflect
these ideal-types and actually have a lot in common. I conclude by highlighting how this
offered important opportunities for interactions among the transatlantic partners.
3.1 Privacy as a Concept: From a Negative to a Positive
Right
What information should be part of the public or private sphere is a question that has long
been debated. Even before the publication of Warren and Brandeis’ paper on a “right to
be let alone”, early liberal thinkers like John Stuart Mill reflected on the “public\private
dichotomy to determine when society should regulate individual conduct” (Solove and
Schwartz 2011: 41). The fact is that at its heart the concept of privacy intersects with our
basic understanding of how individuals should live in society. Thinking about privacy
forces us to reflect on the very value we attribute to individuality. Different societies
unsurprisingly came up with markedly different answers to this question. In Asia, for
one, the relation between the individual and the collective has often been understood
differently than in the Western world (Ess 2005). As Yao-Huai points out, the concept of
private information was long associated in China with a “shameful secret” (2005: 8). In
Thailand, the concept of privacy was similarly often seen in a negative light and a form
of “possessive individualism” (Privacy International 2012: 4; see also Kitiyadisai 2005).
Importantly, this does not mean that privacy is only a Western construct. A
distinction between public and private sphere of activities generally appears to have
been part of most societies (Moore 1984). In many Asian countries, the concept of
“saving face” (i.e., respecting one’s honor) is for example historically associated with a
duty of not interfering with the private or familial affairs of others (Kitiyadisai 2005).
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The main difference is actually where the line has tended to be drawn and, in that
respect, the United States and the European Union share a strong philosophical root3.
Although often presented as opposites, they both follow a liberal privacy paradigm,
which reifies human individuality. In effect, both start from the assumption that society
is composed of “relatively autonomous individuals”, which are generally assumed to be
able to determine their interests (Bennett and Raab 2006: 4). Society is seen as nothing
more than the sum of the individuals it represents. Following this atomistic view of the
world, a clear distinction is drawn “between the individual and other individuals, and
between the individual and the state” (Bennett and Raab 2006: 4). The respect of the
ensuing boundary is originally what privacy is about in both Europe and the United
States.
Before going any further, an important clarification is needed. In privacy debates
across the Atlantic, there is often confusion between what is privacy and data protection.
To make things more blurry, it is common in the United States to talk of “information
privacy law” for what in Europe is generally called “data protection law”4 (Schwartz and
Peifer 2017: 122). As a general legal concept, privacy refers to the basic human right
internationally recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (Bauman et al. 2014: 132).
In Europe, the right to privacy is furthermore enshrined in the European Convention on
Human Rights of 1950 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of
2000 (Bellanova and De Hert 2009). While the American constitution does not explicitly
include the respect of privacy as a fundamental right, the Supreme Court of the United
States has in the past argued that such a right was present in its “penumbras” or “zones
of shades” (Solove and Schwartz 2011: 35). The Fourth Amendment was most notably
recognized by the Supreme court as primarily aiming to protect the right to privacy of
American citizens (Bellanova and De Hert 2009: 70).
Meanwhile, “information privacy” or “data protection” refers to the body of law
that deals specifically with how personal information5 should be used and shared to
respect basic privacy principles. In judicial terms, it is the lex specialis that deals with the
3A full discussion of the meaning and impact of the cultural differences over privacy is outside the
scope of this research, but it should be noted that privacy cultures are not static and that important
changes have been ongoing in many countries around the world for a long time (Bygrave 2004; Ess 2005).
4Data protection is actually derived from the German expression Datenschutz (Bennett and Raab
2006: 8).
5This research considers the expressions “personal information” and “personal data” to be synonymous
and will use them interchangeably.
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information that our activities generate on a daily basis. How that specific body of rules
has evolved through the interactions between the European and American jurisdictions
is again the main question of this research. For now, though, my aim in this chapter is
to examine to what extent the regulatory approaches adopted in the European Union
and the United States actually differ from each other in light of their respective privacy
conceptions.
According to their joint liberal viewpoint, privacy guarantees are supposed to en-
sure that free and rational individuals have sufficient personal space to realize themselves.
It should moreover be a space in which other individuals or the state refrain from intrud-
ing. In John Stuart Mill’s work, the dichotomy between the public and private sphere
was specifically used to determine when an individual’s activities should be subject to
public regulation or not. The “right to be let alone” enunciated by Warren and Brandeis
follows the same logic. In its essence, it is a negative obligation that requires individuals
to abstain from interfering with the private space of other individuals. Governments are
similarly expected not to take any actions that would violate this individual right to
privacy. In the end, “the protection of society must come mainly through a recognition
of the rights of the individual” (Warren and Brandeis 1890: 219-20).
Over the years, the right to privacy however became understood in more positive
terms. As more and more information could be collected, analyzed, and shared, it became
difficult to sustain the illusion that individuals could easily maintain a strict boundary
between their public and private life. The rise of computers and the growth of personal
record-keeping activities by governments in the 50s and 60s particularly challenged this
early view. Relatively vague definitions of privacy emphasizing the obligation of not
intruding in anyone’s private life were quickly becoming pointless (Rule 2009: 23). Alan
Westin is generally recognized for the modern redefinition of the concept of privacy as
“the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how,
and to what extent information about them is communicated to others” (1967: 7). From
there, privacy has increasingly been seen not as the capacity to limit access to ourselves
but to decide how personal information gathered from us is used. As Charles Fried wrote
one year after Westin:
At first approximation, privacy seems to be related to secrecy, to limiting the knowl-
edge of others about oneself. This notion must be refined. It is not true, for instance,
that the less that is know about us the more privacy we have. Privacy is not simply
an absence of information about what is in the minds of others; rather it is the
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control we have over information about ourselves. (Cited in Solove and Schwartz
2011: 47)
This “privacy as control” approach importantly played a crucial role in the formu-
lation of the first clear set of privacy rules in the 70s. Leading the way, the United States
Department of Health, Education and Welfare adopted the first official report indicating
that individuals should have the capacity to influence how information about them is
used and disclosed. While not arguing that they should have complete control over their
personal information, the report maintained that “a record containing information about
an individual in identifiable form must [...] be governed by procedures that afford the
individual a right to participate in deciding what the content of the record will be and
what disclosure and use will be made of [it]” (U.S. Department of Health Education and
Welfare 1973: 41; emphasis added). To operationalize this, the report went on articulat-
ing what would become known as the Fair Information Practices. The latter was a set
of five basic principles that governments and private actors were expected to follow in
order to guarantee the privacy of individuals:
1. There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose very existence
is secret.
2. There must be a way for a person to find out what information about the
person is in a record and how it is used.
3. There must be a way for a person to prevent information about the person
that was obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other
purposes without the person’s consent.
4. There must be a way for a person to correct or amend a record of identifiable
information about the person.
5. Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of
identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their in-
tended use and must take precautions to prevent misuses of the data. (U.S.
Department of Health Education and Welfare 1973: 41)
Together, these five principles are still today at the heart of the regulatory ap-
proaches to privacy in both the United States and Europe. In 1974, the Privacy Act
adopted in the United States largely drew on them to determine how public agencies
should guarantee the privacy of American citizens in their dealings with them (Rule
2009: 24). The first wave of modern privacy laws adopted by European states, like Swe-
den, was also influenced by these very principles (Newman 2008: 25). These even ended
up being the core component of the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and
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Transborder Flows of Personal Data adopted in 1980, which are still today the closest
thing we have to a global agreement on the regulation of privacy (Solove and Schwartz
2011: 1062). This relative consensus however should not be overplayed. The OECD
guidelines represent a lowest common denominator more than anything else. Since their
adoption, “the scope of enforcement and implementation mechanisms has [moreover] var-
ied across countries, especially with regard to the private sector” (Newman 2008: 26).
As Europe took a more and more active role in the regulation of the use of personal
information by private actors, the United States still maintains a relatively hands-off
policy towards the private sector. Before looking into how the regulatory approaches in
these two areas have evolved since 1995, the next section will discuss how their respective
conceptions of privacy have moved apart while both following the same liberal paradigm.
3.2 The American and European Privacy Divide
Even though the United States and the European Union share a common liberal view of
privacy, whereby claims to privacy are made by relatively autonomous individuals, they
both significantly diverge in the degree to which they think governments should actively
oversee the use of personal information in the marketplace. The difference is such that
prominent privacy scholars stated “that we must acknowledge... that there are, on the
two sides of the Atlantic, two different cultures of privacy” (Solove and Schwartz 2011:
1066). Others have talked of the existence of a literal chiasmus between Europe and the
United States (Bellanova and De Hert 2009) and that both have merely been able to
“agree to disagree” (Bessette and Haufler 2001: 88).
This ‘cultural clash’ over the protection of privacy rests primarily on their opposi-
tion over “an essentially utilitarian logic of efficiency and a Kantian logic of rights” (Rule
2009: 27; see also Kobrin 2004). According to the former, the use of personal information
and more broadly surveillance by any entities should be evaluated against the benefits
they provide. It is “the total utility or pleasure generated by [their] use” (Rule 2009: 11),
which matters rather than the individual intrusion. The use of personal data by credit
agencies, health providers or even marketers can in other words be justified if it provides
individuals or our societies with sufficient benefits. Meanwhile, the rights logic embraces
the Kantian concept of ‘categorical imperatives’ and the idea that each individual has
fundamental rights that need to be respected in all circumstances. According to this
approach, no personal or group gains could justify any form of invasion of privacy. At a
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minimum, individuals have a fundamental right to decide how information about them
can be used by others.
In the United States, the utilitarian logic has especially grown in importance since
the 70s and the development of the influential law and economics movement. Emanating
from the Chicago School, this legal scholarship promoted the use of free-market views to
analyze and change various fields of law6. With regards to privacy, legal scholars adopting
this specific economic analysis of law centrally argued that it is just one of two economic
goods existing in the ‘information market’. For them, the natural desire of individuals
to conceal information about themselves only exists next to the equally natural interest
of other individuals for “casual prying [...] motivated, to a greater extent than we may
realize, by rational considerations of self-interest” (Posner 2009: 394).
This view fundamentally rests on the adoption of a pure rational choice model,
which assumes that access to as complete information as possible is essential for any
democracy and economy to prosper. Citing the former member of the Federal Reserve
Board Governor, Edward Gramlich, Fred Cate maintains that the more information is
available “the more accurately and efficiently will the economy meet [our] needs and
preferences” (2000: 882). By contrast, the more information is hidden, the more risks
there are of miscalculations or mistakes. Seen in this light, demands for privacy can
obviously even be seen negatively as they might produce sub-optimal outcomes. This is
nowhere near as evident as in Posner’s equation of privacy to an individual’s desire for
manipulation and misrepresentation:
It is no answer that such individuals have “the right to be let alone.” Very few people
want to be let alone. They want to manipulate the world around them by selective
disclosure of facts about themselves. Why should others be asked to take their
self-serving claims at face value and be prevented from obtaining the information
necessary to verify or disprove these claims? (Posner 1978: 400)
For him and other proponents of this economic analysis of law, any regulations
should “treat [privacy] preferences as a matter of individual taste, entitled to no more
(and often much less) weight than preferences for black shoes over brown or red wine
over white” (Cohen 2000: 1423). In line with their utilitarian logic, they do not consider
6Apart from privacy, antitrust is another field of law where the influence of the law and economics
movement has been particularly significant. Following the publication of The Antitrust Paradox (1978)
by Robert Borke, courts have progressively adopted a ‘consumer welfare standard’ to evaluate merger
and acquisitions. Based on a neoliberal theory of price, this specific standard is now criticized for having
allowed the rise of a new Gilded Age (Khan 2017; Wu 2018).
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privacy to have any intrinsic value. One’s preference for keeping information private
should in practice always be evaluated against another for having access to it. Individual
control over information and, by extension, privacy rights should in the end be allocated
to the individual or company that values it the most (Solove 2004: 78). Following
Ronald Coase’s theory of transaction costs, the question of privacy thus becomes one of
ownership allocation. Governments should merely set basic property rights and then let
the ‘information marketplace’ efficiently ensure that the appropriate level is achieved by
letting each individual freely decide which information they want to share based on their
own cost-benefit analysis. Information readily shared by individuals should not be seen
as private. Meanwhile, information collected by a company and seen as valuable when
kept secret should stay private.
As opposed to this market-based approach to privacy that has come to define
the American privacy regulatory framework, Europe has increasingly adopted a rights-
based approach (Schwartz and Peifer 2017; Simitis 1995). While also rooted in a liberal
paradigm, it starts from the very different assumption that privacy is not a matter of
preference but “of fair and just treatment of individuals” (Cohen 2000: 1423). It is
a fundamental right that has value for its own sake in a free and equal society. The
respect for privacy is nothing less than a question of human dignity and democracy, not
of managing an ‘information market’. As such, the law should primarily aim to set basic
conditions under which an individual’s information may be used, rather than establish
basic property rights.
Importantly, this does not mean that the concept of ownership is entirely alien to
a right-based approach. To the discontent of many privacy advocates, property rhetoric
often makes its way in public debates over privacy. The fact is that both the notions
of private and control that are central to any privacy discussions adopting the liberal
paradigm tend to create questions of data ownership. If any information is to be kept
out of the public’s eye and under the control of someone, it should be someone’s pri-
vate property the usual thinking goes. As Cohen interestingly points out, linguistically
speaking the word private notably means not ‘common’ and in other words not owned
by anyone else (Cohen 2000: 1379). The lack of non-ownership words to describe things
over which anyone has private control is precisely why property talk regularly pervades
rights-based discourse of privacy.
Talking of ownership according to a fundamental rights logic is however signifi-
cantly different than according to an utilitarian one. First and foremost, it rejects the
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commodification of personal information that is generally hidden behind ownership talks.
Property is in effect not seen as being over a tradable asset, but a fundamental element
of an individual’s personhood (Radin 1982). As such, the aim of talking about property
rights is not to solve market efficiency or to allow for personal information to be traded,
but to ensure human dignity. The allocation of rights is accordingly not based on the
instrumental value granted by an individual or a company to a specific piece of infor-
mation. It is rather attributed following a natural rights logic that considers that all
individuals have the right to own their personal information based on their fundamental
humanity (Solove 2004: 77). With that in mind, concepts of ownership are rarely pro-
moted by proponents of a rights-based approach to privacy. Doing so is generally seen
as a slippery slope towards the very commodification that it notably aims to escape.
Having now defined and contrasted the utilitarian and Kantian logic respectively
preferred in the United States and Europe, the next two sections will present in more
detail how they are each reflected in the regulatory approaches followed by both jurisdic-
tions since 1995. While doing so, it will retrace the main regulatory moments and actors
that shaped their evolution. This will then be used to emphasize in the last section that
in practice neither fully embrace the logic attributed to them. In effect, both recognize to
some extent that “people have some special rights over disposition of ‘their’ information”
(Rule 2009: 11). They also both give an important role to private actors and expect the
marketplace to contribute to the regulation of privacy.
3.3 The United States and the Marketplace for Privacy
since 1995
Contrary to what is sometimes portrayed in public debates, the American legal system
does offer privacy protections to its citizens. While they might be considered insufficient
(O’Connor, Lange and Lange 2015; Reidenberg 1992; Schwartz and Peifer 2017; Zuboff
2019), any analysis of the American regulatory approach towards privacy needs to start
by recognizing their existence. As pointed out above, the American Constitution has on
multiple occasions been considered to guard American citizens against various intrusions
in their private life by state agencies. Although no part of the Constitution specifically
mentions privacy7, various amendments that form the Bill of Rights have in effect been
7Some federal states, like Alaska and Florida, do specifically provide a right to privacy.
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understood by the US Supreme Court as providing Americans with a right to privacy.
In Katz v. United States (1967), the US Supreme Court for example established that
all Americans had a right to a reasonable expectation of privacy based on the Fourth
Amendment that prohibits unreasonable seizures and searches by public authorities. In
Roe v. Wade (1973), the Supreme Court also famously concluded that a woman had a
right to privately decide to terminate or not her pregnancy with her doctors based on the
Fourteenth Amendment guaranteeing due process. Other Amendments that have over
time been construed to give privacy guarantees to American citizens include the First
that protects the right of association and the Fifth that protects against self-incrimination
(Solove 2004: 62-3).
Next to these constitutional rights, the United States federal government also
adopted a number of statutory laws to govern the use of personal data. The Privacy
Act of 1974 chiefly ensures that all federal agencies apply the previously discussed Fair
Information Practices when dealing with the personal information of American citizens.
Accordingly, individuals can access their personal information held by the federal govern-
ment and request changes to it if necessary. This however does not cover the collection
and use of personal data by private entities. The latter indeed falls outside the purview
of this Act that only applies to federal agencies and leave private businesses to decide
for themselves what rules they should follow when dealing with personal information.
Various laws were passed since then to regulate their activities, but these significantly
remained limited to specific economic sectors or groups of individuals. Following the dis-
closure by journalists of the list of movies rented by the Supreme Court Justice nominee
Robert Borke, Congress for example adopted the Video Privacy Protection Act in 1988
to prohibit video renting companies to share information about what movies consumers
rent or buy (Solove 2004: 69).
Since 1995, sectoral laws were more specifically enacted to further limit the activ-
ities of private companies dealing with various types of personal data, including health
data, children data, financial data, marketing information, and credit scores. All these
laws and their respective years of adoption are summarized in table 3.1 below. Laws,
like the PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the CLOUD Act of 2018, that gave more surveillance
power to police forces were knowingly excluded as they were considered to primarily cre-
ate security exceptions rather than creating general privacy rules8. As can be seen, no
8The links between privacy and surveillance should not be understated. As security exceptions are
created, they can undermine privacy protections that citizens would have normally been entitled to. The
evolution of surveillance in both the United States and the European Union has, in turn, had significant
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laws were adopted after 2003. Amendments did periodically modify part of the preex-
isting rules, but no new major legislative acts were passed. As such, the use of personal
data in many economic sectors remains nowadays lightly regulated by public authorities
and industry self-regulation is expected to fill in the gaps.
Table 3.1 Main privacy laws adopted in the United States since 1995
1996 • Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
1998 • Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)
1999 • The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)
2003 • Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography And Marketing Act
(CAN-SPAM)
2003 • Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA)
This combination of laws providing relatively strong privacy protections for the
public sector, while “granting private-sector actors wide latitude in their use of personal
information” forms the heart of the American limited privacy regime (Newman 2008:
30). Rather than having one comprehensive regulation that covers both the public and
private sectors, the United States in effect relies on a patchwork of laws and private
rules to govern the use of personal data. This has importantly not meant that American
citizens have enjoyed no privacy protections or only those in the few sectoral laws just
mentioned. Starting in the mid-1990s, various types of industry self-regulations have
been adopted and extended the use of the Fair Information Practices to various economic
sectors.
Table 3.2 adds to the previous list of privacy laws all industry self-regulations
dealing with privacy adopted in the United States since 1995. These were importantly
identified based on an extensive review of preexisting research (Cavoukian and Cromp-
ton 2000; European Commission 2001a, 2012b; European Parliament 2012; Rodrigues
and Papkonstantinou 2018; Trzaskowski 2006) and only include documents that set out
how private companies should collect and use personal data. These do not include policy
documents setting out technical standards, like the Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standard, Mozilla’s ‘Do Not Track’ open standard or Internet protocols (cf. DeNardis
2009, 2014; Harcourt, Christou and Simpson 2020). Self-regulations adopted by transna-
consequences for their privacy regimes (see e.g., Chapter 2 in Farrell & Newman, 2019a). This is however
outside the scope of this research, which aims to understand how privacy rules have evolved in both the
United States and Europe, and not how their application has been affected by surveillance imperatives.
To put it somewhat differently, surveillance laws are not taken to be constitutive elements of the privacy
regulatory framework although they might affect it.
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tional private actors, like the International Chamber of Commerce or the Global Business
Dialogue on Electronic Commerce, were moreover excluded to focus on the regulations
that primarily aimed to oversee the American market9.
Table 3.2 Main industry self-regulations dealing with privacy adopted in the United States
since 1995
1997 • Individual Reference Services Group’s Principles
1997 • American Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ Webstrust Program
1997 • Better Business Bureau’s BBBOnline Privacy Program
1997 • Direct Marketing Association’s Ethical Business Practice
1997 • Internet Alliance’s Code of Conduct
1997 • TrustArc (then-named TRUSTe)
1999 • Online Privacy Alliance’s Guidelines
2000 • Electronic Commerce and Consumer Protection Group’s Guidelines
2000 • Entertainment Software Rating Board’s Privacy Online Principles
2000 • Network Advertising’s Code of Conduct
2000 • PricewaterhouseCoopers’ BetterWeb Standards
2001 • SquareTrade’s Seal Program
2004 • Entertainment Retailer Association’s Code of Conduct
2009 • Digital Advertising Alliance’s Behavioral Advertising Principles
2011 • Interactive Advertising Bureau’s Code of Conduct
2014 • Verasafe’s Privacy Program
As it can easily be seen, the number of privacy regulations significantly increase
as soon as we consider the ones adopted by private actors. A couple of patterns can
moreover be observed by looking at table 3.2. First, industry self-regulations never
stopped to be created. While their rate of adoption clearly slowed over time, new codes
of conduct or certification programs were continuously adopted. These are in addition to
the revisions made to early ones and are not listed in table 3.2. Just like national laws,
industry self-regulations will in effect be amended or adapted over the course of their
life. As such, the American regulatory approach towards privacy appears more dynamic
when considering industry self-regulation rather than only statutory laws. Second, most
of these private regulations were however created at the turn of the millennium just like
almost all statutory laws (see table 3.1 above). This reflects the heightened interest that
privacy came to take with the commercialization of the Internet (Rothchild 2016) and the
9Over the years some privacy programs, like TrustArc and Verasafe, have developed services for other
markets. They were however kept in the table as their most important source of activity remains in the
United States.
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first clash over this issue between the European Union and the United States following
the adoption of the European Directive (Farrell 2003; Kobrin 2004). This shows that
as public scrutiny was lower in the mid-2000s, the incentive for private actors to create
new regulations was also lower. Here, it must be noted that the demand for industry
self-regulation is not infinite and it is quite normal that as time passes fewer are being
created. Even more so as industry self-regulations adopted in the early 2000s were also
revised and updated as just indicated. Having said that, it is still noteworthy that new
regulations only appear as the public oversight by the FTC began to become stronger
after 2008 and when online advertising was again on the rise (Gellman and Dixon 2016).
One recurring argument for embracing the use of industry self-regulations is sig-
nificantly their supposed dynamism. For them, the complex and quickly evolving nature
of new data technologies can simply best be managed by letting private businesses regu-
late themselves.v Similar thoughts were held by interviewees for this research who were
supportive of self-regulation:
[T]he problem with legislation is that it takes a long time. It is not enough in a
world of fast-paced technological change. [...] In a fast innovative area, legislation
cannot keep up with the speed of technological development. [...] If it’s doing the
job you should let it go and not regulate it. (Interview E25, done on March 15th,
2019)
Traditionally speaking, states cannot easily manage cross-border regulatory
issues such as data which is fundamentally borderless. (Interview E27, done on
April 4th, 2019)
Given the complexity of the digital economy and the ubiquitousness of data,
[data protection authorities] simply do not have the means to do this alone.
(Interview E39, done on May 6th, 2019)
Such arguments should however be carefully considered and certainly not taken
at face value. While the regulation of new technologies can indeed present a challenge
to public regulators (Tene and Hughes 2014: 442), it is well exaggerated to maintain
that they are helpless in front of them. It is actually worth remembering that many
so-called disruptive innovations like computers or the Internet have been developed by
the public sector or in partnership with it (Mazzucato 2011; Spar 1999; Weiss 2014). Far
from being disconnected, public officials thus often have a good understanding of the
technological changes taking place at various points in time. Moreover, the adaptation
capacity and flexibility of private forms of regulations as compared to public ones is
often assumed more than empirically verified. As indicated above, the adoption of new
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regulations was rarely dissociated of the level of public scrutiny and, in 2010, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) even remarked that “industry efforts to address privacy through
self-regulation have been too slow, and up to now have failed to provide adequate and
meaningful protection” (2010: iii; emphasis added). As it will be discussed at greater
length in chapter 6, the exploration of new rules by the private sector has indeed not
been as significant as it might have been hoped for.
More than anything else, the adoption of industry self-regulation reflects the utili-
tarian logic and more broadly (neo)liberal agenda that came to prominence in the United
States and questioned the utility and even capacity of states to govern various issue-areas,
including privacy. In its analysis of the evolution of the European and American pri-
vacy regimes, Newman argued that representatives of the private sector were able to
use institutional features, and more precisely the number of veto points, existing in the
American political system to block the adoption of comprehensive privacy rules for the
private sector and support the use of industry self-regulation (Newman 2008: 57-60). At
the same time, he highlights that this went against the previously well-established prac-
tice of creating “independent agencies to overcome the problems posed by the growing
complexity of governing a modern society” and reflected the growing unwillingness of
American public authorities to delegate tasks (Newman 2008: 72-3). More accurately,
though, it did not end delegation practices but merely replace the entity to which tasks
were delegated. Private actors instead of public ones were given the role to police the
marketplace. This significant change should be understood in light of the broader dis-
missal of the role of public regulators happening in the 70s and that specifically flourished
with the rise of the law and economics movement previously discussed. Since then, the
delegation of regulatory tasks to the private sector has been a constant feature of the
American regulatory approach to privacy. The next section will now present in greater
detail the European approach.
3.4 The European Union and Privacy Rights since 1995
In stark contrast to the United States, privacy is clearly recognized as a fundamental
human right in Europe since the adoption of the European Convention of Human Rights
in 1950 (Bellanova and De Hert 2009: 65). Without having to make an extensive reading
of any articles or looking at the “penumbras” or “zones of shades”, its article 8 conspic-
uously states that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
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his home and his correspondence”. Following on this broad recognition, the Convention
for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data
(Convention 108) adopted by the Council of Europe was the first internationally binding
instrument to propose clear privacy rules for both the public and private sectors. As op-
posed to the regulatory approach being simultaneously developed in the United States,
the goal of this early European regulatory framework was to “approach all privacy issues
in a centralized and enforceable manner” (Bessette and Haufler 2001: 78).
In practice, though, the regulation of privacy remained highly decentralized and
not all European countries adopted rules for the use of personal data by the private
sector. While France and Germany adopted privacy laws covering the private sector
back in the 70s, countries like Belgium, Greece, Italy, and Portugal had not ratified the
1981 convention and had no national privacy regulations up until the mid-1990s. Spain
that had ratified the convention back in 1983 also did not even adopt a privacy law
covering the use of personal data by the private sector before 1999 (Newman 2008: 84).
Thus, many European countries did not have an approach so different from the United
States just a few years ago.
This all changed in 1995 with the passage of the Directive on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data. Following years of negotiation, the adoption of this European Directive promoted
the adoption of a comprehensive privacy regime in Europe for the first time. In effect, all
Member states of the European Union had to adopt one set of “rules for the public and
private sectors, enforced by independent regulatory agencies” (Newman 2008: 43). As a
directive10, each Member states had some leeway in how they wanted to set up their own
regulatory framework, but they all had to achieve this broad objective by 1998. While
not all respected this deadline, all came to adopt a comprehensive law in the early 2000s
at the latest and created data protection authorities to oversee them.
Since then, the European Union has continuously adopted new directives or regu-
lations to complement and strengthen its privacy regime as shown in table 3.3. In 2001, it
first adopted a regulation covering the use of personal data by European Institutions (i.e.,
European Commission, European Parliament, etc.) and, in 2002, it added the E-Privacy
Directive that provided rules for the use of personal data in electronic communications.
10As opposed to regulations, directives are not directly enforceable. Member states must adopt an
implementing legislation to give it legal effect. While they are required to do so, they enjoy some
flexibility in this process as indicated in article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union.
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Table 3.3 Main privacy laws adopted in the European Union since 1995
1995 • Data Protection Directive
2001 • Data Protection Regulation for EU Institutions (45/2001)
2002 • E-Privacy Directive
2006 • Data Retention Directive
2009 • Amended E-Privacy Directive
2016 • General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
2018 • Revised Data Protection Regulation for EU Institutions (2018/1725)
The latter was also amended twice with the adoption of the Data Retention Directive in
2006 and the revised E-Privacy Directive in 2009. Both in turn helped ensure that the
rules for the use of personal data were keeping up with the development of new electronic
services.
While important, these amendments and revised laws however did not fundamen-
tally change the European privacy regime as the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) did when adopted in 2016. In addition to extensively update the European
rulebook, the move from a directive to a regulation broadly means that data protec-
tion rules negotiated at the European level are now directly enforceable in all Member
States of the European Union. This specifically ensures that the same set of rules should
now be applied throughout Europe. Although the Directive succeeded in promoting a
comprehensive approach towards privacy, it had in effect failed to fully harmonize data
protection rules. Significant discrepancies remained between the laws adopted in each
European country and limited the development of the European digital single market.
The GDPR has moreover raised the bar in terms of sanctions that can be applied
for non-compliance. In the future, private companies violating its rules may receive
administrative fines of up to 20 million euros or 4% of their annual worldwide turnover,
whichever is greater (Art. 83). This drastically contrasts with the Data Directive, which
did not even provide specific rules for the size of the administrative fines that data
protection authorities could hand out and that often ended up to be quite small. In
2018, Facebook was for example fined 500,000 pounds by the Information Commissioner
of the United Kingdom for the Cambridge Analytica scandal, which was the maximum it
could levy based on the British law implementing the Data Directive. If the GDPR had
been in force11 at the time, Facebook could have instead faced a fine of up to 1,27 billion
11The GDPR came into force on May 25th, 2018.
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pounds or 4% of its 2017 worldwide turnover (Waterson 2018). Since the entry into force
of the GDPR, various data protection authorities in Europe have in effect used their
new powers and handed out larger fines to private companies. In 2019, the French data
protection authority gave a fine of 50 million euros to Google for not having properly
informed its users about its data practices (Satariano 2019). While still being far from
the maximum fine it could have handed out, this was the largest ever applied for privacy
violations in Europe.
This reliance on comprehensive rules and independent regulatory agencies to reg-
ulate the use of personal data since 1995 is in line with the rights-based approach pre-
ferred in Europe. As a fundamental right, privacy is not seen as something that should
be mainly regulated by the private sector. Limits should be set and enforced by pub-
lic authorities to ensure that business interests do not take precedence at any point in
time. Nor should individuals have to accept fewer privacy protections for better ser-
vices. The same rules should be applied to all and no one should be left to decide how
much value they want to attribute to their own information. This link between this
privacy conception and European regulatory approach was explicitly recognized in the
1994 report on Europe and the global information society drafted under the direction of
then-Commissioner for the internal market Martin Bangemann. While generally sup-
portive of the use of market mechanisms by the European Union to regulate the digital
economy to remain competitive with the United States (Franda 2001: 84), it emphasized
the leadership role of Europe “in the protection the fundamental rights of the individual
with regard to personal data processing” (European Commission 1994: 22) and urged
Member states to quickly adopt the comprehensive approach promoted by the Data Di-
rective. Interviewees for this research similarly pointed out the link between the nature
of privacy as a fundamental right and today’s European regulatory approach towards it:
[Private codes] can be used to demonstrate compliance, but they cannot replace
the law. [...] There needs to be legal rules backing private codes. [...] Privacy is a
fundamental right. (Interview E18, done on February 27th, 2019)
Self-regulation alone doesn’t do the trick. [...] The protection of fundamen-
tal rights, cannot be left to private operators. (Interview E20, done on March 3rd
2019)
This understanding of privacy as a fundamental right is at the very heart of
the opposition between the European and American privacy regimes. Although rules
promoted in both jurisdictions might not always be that different as chapter 5 will show,
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their different conceptions of privacy makes them disagree on the role that public and
private actors should play in its regulation. While the United States federal government
champions the role of private actors, the European Commission supports the adoption
of comprehensive public rules. Such disagreement is evidently hard to bridge and clearly
limit possibilities to develop a harmonized approach. At the same time, it is wrong
to present both regulatory frameworks as having no points in common and existing
independently from the other. As the next and final section will highlight, they are in
practice both closer to hybrid forms of regulation than the two ideal-types just described
and have had opportunities to influence each other over the years.
3.5 Transatlantic Privacy Regulation: Between Public and
Private Rule-Making
Despite their broad differences, it should be reemphasized that both the European and
American privacy regimes start from the same liberal root that draws a clear distinction
between the individual and the collective. Based on their belief that society is made
up of relatively autonomous and rational individuals, they both agree on the basic idea
that all individuals need to have some form of control over their personal information to
actively participate in society. Being able to withhold details about oneself is simply put
viewed as a condition for the development of one’s own opinion and personality, which
forms the heart of what being a distinct person means from a broad liberal standpoint.
This joint adoption of a liberal privacy paradigm is important because it allowed
both jurisdictions to have similar concepts to talk about privacy. Concepts like con-
sent, transparency, accessibility, security, and limitations have formed the heart of the
American and European privacy regimes since the first adoption of the Fair Information
Practices in the United States in the 70s. While disagreeing on their exact meaning and
who should primarily be in charge to oversee their application, these shared concepts
provide a common platform to discuss privacy regulations. This does not ensure a com-
mon understanding as the use of a similar language combined with different basic privacy
conceptions creates high risks of confusion. This can regularly be observed as officials
from both jurisdictions often seem to talk past each other (Tene and Hughes 2014: 442).
Each side tending to oversimplify the legal framework proposed by the other to promote
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its own. Nevertheless, these shared concepts serve as a basis from which they can and
have exchanged over the years.
Interactions between the two jurisdictions’ regulatory frameworks were also eased
by the fact that none of them is a pure reflection of the ideal-types described in the
last two sections. State intervention is neither fully rejected in the United States nor
the only option considered in Europe. Moving away from their broad characterization as
“limited” or “comprehensive” systems (Newman 2008: 26-30), each regulatory frameworks
in practice rely on a mix of rules established and enforced by public and private actors to
deal with the use of personal information by private businesses. As such, they follow more
hybrid or co-regulation approaches (Hirsch 2011) that have importantly been moving
closer to each other through their joint influence.
In the United States, industry self-regulation rarely occurs without any public
intervention. Generally speaking, private companies and associations are relatively free
to determine what rules they want to create for themselves or their members. The Amer-
ican federal government has a more limited influence at the drafting stage of industry
self-regulations. It is nonetheless really active in enforcing them once created. As indi-
cated above, one characteristic of the American limited system is that no independent
regulatory agency was created to deal specifically with the use of personal data. However,
the FTC progressively came to play that role through the application of its prohibition of
unfair or deceptive practices, which allowed it to prosecute various private companies for
cases of non-compliance with the privacy rules that they had maintained to be following.
Discussing the American regulatory approach to privacy, one interviewee highlighted this
particular nature of its self-regulation system:
There is still a misunderstanding in Europe about how the US privacy system works.
I would say that it is enforceable self-certification, rather than self-regulation. [...]
At the same time, you need that back stop enforcement that the FTC provides.
There must be penalties so that folks stay in line. (Interview E28, done on April
19th, 2019)
This enforcement role is far from minor. As another interviewee noted, the FTC
“often gives much bigger fines than those the EU gave under the 95 Directive and even
what is discussed under the GDPR” (Interview E15, done on February 19th, 2019). In
fact, following the Cambridge Analytica scandal, the FTC imposed a $5 billion fine on
Facebook (Federal Trade Commission 2019), which is 7750 times larger than the fine that
Facebook received for the same scandal in the United Kingdom. To be fair, the fine that
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it received was again based on the Data Directive, not the GDPR. Yet, the highest fine
it could have levied against Facebook on the GDPR was still almost 5 times smaller as
previously noted (i.e., £1,27 billion).
In addition to this enforcement role, the American federal government also con-
tributes to the development of industry self-regulation in various ways. Despite insti-
tutional constraints making this role more marginal (Newman and Bach 2004: 394), it
cannot be entirely discarded. Back in 1998, the FTC importantly published guidelines
based on the Fair Information Practices indicating what self-regulatory programs devel-
oped by the industry should minimally include (Federal Trade Commission 1998: 15-6).
These became an unofficial benchmark for industry self-regulation and contributed to es-
tablishing the role of the FTC as the main governmental agency dealing with privacy in
the United States. As of now, it is still often sought for its views on privacy regulations by
many industry associations. Its enforcement role obviously creates a particularly strong
incentive for the industry to get its input. One interviewee for this research actually
maintained that receiving the FTC’s advice was integral to the process of developing a
self-regulation in the United States:
It’s a two-way street relationship. We meet with the FTC multiple times every year.
[...] If we have a new code, we always share it with the FTC to get their feedback
on it. It is a very important part of that process. (Interview E32, done on April
25th, 2019)
All in all, few interviewees went as far as that. The role of the FTC remains
primarily related to enforcement, not rule-making. The general view was that the FTC
could indeed play a guiding role, but it was often indirect. In addition to publishing
additional guidelines and case-studies, the FTC has for example organized workshops
allowing the industry to exchange ideas. They would, however, “not provide a lot of
remarks on these [self-regulatory] programs” (Interview E38, done on May 16th, 2019).
One notable exception is the Safe Harbor program established under the 1998 Children’s
online privacy law (COPPA), which provides an official role for the FTC in the drafting of
industry self-regulation. In American law, “safe-harbors” are legal provisions that limit
the liability of private operators by specifying what conduct would not be deemed in
violation of a specific rule. Copyrights, tax, and environmental law are just a few legal
fields that make regular use of such types of provisions. In COPPA, it is foreseen that
private companies that abide by self-regulatory programs approved by the FTC will be
deemed to be compliant with its rules. As part of this process, the FTC provides detailed
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feedback and invites public comments on industry self-regulatory initiatives that want
to be approved to become official “safe-harbor certifiers” under COPPA.
In addition to the FTC, the Department of Commerce has also played an active
role in influencing the development of industry self-regulation by negotiating various in-
ternational instruments. Of particular importance, the EU - U.S. Safe Harbor framework,
the Privacy Shield, and the APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) system have all
served to set basic rules for private companies dealing with personal information coming
from Europe or Asia that went further than the requirements in the original guidance
put forward by the FTC. In the case of the Safe Harbor and Privacy Shield, the De-
partment of Commerce was able to sell to its European counterparts the just presented
concept of a Safe Harbor and agree on seven principles that if complied with would limit
the liability of American companies dealing with the personal data of Europeans. In a
similar fashion, the CBPR system developed a set of principles based on which private
companies operating in Asia could get a voluntary certification from a private account-
ability agent to demonstrate their respect for privacy. In both cases, the possibility of
legal enforcement by the FTC is supposed to ensure that these self-regulatory programs
have real teeth.
Just as in the United States, co-regulation has been a defining feature of the Eu-
ropean regulatory approach towards privacy. While starting from the position that basic
rules should be set by public authorities, the European Union has constantly given a
role to industry self-regulation. Far from only relying on public rules and enforcement
by independent public agencies, the 1995 Data Directive specifically carved out a role for
the private sector. In its article 27, it indicated that Member States and the European
Commission should promote the creation and adoption of “codes of conduct” by various
economic sectors. It also provided that these codes can be officially approved by the
European Commission through the Article 29 Working Party, the advisory body created
to oversee the application of the Data Directive and primarily composed of representa-
tives from data protection authorities in each Member States. As expressed by multiple
interviewees, the European Commission has on multiple occasions helped industry came
together and exchange with other stakeholders to develop self-regulatory programs:
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The Commission plays a role of coordinator and facilitator. It helps industry to
come together and organize various workshops. (Interview E12, done on February
12th, 2019)
The Commission acted as a facilitator. It hosted [industry’s] work and helped them
invite various stakeholders. (Interview E24, done on March 15th, 2019)
It is self-regulation, but the European Commission is so involved that it
might be more accurate to name it co-regulation. [...] Industry still has to do the
work, but it is under the stewardship of the EU. (Interview E26, done on March
22nd, 2019)
In some cases, it even went as far as being the initiator and specifically asked
industry representatives to develop codes for specific sectors:
The trigger in both cases was public policy. [...] The European Commission wanted
to see more activities in both sectors. Studies had shown that the EU was lacking
behind the US and Asian countries in adoption of these services and it wanted the
private sector to raise trust in the marketplace. (Interview E26, done on March
22nd, 2019)
As opposed to the American approach that principally plays a role in enforcing
the rules devised by the industry, the European approach to self-regulation has thus been
a “coordinated” (Newman and Bach 2004) or “regulated” one (Shulz and Held 2004). In
practice, the European Commission aims to be involved early on in the process and
actively influence the content of industry self-regulations. Rather than creating new
rules per se, it is moreover hoped that they can help by specifying how public rules can
be applied in different sectors and relatively uniformly all across Europe. In the words
of the European Commission, the use of co-regulatory tools can help it have “greater
flexibility in the way that [its] rules are implemented on the ground” and support their
“[m]ore effective enforcement” (European Commission 2001b). At the same time, this
co-regulatory approach helps it limit the lack of legitimacy and the democratic deficit
of pure forms of private self-regulation (Christou and Simpson 2007: 22, see also Börzel
and Risse 2010).
While giving less freedom to private actors, this European approach did lead to
the creation of various industry self-regulations (Rodrigues and Papkonstantinou 2018).
Table 3.4 lists all those adopted at the European level since 1995. It includes both
codes primarily aimed at privacy as well as those dealing with it among other things.
Just like in table 3.2, these were identified based on preexisting research (Cavoukian
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and Crompton 2000; European Commission 2001a, 2012b; European Parliament 2012;
Rodrigues and Papkonstantinou 2018; Trzaskowski 2006) and excludes self-regulatory
programs that have been active in both jurisdictions at the same time, like the one
of the International Chamber of Commerce and the Global Business Dialogue on e-
commerce. It also excludes regulatory documents that would mainly set out technical
standards. It finally does not include all the codes developed and active in a single
European Member State. Only self-regulations that were devised for the entire European
market or were minimally active in multiple European countries were kept. Including all
codes and other self-regulatory tools adopted at the national level would give an even
stronger feeling that self-regulation has truly been an important feature of the European
approach towards privacy regulation, but it would simultaneously depict a more dynamic
regulatory ecosystem than it actually is. The fact is that many codes adopted by national
associations reflect the ones of an umbrella association representing them at the European
level. Some national associations, like in Spain and the Netherlands, acted as pioneers
and should should be recognized as such. This research nevertheless knowingly limits
itself to the regulatory developments happening at the European level.
It is noteworthy that only one code developed by the Federation of European
Direct Marketing Association (FEDMA) followed the process envisioned by the article
27 of the Data Directive and was officially approved by the Article 29 Working Party.
Others either never tried to get the official approval or gave up because the process was
considered to be too burdensome. In effect, it took FEDMA almost five years to have its
code adopted. The European ‘coordinated’ or ‘regulated’ approach thus seems to have
partly limited the development of self-regulations and many interviewees for this study
were prone to maintain that there was in fact only one real code that had been adopted in
Europe since 1995 (Interviews E5, E11, E16, E24, E26, E36). Regardless of this limited
number of codes that were officially approved, the European Union interestingly did not
put an end to industry self-regulation in the GDPR and even extended its role. Articles
40 to 43 of the GDPR now indicates that the European Commission and the European
Member States should continue to promote the adoption of codes of conduct as well
as certification schemes. Next to codes of conduct, which are expected to specify how
privacy rules apply in specific economic sectors, certifications are seen as tools to be used
to validate the compliance of private businesses with the rules of the GDPR. Moreover,
both codes of conduct and certifications can now potentially serve as a sufficient legal
12This self-regulatory program drafted in partnership by the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Con-
federations of Europe (UNICE; now called Business Europe) and the European Consumer Organisation
(BEUC) ended up being never adopted.
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Table 3.4 Main indsutry self-regulations dealing with privacy adopted at the European level
since 1995
1997 • Interactive Media in Retail Group’s (IMRG) Code of Practice
1999 • Which’s Webtrader Code of Practice
2000 • Eurocommerce’s EuroLabel
2001 • UNICE - BEUC e-Confidence Project12
2001 • Clicksure Quality Standard
2001 • Trusted Shops’ Quality Criteria
2001 • TUV SUD Safe Shopping Standard
2002 • European eCommerce and Omni-Channel Trade Association’s (EMOTA)
Convention
2003 • SafeBuy’s Code of Practice
2003 • Federation of European Direct Marketing Association’s (FEDMA) Code of
practice
2005 • Electronc Retailing Association (ERA) Europe Marketing Guidelines for
Electronic Retailers
2011 • European Advertising Standards Alliance’s (EASA) Recommendations on
Online Behavioural Advertising
2011 • Europrise’s Privacy Seal
2011 • Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB) Europe’s Online Behavioural
Advertising Framework
2012 • European Digital Advertising Alliance’s (EDAA) Self-Certification Criteria
for Online Behavioural Advertising
2015 • E-Commerce Europe Code of Conduct
2017 • E-Commerce Foundation SafeShop Trustmark
basis for the transfer of personal data outside Europe. This is significant because this
gives an important role to private actors in the key question of how personal data should
be protected when crossing national frontiers. The European Data Protection Board,
the entity that replaced the Article 29 Working Party in the GDPR, actually expects
that these private mechanisms will help the European Union “in the promotion and
cultivation of the level of protection which the GDPR provides to the wider international
community” (European Data Protection Board 2019: 10).
This continuous support for self-regulation in Europe seems related to the broader
trend in favour of accountability mechanisms (Guagnin et al. 2012). Since the adoption
of the Data Directive in 1995, it became increasingly clear that one of the key issues
in the protection of privacy was the question of compliance. Having a comprehensive
law is not in itself sufficient as you still need to ensure that it is applied and as one
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interviewee straightforwardly said, “regulators will never have enough resources to do it
[check compliance of all companies], so you have to figure out a way for companies to
pay for certification services while also being answerable” (Interview E37, done on May
14th, 2019). This is precisely what the inclusion of certification schemes in the GDPR
aims to achieve. This renewed interest for self-regulatory tools based on the concept of
accountability is not disconnected from developments in the United States as the latter
have promoted the adoption of certification programs since the creation of the APEC
CBPR system. For them, the main rationale was that agreeing on certifications was the
best way to allow for the transnational flow of data to continue without having to agree
on a global set of privacy rules. This view now seems to be partly shared by the EU as
it again included certifications as a potential tool for data transfers outside Europe and
hopes that it will help it promote its rules globally.
3.6 Conclusion
As I tried to highlight in this chapter, the protection of privacy is not only a European
story. The United States has been at the forefront of privacy debates for more than a
century now. In addition to being American legal scholars who were at the origins of
the modern concept of privacy, the Fair Information Practices developed by the United
States Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 1973 still form today the heart
of the privacy regimes in both the European Union and the United States. Since then,
the regulation of privacy in the United States moreover never came to a standstill. At
the federal level alone, new sectoral laws and industry self-regulations were continuously
adopted and contributed to reshape how private companies could collect and use personal
data in the United States. The federal government remained also active on the global
stage by negotiating international instruments like the Safe Harbor and Privacy Shield
with the European Union and the CBPR system with APEC countries. Far from being a
laggard, the United States should thus be seen as having adopted a different regulatory
approach than Europe.
With this in mind, I point out that this difference in regulatory approaches be-
tween the United States and the European Union does reflect a different conception of
what privacy is. Despite starting from a similar liberal paradigm, both jurisdictions
have indeed progressively diverged on what they believe is the exact nature of privacy.
While the United States tends to see privacy as an economic good that can be traded
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and should generally not be subject to extensive public regulations, the European Union
views it as a fundamental right that is intrinsically linked with what it means to be an
individual. This distinction is a clear source of misunderstanding and one important
reason why a global privacy regime has never emerged and why different countries still
maintain “conflicting regulatory regimes to deal with [the] issues” brought by new infor-
mation technologies (Haufler 2001: 70; see also Dimitrov et al. 2007). Yet, I importantly
caution against overemphasizing the importance of these differences and argue that, in
practice, both the European Union and the United States are closer to each other than
the two ideal-types generally ascribed to them.
Hybrid or co-regulation approaches are in effect used in both jurisdictions to
ensure that the use of personal data by the private sector is respectful of the privacy
of their citizens. In the United States, the FTC and the Department of Commerce
have particularly contributed to the creation of industry self-regulations. Through its
enforcement capacity, the FTC even actively promoted the adoption of specific obligations
by the industry. In that regard, this form of ‘enforced’ self-regulation is not too dissimilar
to the European ‘coordinated’ approach, which continuously tried to spur and organize
the development of industry rules. The recognition of this hybrid or co-regulatory nature
of both the European and American regulatory approaches to privacy is key for this
research and it is where I start to depart from the previous ‘clash of cultures’ or ‘clash of
systems’ arguments. By acknowledging the actual proximity that exists between them,
I can more aptly show how they actually interacted and influenced each other’s data
protection rules over the years.
Back in early 1999, Clinton’s head advisor for e-commerce, Ira Magaziner inter-
estingly considered that “if the privacy protections (sic) by the private sector can be
spread internationally, that will become the de facto way privacy is protected, and that
will diffuse this disagreement [with the European Union]” (cited in Farrell 2003: 289). By
promoting the use of self-regulatory tools globally, he hoped to limit the EU’s influence
in the United States as well as globally. To some extent, the adoption of the EU - U.S.
Safe Harbor Agreement represented a success in that regard. By making the European
Commission accept as sufficient the use of industry self-regulations, it did limit calls for
the adoption of a comprehensive federal privacy law as well as the direct influence of
the European Data Directive in the United States. The adoption of the CBPR system
and the broader promotion of accountability mechanisms by American actors have also
partly achieved Magaziner’s hope by promoting self-regulatory tools as ‘interoperability’
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mechanisms between different privacy systems. As one interviewee who worked close to
these negotiations indicated:
We promoted the concept of interoperability because we believe that we cannot end
up with the exact same vision of privacy. Privacy is a cultural thing, which means
it will be implemented differently in different regions of the world. (Interview E27,
done on April 4th, 2019)
This use of self-regulatory tools as an interoperability mechanism is now part
of the European regulatory framework. As mentioned above, the GDPR specifically
indicates that codes of conduct and certification mechanisms can be used to allow the
transfer of European personal data to third countries. This contrasts with the adequacy
decision procedure under which the European Union expects its partner to have a legal
framework equivalent to its own before agreeing to allow personal data to flow freely
between them. Although private tools like Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs) already
allowed the transfer of personal data under the Data Directive, this heightened support
for industry self-regulations does reflect a recognition by the European Commission that
exporting its comprehensive privacy model throughout the world is far from an easy task.
As specifically highlighted by one interviewee:
[A]dequacy findings are challenging policy tools. [...] You look at the adequacy with
Japan. It took close to 4 years to be negotiated and it will have to be reviewed every 4
years under the GDPR. This process is way too long and burdensome. Realistically,
they probably do not have the means to go through this with all countries around
the world. If it’s a tool to export European rules, I would say it’s an inefficient tool.
[...] I think certification by private companies is more realistic. It is easier to have
a conversation with companies than an international negotiation. (Interview E15,
done on February 19th, 2019)
Significantly, industry self-regulations have not succeeded in entirely diffusing the
disagreement as Magaziner might have hoped for at the end of the 1990s. With the recent
adoption of the GDPR and the (re)negotiations of new adequacy decisions, the European
Commission still keeps on promoting its comprehensive privacy system and to sometimes
clash with the United States globally. Repeated legal challenges by privacy activists,
like Max Schrems, to any agreements allowing data to flow between both jurisdictions
moreover show on an almost daily basis that this transnational conflict is alive and well.
Indeed, industry self-regulations did not become “the de facto way privacy is protected
globally”. Yet, they did become an important part of its regulation and have created new
spaces of interactions between the two.
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Rather than only being the American and European public authorities that co-
operate on the regulation of privacy, there are now various industry groups and private
companies that work together to define the data protection rules that govern the use
of personal data. Through their work, they create new bridges and avenues for each
regulatory systems to influence the other. As notably seen with the case of the original
EU - U.S. Safe Harbor Agreement, they sometimes even work directly with public regu-
lators in that process. Overall, this multiplication of public and private regulators and
regulations creates a complex governance system that alters the process of rule formation
in both jurisdictions through two joint processes: exploitation and exploration. Before
reviewing each of them, the next chapter will explain at greater length how the transat-
lantic regulation of privacy can be conceptualized as a complex governance system and




The Evolution of Transatlantic Data
Protection Rules
They think GDPR is a revolution,
but it’s an evolution
Vĕra Jourová, European Union’s
Justice Commissioner, 2018
Far from simply being two rival models, the European and American approaches
share a strong philosophical root. In effect, both start from a liberal paradigm to con-
ceptualize privacy and broadly agree on the basic idea that individuals should have some
form of control over their personal information to realize themselves. This contrasts
with views according to which the broad public interest should prime over individual
privacy interests. Over the years, exceptions made for security concerns, whether or
not justified, have challenged this original standpoint (de Goede 2014). While having
significant consequences for the regulation of privacy, they remain presented as excep-
tions or temporary (at least officially) deviations from this general principle. This basic
agreement on the meaning of privacy is significant. While this can sometimes create
misunderstandings as these broad principles are not always understood or applied the
same way across the Atlantic, it still provides American and European regulators with a
similar conceptual framework and language to discuss the regulation of privacy. As I will
show in this chapter, this is made evident in their respective adoption of the same set of
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basic data protection principles, including notably consent, access, quality, security, and
transparency.
Moreover, their regulatory approaches have often been more hybrid, involving
both public and private actions, rather than only relying on one or the other. Again, it
should be clear that the point is not that categorizations opposing the American and Eu-
ropean “limited and comprehensive systems” (Newman 2008), “sectoral to omnibus laws”
(Solove and Schwartz 2011) or “market-based to rights-based approaches” (Schwartz and
Peifer 2017) are wrong, far from it. They all reflect the real existence of a transatlantic
divide over the question of privacy and have given us essential tools to reflect on it. As
broad models that simplify our world, they however hide as much as they provide new
light. In effect, just as they emphasize the differences between the two jurisdictions they
minimize their similarities. In practice, even though the European Union has clearly
been more forthright in its desire to regulate privacy issues, governmental agencies in the
United States have also been active. In addition to play an important role in ensuring the
enforcement of industry self-regulations, agencies like the FTC often coordinated their
activities. Similarly, the European Union has not only relied on public rules but also
supported the development of rules by the industry.
Recognizing this actual proximity between the regulation of privacy in the United
States and the European Union both in terms of their conceptual background and reg-
ulatory approaches was a first key step to consider how they could be seen as forming
a complex governance system. If either one of them were to reject the basic idea that
privacy is about protecting individuals’ control over their personal information, there
would hardly be anything for their regulators to exchange on and it would be hard seeing
them as together forming one regulatory system. Such fundamental disagreement can
actually appear in debates over the increasing use of security exceptions, which precisely
tends to reject individual interests for individual privacy for the supposedly collective
interest. Although the European Commission has also shown an interest in deploying
surveillance techniques of its own and sometimes readily worked with the American gov-
ernment (de Goede 2012), this is an area where interactions between their regulators are
particularly difficult. The existence of a close cooperation between police and surveil-
lance services in the United Kingdom and the United States is now a key reason why the
former European Member State might not receive an adequacy decision and will have a
hard time to cooperate with its European counterparts on privacy issues in the future,
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even though it has in place an almost if not identical regulatory framework as it already
implemented the GDPR (Espinoza and Khan 2019).
Putting aside these nonetheless important security questions, the early adoption
of a similar set of basic privacy principles and hybrid forms of regulation have allowed the
United States and European Union to influence each other in ways that have often gone
unnoticed. This chapter is the first of three that attempts to specifically demonstrate
how interactions between public and private regulators in both jurisdictions have shaped
the formation of data protection rules since the adoption of the European Data Directive
over a little bit more than twenty years ago. These three chapters will importantly
emphasize that it is not merely a story of a shift in leadership (Vogel 2003) nor of
competition (Drezner 2007) as previous scholars have argued. These are certainly part
of the explanation and will be mentioned where relevant, but each significantly fails
to see how their domestic regulatory processes have been and are still being shaped
by the regulatory exchanges taking place between various public and private actors.
Rather than simply being two national regulatory systems evolving in isolation from
each other and then attempting to impose their regulatory preference to the other, their
constant interactions have created a complex governance system (Kahler 2016; Oatley
2019; Orsini et al. 2019) that upended their respective process of rule formation from
the very beginning. In other words, transnational interactions have been endogenous to
the process of rule formation in both jurisdictions rather than exogenous forces occurring
after each adopted their respective regulations.
In the rest of this chapter, I explain why the transatlantic regulation of privacy can
be conceptualized as a complex governance system and what it means for its analysis.
To do so, I start by extending the definition of complex systems that I introduced in
chapter 2 and explains how it more precisely fits the present case. I take this opportunity
to specifically emphasize the value-added of looking at regulations from a multilevel
perspective where they are not only seen as single coherent policy documents but also
as varying collections of principles and rules. I then detail how I built an entirely novel
database of transatlantic data protection principles and rules that serves as the primary
source of data for the remainder of this research. After having introduced the main
elements of this complex governance system, I begin to trace its evolution by describing
the early sets of data protection rules promoted in the United States and the European
Union back in the mid-1990s. This will form the starting point to look at how they have
evolved up to the adoption of the GDPR in 2016. In the last two sections, I finally define
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and sketch the two joint processes, exploration and exploitation, that have driven the
evolution of this complex governance system and that will be further analyzed in the
following two chapters.
4.1 Transatlantic Privacy Regulation as a Complex Gover-
nance System
The formation of rules to govern the global economy does not happen in a vacuum.
Whether it is governments adopting a new law or industry associations putting forward
a new self-regulation, it is always influenced by what previous actors have done and this is
no different in the case of data protection. Again, data protection or information privacy
rules (in the United States), hereafter discussed, refer to the set of rules that define
how personal data should be used to ensure respect for privacy. When devising such
rules, governments and industry associations increasingly start from a dense institutional
environment. Over the years, the absence of a global privacy regime (Dimitrov et al.
2007; Haufler 2001) as often led it to be seen as having a relatively low institutional
density (Newman and Posner 2015). The lack of international rules codified in one
multilateral international treaty or enforced by an international organization was seen
as creating an environment where national regulators were left relatively unconstrained.
The absence of such an interstate agreement or international organization, however, does
not necessarily translate to a weakly institutionalized environment. It does mean that
it is less centralized as there is no single actor setting or adjudicating the rules for all,
like the World Trade Organization (WTO) is supposed to do for the trade regime, but it
clearly does not mean that there are fewer institutions. If anything, the lack of a central
authority has allowed a proliferation of competing actors and institutions aiming to set
data protection rules, which form a complex governance system.
As mentioned in chapter 2, complex systems are “open systems [...] that include
multiple elements (units) of various types intricately interconnected with one another
and operating at various levels” (Orsini et al. 2019: 3; see also Bousquet and Curtis
2011, Kavalski 2007,Mitchell 2009, Morin, Pauwelyn and Hollway 2017). They moreover
lack central coordination and order results from the continuous interactions between the
elements of the systems rather than a single source of authority as in hierarchical systems
(Orsini et al. 2019: 3). From this broad definition, I keep that complex systems share five
83
key characteristics: (1) no central coordination, (2) openness, (3) multiple heterogeneous
elements, (4) interdependence, and (5) multilevel structure. The transatlantic regulation
of privacy has all of them.
First, and as just mentioned, there is no single entity with the capacity to author-
itatively define data protection rules in the transatlantic space. As the United States
and the European Union never reached the adoption of a formal interstate agreement
detailing what rules should private companies follow when using personal data, there
are in effect no international organization or institution deciding what the content of
these rules should be. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s
(OECD) Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data of 1980 and its revised version of 2013 are probably the closest thing to it. Yet,
their status of guidelines precisely means that they lack the authoritative status that
WTO agreements for example have. Moreover, they represent more of a lowest common
denominator than a complete set of rules. As it will be detailed below, the early Eu-
ropean and American models of regulation were already quite different from the OECD
guidelines in the mid-1990s. The Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention 108) of
1981 could be a new contender for the role as it is now open for non-European countries
to join, but the United States is still not part of it and few countries outside of Europe
are.
In the absence of such a supranational agreement, it could still be thought that
the United States and the European Union are internally the central authority that can
each define their preferred set of data protection rules. This is certainly in line with the
traditional approach to view national systems as being hierarchical and perfectly orderly.
In practice, though, the formation of rules does not have to only come from public
authorities as the previous chapter pointed out. Both the United States and European
Union rely on a hybrid form of regulation that explicitly recognizes the capacity of private
actors to create rules, which can even become part of public regulation later on. While
public authorities indeed have the power to enforce their laws and force private companies
to abide by their rules, private actors can still create their own rules separately or on top
of public ones. The process of rule formation is thus neither centrally managed in these
two jurisdictions taken separately.
Second, the transatlantic regulation of privacy is open to external influences com-
ing both from other geographical areas and policy fields. Although this research focuses
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on the American and European interactions on privacy due to their historic and partic-
ularly close relationship, both have been interacting with actors in other regions of the
world and notably Asia. While the United States negotiated a privacy framework with
countries part of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the European Union
negotiated an adequacy decision with Japan and now works on one with its neighbour
South Korea. Similarly, many private actors discussed below had interactions with some
of their Asian counterparts. Other policy fields, like telecommunications and competi-
tion, have also sometimes informed its regulation and notably supported the creation of
new rules as briefly discussed in chapter 6.
Third, there are multiple public and private regulations that have been adopted
to define what should be good data practices for private companies. These include both
hard and soft law-type of regulations (Abbott et al. 2000; Vogel 2008). Next to public
laws, like the Data Directive in Europe or the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA) in the United States, and soft laws, like the OECD privacy guidelines, industry
associations were prone to create codes of conduct, certifications or other private forms of
regulation to govern their own activities. Figure 4.1 actually shows the significant growth
in the number of active industry self-regulations including data protection rules in the
European Union and the United States from 1997 to 2017. Again, this only includes
regulations created by industry associations at the European level or aimed to apply in
more than one European country. Industry attempts at developing rules applicable on
the world stage and potentially having an influence in both the European Union and the
United States are included and shown separately.
The visible spike in the mid-1990s and the beginning of the 2000s is clearly asso-
ciated with the adoption of the European Data directive in 1995 and the Safe Harbor in
2000 and highlights that the evolution of industry self-regulation is closely related to the
level of scrutiny by public authorities as previously noted (see section 3.3 & 3.5). The
relative stability in the number of industry self-regulations is however not only due to
a slow-down in the adoption of new ones, but also the termination of some early ones.
As time passed, industry associations that had adopted a self-regulation indeed ceased
to exist or simply stopped being active in the privacy space. The relative stability that
emerged in the number of industry self-regulations over time thus also results from the
fact that the creation of new ones closely approximated the number of those disappear-
ing. This kind of ‘plateauing effect’ is moreover reinforced by the fact that instead of
having new actors coming in and creating new regulations, what we see occurring is in-
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Figure 4.1: Sum of active industry self-regulations including data protection rules in the transat-
lantic space (1997-2017)
dustry associations that revise the one they already have in place. To observe change
thus requires to look into the content of each regulation rather than only looking at their
rate of adoption, which the multilevel approach explained below specifically allows.
Fourth, while different and being promoted by a diverse set of actors, all these
regulations are tied together. At their heart, they are all based on the same liberal
paradigm and, despite differences in how they apply it, they do agree on some core
data protection principles (i.e., consent, access, quality, security, transparency, etc.). As
explained in chapter 3 (see especially p. 54), both jurisdictions effectively start from
the broad viewpoint that their societies are made of autonomous individuals that are
able to determine their own interests and that need to be given the relevant space to do
so. From this broad conception, they again part ways on how it should be protected.
While the United States traditionally views it as a question of managing an information
market, the European Union sees it as a human right that cannot be traded away. Yet,
they do agree on the basic point that privacy rights aim to empower individuals. This in
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turn offers them a common language to influence each other as previous work focusing
on their different choice of regulatory approach again failed to see.
Moreover, private companies obviously have to respect the rules of the countries
where they do business. As in other fields of law (Bartley 2011; Green 2013a), private
forms of regulation will thus quite straightforwardly use these public laws as the basis to
devise their own rules. This, in turn, tends to blur the distinction between ‘delegated’
and ‘entrepreneurial’ form of private authority as I previously hinted at in chapter 2 and
will further discuss in chapter 6. In addition to these ties between the rules in their
regulations, public and private actors often directly interact with one another. It is not
unusual to find individuals that worked over the years for many organizations behind
these regulations. Among the interviewees for this research, some notably worked for
both public agencies and multiple private organizations that put out privacy-related
regulations. Apart from these personal ties, links also exist between the organizations
they represent. Official partnerships, joint projects, institutional support, and lobbying
are all different forms of direct interactions that regularly take place between public
and private actors in the regulation of privacy. Together, all these are the interactions
that drive the evolution of the system and will be crucially investigated in the next two
chapters.
Fifth, and finally, the transatlantic regulation of privacy operates at multiple levels
that feed into each other. As a whole, it represents the entire American and European
legal systems. These are more precisely made of regulators operating at the international,
regional, national, and even sub-national levels. As widely recognized, decisions taken by
one regulator at a higher level can trickle down and influence regulations at another as in
a traditional hierarchical system, but the contrary is also possible. Regulations and rules
developed by sub-national authorities (e.g., the government of California) can influence
regulations adopted at a higher level. Regulations themselves can also be viewed as
existing at multiple levels. As a whole, they are relatively coherent documents that aim to
achieve a specific policy goal (i.e., guaranteeing an individual’s privacy). Yet at another
level, they can be viewed as collections of rules and show much more diversity than
otherwise thought. Interestingly, trends and patterns of change appearing at one level
might not be as significant or evident to spot at another (Modelski 1996). The adoption
of a new rule could notably have significant legal consequences, while not fundamentally
challenging the legal system in place. Similarly, the adoption of a new regulation that
might appear as revolutionary by the people it targets might still show a lot of continuity
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when looking at its individual components (i.e., rules) as a whole. This is certainly the
case of the GDPR, which is often portrayed as representing a radical change due to
its directly enforceable nature in all European member states and stronger enforcement
mechanisms. Yet, as the European Union’s Justice Commissioner cited in epigraph to this
chapter rightfully pointed out, the GDPR represents more an evolution than revolution as
it still largely follows the same principles and rules previously found in the Data Directive
and other regulations adopted since then. At the level of its constitutive rules, the GDPR
is in fact not as novel or disruptive as many think. It might also be that seemingly small
changes at one level have disproportionate consequences at another. Changes in how
consent is gained could for example upend some of the most basic principles of the
regulation of privacy in one or both jurisdictions.
The recognition of the multilevel nature of regulations offers a new way to look at
regulatory changes and is one of the key contributions of the present work. In contrast to
previous studies focusing on the global influence of one paradigm or policy idea (Elkins,
Guzman and Simmons 2006; Hall 1993; Meseguer 2009; Simmons and Elkins 2004) as well
as recent work like the one of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) Global Cyberlaw Tracker comparing the presence or absence of legislation,
the current approach can go further and highlight how the adoption of seemingly similar
adoption of privacy regulations can actually hide a lot of diversity. It also differs from
many strands of work in political science that tends to see change in stark opposition to
continuity, such as those emphasizing how critical junctures break from otherwise path-
dependent tendencies (Bell 2011; Cappocia 2015; Kelemen and Cappocia 2007). In effect,
the multilevel approach that I take here allows me to see that the same regulation can
simultaneously support processes of convergence and divergence, which are both key in
the evolution of a complex governance system as I noted in chapter 2. Before introducing
how each process materializes itself, the next section will present the original database on
data protection principles and rules in the transatlantic area that I built for this research.
4.2 A Database on Transatlantic Data Protection Principles
and Rules
The primary source of data for this research is an original database that I created on data
protection principles and rules found in 126 public and private regulations adopted in
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the transatlantic area and in force after 1995. As no other contributions had previously
attempted to do such a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of data protection rules
promoted in the United States and the European Union, I did not have much to start
from and largely had to build it from scratch. It includes the OECD privacy guidelines
adopted in 1980 as they were still promoted up until their revision in 2013. The only
other regulation created before 1995 and that I included in this database is the code on
market and social research jointly adopted by the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) and the European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research (ESOMAR) in 1994
and then only revised in 2001. The entire list of regulations included in the database is
listed in appendix B and include all the regulations and their revisions identified in the
previous chapter (see table 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4).
Again, I identified all these regulations based on previous research (Cavoukian
and Crompton 2000; European Commission 2001a, 2012b; European Parliament 2012;
Rodrigues and Papkonstantinou 2018; Trzaskowski 2006). In building this specific cor-
pus of regulations, I aimed to be as exhaustive as possible and to include all those created
at the American federal level, European level, or international level by public or private
actors. In line with the complexity approach taken in this research, it was indeed es-
sential that this database includes all constitutive elements of this system to uncover
how each interacted differently with the other and, in the end, affected its evolution.
The network methodology that I use and discuss at greater length in chapter 5 moreover
made techniques like random sampling difficult as they could have led me to miss out on
essential elements of the system, changing its structure and potentially giving a wrong
picture of who are the important actors and pathways of influence (Wasserman and Faust
1994: 31-34; see also Carrington, Scott and Wasserman 2005; Cunningham, Everton and
Murray 2016). While more targeted forms of sampling can sometimes be used, they need
to ensure to provide a similar network structure at a lower scale than the full network.
As the number of privacy regulations was already limited, building such a sample was
in this case almost impossible and only created risks of losing crucial information on the
evolution of privacy regulations.
With that in mind, the creation of this original database still required to define
what exactly formed the population of this transatlantic regulatory system and, concomi-
tantly, what were its boundaries. As noted above, one characteristic of complex systems
is that they are open to their external environment and that their external boundaries
are not always as clear as closed systems for which we can normally identify without too
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much doubt all of their constitutive elements. One common example of this is a plane,
which can be viewed as a system of integrated components that can be relatively easily
listed, if not by the present author, by one of its engineers. Doing so for a regulatory
system is however a much harder task as there are different ways to define what consti-
tutes them. Which elements should be included or not then becomes not only a matter
of external and verifiable reality but of the analytical strategy being used by a researcher
(Cilliers 2001: 114). In this case, one of these very choices that I made was to focus on
the transatlantic area. Other studies could well have decided to look at the evolution of
privacy regulation from a global, Asian, or another perspective. As previously noted, the
focus on the transatlantic area reflects both their long-lasting and significant relationship,
as well as their importance for global privacy debates. Their joint adoption of a liberal
paradigm was moreover seen as creating a sufficient link between the two to view them
as one regulatory system made of different regulators.
Two other important choices that I made in the definition of the population form-
ing the present database relate to the levels of analysis included in the present research.
First, only regulations adopted at the American federal, European, or international level
were included. This means that laws adopted by federal states or European Member
states are not part of the present database. This choice was not taken lightly as previ-
ous research has emphasized the significant catalyst role that some of these actors can
play. In the United States, the state of California has long been recognized as having
the capacity to act as a catalyst for the adoption of regulations (Vogel 1995; Chander,
Kaminski and McGeveran 2020). Similarly, France and Germany are regularly pointed
out as having a particular say in shaping the regulation of various issue-areas in Europe,
and notably privacy (Green Cowles 2001; Recio 2017). As this research is fundamentally
about the interactions between regulators on both sides of the Atlantic, it was however
considered that these different entities did not engage with each other as repeatedly
and significantly as American federal agencies and the European Commission. While
including these additional actors could have provided more detailed information about
internal dynamics in each jurisdiction, it also created additional risks of missing more
interactions between these different regulators and ending up with an erroneous picture
of the transatlantic system. In effect, it even risked creating more noise in the analysis
as not all federal states or European member states are of equal importance nor have a
global influence. Considering that the American federal government and the European
Commission moreover have the legal authority to supersede these federal or national
laws, their own interactions and how it affected the content of their regulations have
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more influence over the content of the rules promoted in each jurisdiction. Having said
that, mentions to relevant laws of federal states or European member states will be made
when necessary. These are simply not presented as the core regulators that interacted
with each other in the transatlantic area.
My decision to only include regulations at the American federal, European, or
international level is also valid for private regulators. While in the United States there
does not seem to have been a lot of industry self-regulations created for one specific
state, this choice is quite significant in Europe where each member state often has its
own set of industry associations developing codes of conduct, guidelines, or certification
programmes. Early codes adopted by the ancestor of the industry association now named
Adigital in Spain or ECP.NL in the Netherlands notably appeared in a preliminary
research as having played an important role in the development of private forms of
regulation in Europe and even globally in the mid-1990s. In the case of ECP.NL, their
code notably ended up being referenced in a recommendation on the development of
private codes of conduct for e-commerce adopted by the United Nations Centre for Trade
Facilitation and Electronic Business in 2001. Just as federal states or European member
states, most of these national actors were however less active in the transnational space
and were members of larger European associations setting out their own regulations that
they were supposed to follow. The Federation of European Direct Marketing Association
(FEDMA) that had its code approved by the Article 29 working party created by the
Data Directive is actually representing direct marketing associations in most European
member states, which all are supposed to implement its code. This is not to say that the
relation of influence never goes the other way around or that they did not play any role,
but as a whole, they are not as significant and were thus discarded. National associations
that actually became active in more than one European member state were the only ones
kept in the database.
A second important choice that I made when defining the population of regulations
included in my original database was to only include industry self-regulations setting
up rules for multiple private companies. This means that I included codes of conduct
devised by an industry group for all its members or certification programmes built by one
company but used by many. Meanwhile, I excluded internal policies adopted by a single
company for its own use. Although those of large and well-known companies may lead
others to adopt the same practices, few have such a systemic impact. Moreover, most
of these companies actually base their policies on the codes of conduct put forward by
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industry associations they are part of or the requirements of a certification programme
that they voluntarily follow. Microsoft and Apple for example had their privacy policies
certified under TrustArc’s certification programme, which is included in the database
used for this research. Similarly, Google and Facebook are current members of the Direct
Marketing Association (DMA) and thus have to abide by its code of conduct that is also
part of the database. As these industry self-regulations also directly apply to many small
firms, they give a more systemic view of which data protection rules are promoted by
private actors and how do these evolve over time. It does not mean that it would not be
relevant to look into the relations between private companies’ internal policies and these
different industry self-regulations. Doing so could show that some companies perhaps
do not fully implement the industry self-regulations that they are supposed to follow.
It could also highlight that industry self-regulations are not the ones devising new rules
and are rather used by some companies to project their owns onto others. On that last
point, it could however be the opposite and that some companies simultaneously active
in multiple industry associations are the ones promoting the rules of an industry self-
regulation in other fora. Despite potentially providing additional insights on who sets
data protection rules and how, these dynamics will not be further investigated in this
work as doing so would have made my current data collection too cumbersome and raised
the risks of getting a wrongful representation of the system in place. Future research could
however add to the present work by looking at this extra-layer of interactions as I will
briefly discuss in the conclusion of this research.
Having specified these inclusion and exclusion rules1, 126 regulations were man-
ually collected from publicly available websites. As reiterated above, I identified these
regulations based on previous research, including some specifically funded by public agen-
cies aiming to get a better understanding of industry self-regulations in the e-commerce
and privacy space (Cavoukian and Crompton 2000; European Commission 2001a, 2012b;
European Parliament 2012; Rodrigues and Papkonstantinou 2018; Trzaskowski 2006). I
also asked all my interviewees who were according to them the main public and private
regulators that had adopted privacy regulations. Their answers were then compared with
the information that I had found in these documents. In the end, there was only one
private organization that I had missed and that I then duly added to my database.
Public regulations were retrieved from the different governments’ or agencies’
websites. Amendments adopted over time were included as separate regulations. In cases
1These rules are summarized in the introduction to Appendix C that explains at greater length how
documents were collected and coded to ensure replicability.
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where the amendment only modified one or few rules, a separate document including
both the original law and the amendment was added to the database. This allowed
seeing more clearly the evolution of a regulation through time. Compared to public
regulations, accessing older industry self-regulations proved more tricky. Not all private
associations kept a public record of the previous versions of their codes of conduct,
guidelines, or certification programmes. Only the latest set of rules was most of the time
readily accessible online. To access these older versions and gain an insight into how they
changed over time over time, I used the Internet archive Waybak Machine tool allowing
to access most webpages created since the mid-1990s. In a few cases, it was unfortunately
impossible to go that far back and to find their rules before 2000. These only represent a
small number of cases and appropriate caveats will be made when needed in the analysis.
When the version or year of adoption of an industry self-regulation was not clearly
specified, making unclear if changes had been made, the text of the regulation available
online at the beginning of every year was compared using a free online tool allowing to
find textual differences between them. As soon as there was a difference in its content
(i.e., not the title or the address of the organization), I considered that a new version of
the regulation had been adopted and included it as a separate document in my database
with the date of the year it was put up online.
Following a content analysis of these different regulations and their revisions, I
tracked “change and development” in the regulation of privacy (Bowen 2009: 30). From
the 126 identified public and private regulations, 14 principles and 71 rules were found
and manually coded. Principles are here taken as broad “beliefs fact, causation, and
rectitude” and rules as “specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action” implementing
these broader principles (Krasner 1982: 186) . To put it differently, “principles are open-
ended as to the range of actions they prescribe, while rules prescribe specific actions”
(Drahos 2017: 249). As opposed to technical standards defining, for example, production
techniques and that can be very detailed, many rules can still be general in how what
they prescribe must be applied. Yet, they always prescribe a relatively clear action rather
than a broad objective. To give a practical example from the current research, the first
principle listed in the database is transparency, which foresees that the collection and
use of personal information should be done in a clear and open manner. This principle
is then divided into 11 rules that explain how it is applied. It notably includes the
obligation to have a privacy policy informing individuals of how their data is being used,
informing them of the type of data that is being used and to whom it might be disclosed.
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All principles and rules are listed in Appendix C that presents the codebook used for
manually coding all 126 regulations.
In recent years, both legal scholars and political scientists have increasingly made
use of automated tools to analyze legal or political texts (Grimmer and Stewart 2013;
Allee, Elsig and Lugg 2017; Alschner, Pauwelyn and Puig 2017). These are powerful
methods allowing to quickly evaluate the similarity of multiple laws or other legal docu-
ments. As the latter often adopt the same language, they can spot textual patterns and
repetitions across multiple texts and thus potentially single out when and where similar
rules exist. Automated methods are moreover more easily replicated and verifiable as
opposed to manual coding. There are evident risks when coding texts manually to find
false positives (i.e., coding something that should not be) or false negatives (i.e., not
coding something that should be). This does not mean that automated methods should
always be preferred, though.
As Wolfgang Alschner and his colleagues notably point out, most automated
techniques “are language-specific” (2017: 230). This means that they will only work
if all the documents are in the same language. Of more relevance for this research,
basic automated coding techniques do poorly with documents of different formats and
types. In the present case, the database includes American laws, European directives and
regulations, transnational agreements, and industry self-regulations. Although they all
deal with the same issue, quantitatively comparing the presence of strings of text in these
different types of regulations written using different drafting techniques will not produce
something as meaningful as recent studies that compared texts sharing the same basic
structure like trade agreements (Allee, Elsig and Lugg 2017). More complex automated
coding techniques that would have for example relied on parts of manual coding could
have been used. These would have, however, required a similar amount of work than to
manually code this database and, as such, were rejected. Automated coding is finally
well suited to classify and scale documents (Grimmer and Stewart 2013: 268), but it
can hardly identify and single out specific elements (e.g., the rules) in a document. As
this research notably attempted to identify the content of the new rules and principles
emerging in the regulation of privacy over the years, qualitative coding allowing for the
use of a partly inductive approach was thus again seen as the best option.
To ensure the highest possible coding reliability, I developed a codebook that can
be found in Appendix C listing clear inclusion and exclusion rules for all principles and
rules. Each rule was given a different definition and code, which were then attributed
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to a single specific principle. These codes were created both deductively and inductively
(Campbell et al. 2013: 311-2). Again, as far as I am aware, there is no other work that
had previously attempted to develop a similar database and to categorize all existing
data protection rules, making an inductive approach partly inescapable. As just pointed
out, the interest in identifying new elements in the regulation of privacy also made an
inductive work essential. The first set of codes was nonetheless created based on two
sources of information. First, an early research by the Ontario privacy commissioner of
industry self-regulations in the privacy space was used to identify the initial set of data
protection principles and rules (Cavoukian and Crompton 2000). Second, resources put
out by law firms and data protection offices in Europe and the United States summarizing
the content of the GDPR were used to distinguish more recent data protection principles
and rules. White & Case (2019) is one recent example of a law firm that put out a GDPR
Handbook and the Information Commissionner’s Office of the United Kingdom (2019) is
one of a data protection authority that published a guide on how to apply the GDPR.
I then applied the first set of codes to a randomly selected pool of 20 regulations
from the database. Following this first wave of coding, new codes were added for rules
that did not fit any predefined one. Refined codes were also created for broad principles
and rules that could sometimes be split into two or more. At this stage, a difficult
balance had to be found between creating an increasingly complicated coding scheme
and ensuring its reliability. While potentially providing a more detailed picture of the
content of each regulation, the more detailed a coding scheme becomes, the more it risks
losing its discriminant capability (Campbell et al. 2013: 301). As more codes are added, it
becomes more cognitively demanding to distinguish elements in a text and thus raises the
likelihood for coding errors. This means that some subtle, but still significant divergence
in rules found in various regulations were certainly lost in the coding process. One
example of this is the distinction between opt-in and opt-out consent, which unfortunately
could not be included as it was not always clear which one a specific regulation was
advocating for. This is, however, a major distinction in how privacy is protected on
the ground. While the first requires to obtain the formal consent of individuals before
collecting and using their data, the latter basically assumes that individuals using the
services of a company and do not otherwise indicate their disagreement have consented
to have their data collected and used. Making the distinction between these two forms of
consent in a truly replicable manner was even more difficult as there are now also rules
allowing individuals to withdraw their consent or to opt-out of specific data processing
at any time. While different, the similar language used in these provisions truly made
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it impossible to have two different codes for these two types of consent. As always,
this limitation is specifically acknowledged when needed and integrated into the analysis
insofar as possible. I finally used the updated codebook to code the entire corpus of
regulations. Once done, I revised the entire coding one last time for consistency.
My original database built throughout this process will hereafter be used to look
into how interactions between public and private regulators created complex system
dynamics that influenced the content of each of their respective regulations. The next
section will start by presenting the early regulation of privacy by comparing the early
models of data protection rules promoted in the United States and Europe. This will, in
turn, provide the basis for investigating how data protection rules have evolved through
the two processes, exploitation and exploration, that simultaneously pushed towards
greater regulatory convergence and divergence.
4.3 European and American Early Models of Data Protec-
tion Rules
Before detailing the two processes that have been animating the regulation of privacy
in the United States and Europe, it is essential to determine what rules were originally
promoted by both of them. Again, studies on the regulation of privacy in Europe and
the United States generally start by pointing their different regulatory approaches (New-
man 2008). While Europe has had a comprehensive law since the adoption of the Data
Directive in 1995, the United States is seen as still lacking one. Such line of argument yet
does not give a good sense of what are the actual data protection rules that each have
historically hoped to see implemented. It focuses more on the different implementation
strategies than the content of the rules being applied. The multilevel approach and focus
on the content of privacy regulations of the present research promotes a more fine-grained
analysis and aims to distinguish the different rules included by each of them early on.
This will provide the starting point for the remainder of the analysis.
In the case of the United States, it is obviously not as easy to identify one clear
set of rules as in Europe. Their reliance on sectoral laws and codes developed by different
agencies makes it hard to say what is the exact set of rules that the American government
hoped to see applied. While some could be tempted to maintain that they do not have
a preferred set of rules or that they even do not want to promote one, this does not
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seem to fit their actions. Since the United States Department of Health, Education
and Welfare adopted its Fair Information Practices’ guidelines in 1973, many federal
agencies put forward data protection rules. These were followed by the adoption of
various sectoral laws adopted by the federal government that all incorporated a similar
set of core data protection principles and rules. Perhaps more significantly, though, the
United States did negotiate data protection rules on several occasions at the international
level, including with Europe, and clearly developed a position on what type of rules future
privacy regulations should include. To identify the position of the United States back
in the mid-1990s, I use the official guidelines published by the FTC in 1998 listing what
good industry self-regulations should include at the time. As opposed to a law, these
were voluntary in nature. Yet, the central role of the FTC in enforcing industry self-
regulations unsurprisingly pushed private actors to them take quite seriously, if not in
practice see them as mandatory. Moreover, these guidelines mostly included rules found
in federal sectoral laws and the OECD guidelines previously negotiated by the American
government. It should finally be noted that the FTC closely worked with the Department
of Commerce and actually helped the latter develop its position when negotiating the
regulation of privacy on the international scene. With this in mind, these guidelines
adopted by the FTC were considered to represent a de facto model of what the United
States would have liked to see included in a privacy regulation.
Table 4.1 compares the OECD guidelines of 1980, the European Data Directive
of 1995, and the FTC guidelines of 1998. The OECD guidelines were added as a refer-
ence point. As previously noted, they were negotiated by both the United States and
the European Union and in many ways represented the smallest common denominator
between their preferred set of rules. Comparing it with the Data Directive and FTC
guidelines thereby allows getting a sense of the evolution that had already occurred since
the early 80s. To ease the reading, only rules that were included in at least one of these
regulations were listed. When looking at table 4.1, we can first observe that both Eu-
ropean and American regulations moved significantly further than the original OECD
consensus. In effect, both the FTC guidelines and the European Data Directive added
new rules to those found in the OECD guidelines. At the same time, we can see that the
European Union was already attempting to have a more ‘comprehensive’ set of rules as
its Data Directive included more than twice as many new rules as the FTC guidelines.
Of particular interest, each of their new rules also did not deal with the same issues.
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Table 4.1: Comparison of Early Data Protection Rules across the Atlantic







01.01 Privacy statement • • •
01.02 Data controller’s contact
information • •
01.03 Data types and purposes • • •
01.04 Data source •
01.06 Third-party transfer • •
01.09 Automated or passive
data collection •
01.10 Consequences of withhold-
ing personal information • •
02. Consent
02.01 Original consent • • •
02.06 Right to refuse automated
decision-making •
02.07 Right to object •
03. Collection limitations
03.01 Purpose limitations • •
03.02 Fair and lawful • •
03.03 Third-party source •
04. Use limitations
04.01 Original purposes • •
04.02 Fair and lawful •
05. Disclosure
05.01.01 Consent •
05.03.01 Use limitations •
05.03.02 Adequacy of processor
policies •
05.03.03 Contract •
05.04 Third-country transfer •
06. Data quality 06. Data quality • • •
07. Individual participation
07.01 Access and review • • •
07.02 Correction • • •
07.03 Erasure • •
07.04 Notification of third par-
ties •
07.05 Access denial •
07.06 Right to challenge •




08.02 Third-party transfer •
08.03 Special security measures •
09. Children data
09.01 Special notification •
09.02 Special collection limita-
tions •
09.03 Parental control •
09.04 Parental consent •
09.05 Parental access •
09.08 Special security measures •
10. Data security
10.01 Commitment to data secu-
rity • • •
10.08 Data protection officer •
11. Data retention 11. Data retention •
13. Enforcement
13.01 Complaint mechanism •
13.02 Compliance mechanism •
Total 13 30 20
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In Europe, we can first view a broad tendency to expand the list of data protec-
tion principles found in the OECD guidelines. Additional rules were notably included
to ensure that private companies were transparent (Principle 1), respectful of an indi-
vidual’s consent (Principle 2), and allowed them to have some form of control over their
personal data (Principle 7). Without going over all of these additional rules, it is note-
worthy that in addition to requiring that individuals should have access to their personal
information and have the possibility to correct and delete it when found to be wrong,
the Data Directive expressly asked that such changes be notified to all potential parties
to whom the data might have been disclosed “unless this proves impossible or involves
a disproportionate effort” (Art. 12(c)). Following the adoption of the GDPR in 2016,
one of the most widely discussed provision was the so-called right to be forgotten that
is supposed to allow Europeans to ask for the erasure of their personal data (art. 17).
Importantly, this obligation was not entirely new and, in fact, mostly expanded another
right that was already included in the OECD guidelines in 1980. Rather than primarily
allowing to request the erasure of personal data when found to be incorrect or incomplete,
the GDPR more precisely offers several new reasons allowing individuals to request the
erasure of their personal information, including when the data is no longer needed. In
1995, the Data Directive was in fact already expanding the rights to correction and era-
sure by requiring private companies to inform third parties with whom they had shared
personal data of its correction or erasure.
Besides the creation of additional rules elaborating on preexisting principles, the
Data Directive also included rules for three new principles: disclosure (Principle 5),
sensitive data (Principle 8), and data retention (Principle 11). Without again describing
each rule, it can be noted that the focus on data sharing (i.e., disclosure) between private
companies with partners inside and outside of Europe was an early concern for the
European Union. As new technologies used to collect and process personal data was
also making it easier to share it with third parties, the European Union appeared highly
concerned that exchanges of data between private companies would not lead to an indirect
violation of the privacy guarantees offered to individuals, especially when data would be
sent to companies in non-European countries.
Meanwhile, we can see that the United States attempted to generally stay closer
to the rules found in the OECD guidelines. Instead of expanding the broad principles
previously negotiated there, they generally stuck to it and sometimes even dropped some
rules found in the OECD guidelines. One noteworthy absent is the rule on the erasure of
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personal data. As opposed to the Data Directive that expanded it, the FTC guidelines
did not even mention it. This discrepancy highlights the general tendency to give more
freedom to companies using personal data in the United States. Rather than including
the possibility for individuals to request the removal of their personal data altogether, it
seemed like the FTC found sufficient to promote their mere correction. At the same time,
the FTC guidelines also added one new interesting requirement in terms of transparency.
It specifically indicated that industry self-regulations should require private companies
to clearly state how they collected personal information and, notably, if it was through
passive means. The latter occurs when our personal data is collected without us doing
anything specifically. Over the years, this was increasingly done by storing electronic
information on our computers to identify us and collect information about our online
activities. This practice is more popularly known as placing an electronic “cookie”, for
which we regularly receive notice when visiting a website. These were created in 1995
and thus were not a known phenomenon when the Data Directive was drafted. A specific
requirement to be transparent about the use of this tool was added in the 2002 ePrivacy
Directive complementing the Data Directive. By that time, the FTC guidelines had
already included a reference to the importance of informing individuals about the use of
such data collection practices.
Apart from this, the FTC guidelines also comprised rules on two new principles
that were not in the OECD guidelines nor the Data directive. First, it contained multiple
rules aimed at protecting the privacy of children online. These mostly copied what can be
found in COPPA, the American law ensuring the protection of children online adopted
the same year based on the advice of then-FTC’s Chairman Robert Pitofsky (Hertzel
2000: 437). Second, the FTC guidelines also had clear guidance for the creation of
mechanisms to enforce data protection rules (Principle 13). This is in part due to the
role of the FTC, which is notably to ensure that self-regulations are followed. Yet,
it also reflects the particular legal culture in the United States and early interest for
accountability measures noted in chapter 3. One interviewee interestingly remarked that
“Europe didn’t have a concept of accountability in the Data Directive, which was shocking
for an American lawyer like me” (Interview E27, done on April 7th, 2019).
Table 4.1 finally shows that despite sharing some core elements, the early models
of data protection rules in the United States and the European Union were significantly
different. It is here essential to reassert that coding choices might even make them
appear closer than they really are. As previously mentioned, although both the United
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States and the European Union recognized the principle that the use of personal data
should generally be based on an individual’s consent or choice, they have historically
differed in the way it should be collected. In the United States, it has been common to
accept the use of an opt-out form of consent where individuals will be considered to have
provided their consent if they use a company’s services and have not specifically voiced
their objections (opt-out) to the use of their personal data. Meanwhile, in Europe, it was
originally expected that individuals should give their consent before using a company’s
service (opt-in). Due to the sometimes loose language used in the regulations analyzed,
it was again impossible to draw a clear line between these two forms of consent, and the
two models are both shown as including rules on the need of original consent in table
4.1.
This caveat should importantly make clear that regulatory divergences between
the early ‘European’ and ‘American’ models of data protection rules ran deeper than
the analysis that I presented here can actually demonstrate. Just as both jurisdictions
ended up following two different regulatory approaches following a similar liberal starting
point, they also diverged in the content of the rules that they promoted. At the same
time, it is noteworthy that they were still following the same broad principles that they
notably had negotiated at the OECD and that partly originated from the early work of
the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 1973 (see p. 56).
We can effectively see that while diverging on the specifics of how different guarantees
should be implemented, they did fundamentally agree that data protection rules should
aim to ensure that individuals can control how their information is shared and being
used. Here again, the approach of seeing regulations at different levels of abstraction
allows for a more fine-grained understanding of the extent to which both jurisdictions
shared similarities than studies focusing on the convergence of data protection principles
(Bennett 1992) or their divergence in regulatory approach (Newman 2008). It also helps
to see how they could practically interact and influence each other. Even though they
might not have been agreeing on a common set of data protection rules, they still shared
a core understanding of privacy made evident by their acceptance of similar principles.
Since then, new regulations adopted by public and private regulators in both the
United States and European Union evolved based on their joint interactions. Interest-
ingly and perhaps paradoxically, these interactions tended to push them both closer and
further away from each other. Through their interactions, public and private actors in
effect progressively came to share more rules than ever before. At the same time, the
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creation of new rules based on the very same exchanges also tended to push them further
apart and impeded them to become copies of each other. These dual forces reflect the
general tendency of complex systems to evolve in a dynamic state of equilibrium (Kim
2013; Morin, Pauwelyn and Hollway 2017; Pauwelyn 2014; Puig 2014; Ruhl, Katz and
Bommarito 2017). Rather than moving from one clear model (or equilibrium) to another,
which simple comparisons of two regulations might seem to indicate (Chander, Kaminski
and McGeveran 2020; De Hert et al. 2018; Macenaite and Kosta 2017), the transatlantic
regulation of privacy grows through a much more incremental process where stability and
change constantly co-exists. The next and final two sections will introduce at greater
length the two joint processes briefly discussed in chapter 2, exploitation and exploration
(Duit and Galaz 2008; March 1991), behind these converging and diverging trends and
that will be analyzed in more depth in chapter 5 and 6.
4.4 The Convergence of Data Protection Rules in the
Transatlantic Space
The first important trend in the regulation of privacy in the transatlantic area over
the last twenty years or so has been towards greater regulatory convergence. From the
early models of data protection rules put forward and respectively supported by the
American government and the European Commission, public and private regulators in
both jurisdictions have started to include the same rules. As two interviewees for this
research specifically held:
Convergence is the current keyword. [...] We are all progressively going in the same
direction. (Interview E18, done on February 27th, 2019)
We have convergence. Times change and there is a realization that you need
something. [...] The GDPR, being the last and most comprehensive regulation,
is becoming an important source of inspiration globally. (Interview E20, done on
March 1st, 2019)
Importantly, though, this trend has not only been towards European rules. While
European regulators certainly had a significant impact on the set of rules now being
promoted in the United States, and in many other jurisdictions around the world for
that matter, other regulators did not sit idly by waiting to approximate European rules
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as they emerged. Many were indeed active in devising rules and looking to make them
adopted globally. As another interviewee maintained:
It is a global conversation, much more than the EU let it appears. [...] The GDPR
certainly raised the awareness of consumers to privacy issues. I think the Commis-
sion was really good in their marketing campaign, but the reality is that it is a global
discussion. (Interview E15, done on February 19th, 2019)
As new data protection rules populated the transatlantic regulatory system, reg-
ulators have in effect tended to gravitate towards a similar model, and these were not a
purely ‘European’ one. As previously noted, the American government was, for example,
the first to create rules on the protection of children’s privacy and specifically pushing for
the development of private enforcement mechanisms, which have since then been taken
up by European public and private regulators. This similarly occurred for data breach
rules first enunciated by the government of California and various other ones by private
regulators. This process of convergence can be observed by looking at the rising similarity
between regulations adopted in both jurisdictions over time.
Various methods exist to calculate the similarity between two or more texts. Most
commonly, a Jaccard similarity (see e.g., Alschner and Skougarevskiy 2016) index is used.
The latter calculates the number of elements (i.e., a string of x words or manual codes)
that two texts share divided by the remaining number of potential elements (i.e., a non-
similar string of words or non-coded text). To put it simply, it calculates the number
of co-occurrences in two texts against the potential number they could have had. One
limitation of this method is that it is sensitive to the length of the texts compared.
Comparing a significantly longer text or more manual codes with a significantly shorter
one or fewer codes will generally indicate a low level of similarity even though the shorter
text might be an almost replica of part of the longer one. To minimize this phenomenon,
a thematic similarity calculates the average between the number of similar strings of text
or coded texts compared to the total number possible in one text (Armborst 2017: 3).











In the latter, t is the thematic similarity index. It is given by adding the propor-
tion of shared elements (n12) in the first text (n1) to the proportion of shared elements
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(n12) in the second text (n2). It is then divided by two to get the average. In this specific
case, the shared elements are rules that have been manually coded in both regulations.
Importantly, this similarity calculus does not give the textual similarity per se, but the
level of similarity in the coded content of each regulation. In other words, the index
should not be taken as meaning that two regulations with a similarity index of 0.5 are
half-identical, but that the mean of their shared rules compared to their total number of
shared rules is 0.5. This could result from a situation where both regulations have half
of their rules similar to the other (R1 and R2 both share 5 rules out of 10), but it could
also result from two regulations with different ratios of similar rules (R1 shares 3 rules
with R2 out of 4 and R2 also shares 3 rules with R1 but out of 12). These two scenarios
obviously do not mean the same thing even if they produce the same similarity index
and will be discussed when needed. For now, using this thematic similarity index2 shows
that regulations adopted since 1997 have on average become increasingly similar to each
other.
Figure 4.2 depicts this trend and notably shows that despite important yearly
variation the average similarity index between new regulations has risen from a bit more
than 0.4 to close to 0.63. This is particularly significant as the inclusion of new rules in
regulations adopted in the United States and the European Union could have also pushed
towards a greater dissimilarity as discussed at greater length below. For the similarity
index to rise, it means that the number of similar rules rose faster than the total number
of rules included in new or revised versions of previous regulations. It is moreover striking
that the four regulations adopted in 1997 that had on average a lower level of similarity
(0.41)4 were created by four American industry associations, while the four regulations
created in 2017 that have on average the highest level of similarity (0.65) were created by
two American and two European industry associations. More than simply having more
similar regulations in each jurisdiction, there thus seems to have been a real convergence
between those promoted in the European Union and the United States. This is due
2The Jaccard similarity index was also calculated for comparison purposes. As expected, the level of
similarity between all texts was lower and reflects the tendency of this index to undervalue the similarity
between texts of different lengths. The standard deviation between similarity results using one of these
two indexes remained almost identical, indicating that the difference in similarity between two pairs of
texts remained constant.
3Two years (1998 and 2010) were excluded as they had two or less new regulations adopted.
4The already high level of similarity in 1997 can be explained by the fact that all regulations deal with
the same issue (data protection) and were shaped by previous interactions, including the negotiation of
the OECD guidelines in 1980. As recognized by previous research (Bennett 1992), the trend pushing
towards greater convergence analyzed here was thus already underway when the European Data Directive
was adopted in 1995.
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to the rise in interactions between actors in both jurisdictions after 1995 as chapter 5
will specifically highlight. Although actors in both jurisdictions had already been able
to influence each other before 1995, these efforts became increasingly important and
numerous afterward.
Figure 4.2: Average level of similarity between newly adopted regulations in a given year (1997-
2017)
This specific trend towards greater regulatory convergence is in line with the first
main process driving the evolution of complex governance systems: the ‘exploitation’ of
preexisting resources (Duit and Galaz 2008; March 1991). As noted in chapter 2, the con-
cept of exploitation describes a strategy of using “old certainties” to solve a given problem
(March 1991: 71). Looking into the evolution of trade rules, Jean-Frédéric Morin and
his colleagues more specifically define exploitation as the strategy of leveraging “existing
capabilities through activities like reproduction, refinement, efficiency selection, and im-
plementation” (2017: 372). When public or private actors start working on adopting a
regulation on data protection or revising their previous ones, this means that they start
by looking at what currently exists and attempt to use it. This has been repeatedly
recognized in interviews done for this research:
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We were aware of other initiatives. We certainly look at best practices in the
industry and we didn’t want to reinvent the wheel. (Interview E7, done on February
4th, 2019)
We did some pick and choose among what we thought were the best prac-
tices. (Interview E11, done on February 6th, 2019)
It is always best if you do not have to reinvent the wheel. Otherwise, you
risk to make a lot of mistakes. (Interview E26, done on March 22nd, 2019)
As far as external sources, yes, we don’t do this in a vacuum. [While talk-
ing about the influence of another organization on the work of his organization, he
added:] Frankly, most often they are the ones that copy us. (Interview E32, done
on April 25th, 2019)
We believe that in every area there are already practices that we need to
map and that will serve us to identify what we want to base ourselves against. We
almost never start from nothing. (Interview E40, done on May 14th, 2019)
This tendency to exploit preexisting rules has many benefits. It is first less costly
(Morin, Pauwelyn and Hollway 2017). Reinventing the wheel, to paraphrase some of
the interviewees, is not an easy task and can be quite time-consuming. Everyone that
had to come up with a new idea knows this. Writer’s block is one illustration of this in
the academic world. As scholars try to be creative, they can easily feel stuck in front
of a blank page. It can moreover be risky to continuously try to create new rules that
have never been implemented. As one interviewee cited above pointed out, mistakes can
be made. New rules can be misunderstood and create unwanted behaviours. Failing to
look at what already exists can similarly lead to omission and allow unwanted practices.
Exploiting preexisting resources can finally help ensure some form of coherency, which is
traditionally highly valued in regulatory systems. As Pauwelyn rightly points out, lawyers
are often “critical of fragmentation and decentralization, and intuitively in search of order
and central authority” (Pauwelyn 2014). They fear that fragmented systems of rules are
prone to create conflicting behaviours and can quickly become chaotic. By making use
of prior rules, public and private actors can help provide much-needed certainty and
clarity with regards to the rules that need to be followed. As one interviewee pointed
out, many private companies in effect find “it is easier to repeat what you do in one
[regulatory] system to diminish the legal complexity. [...] It pays to have a unified
approach” (Interview E21, done on March 8th, 2019). By supporting some form of order
in complex systems of governance, exploitation strategies are, in other words, particularly
valuable for private businesses.
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Emphasizing the importance of exploitation strategies can easily lead to a sense
that politics are not at play. In a way, it could be thought that this simply means that the
content of new regulations is simply a function of the institutional environment in place
at a specific point in time. This would be an erroneous conclusion. Not all preexisting
rules will be equally exploited. The previously observed convergence in effect did not
happen randomly and tended to be concentrated around the rules of actors holding
specific positions in the system. Understanding around which rules regulators converge
thus requires looking into the interactions between different public and private actors,
which will be analyzed in chapter 5.
4.5 From Convergence to Divergence: Innovations in the
Transatlantic Regulation of Privacy
Next to this tendency towards greater rule convergence, a second but equally important
trend has been towards greater divergence. As seen in figure 4.2, new regulations adopted
in a year never became perfect copies of each other. Indeed, their thematic similarity
index never became equal to one, indicating that no regulations adopted in any given
year included all the same rules. This is in part because the process of convergence
is incremental and notably depends on the interactions that informed the exploitation
strategy of an actor. Depending on with whom they previously worked, they do not have
access to the same pool of rules to work from at a specific point in time. It should also be
noted that the exploitation process does sometimes imply a selection between competing
rules and that not all actors will necessarily make the same choices depending again on
their previous interactions. Yet, these lasting discrepancies are also due to the creation
of new data protection rules. Over time, regulators do not merely copy what others have
done but also tend to innovate.
A ‘regulatory innovation’ is here understood as the creation of a rule that pre-
scribes or proscribes a behaviour for the first time in the regulatory system. This can
both be by further specifying a preexisting principle, like adding a requirement for the
type of information that should be part of a private company’s privacy policy statement,
or creating a rule for an entirely new principle. It is moreover important to note that what
is new in a given regulatory system might actually not be in another one. For example,
it could be that a data protection rule appearing for the first time in the transatlantic
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space already existed in Asia or elsewhere. A new data protection rule could also be
used in another policy space (e.g., competition or financial law). Although it might not
be the first-ever enunciation of a rule, the act of including it for the first time in a new
regulatory system is still considered to be innovative as it generally requires to think of
how it could be interpreted to fit in a new geographical space or for a new object of
regulation. The choice of where the system boundaries are drawn yet becomes crucial
to consider as it clearly affects what will be determined as new or not. In the present
case, the exclusion of the European Member States and American federal states from
the transatlantic privacy system will sometimes create situations where it could look like
the European Commission or the American Federal government created a new rule while
it is, in fact, German or Californian regulators that were behind it. As the goal of this
research is not to pinpoint the definitive origin of a new rule but to understand broad
processes animating the evolution of privacy regulation in the transatlantic space, this
is not highly problematic and especially because these would still appear as ‘European’
or ‘American’ regulatory innovations. When possible, this additional level of detail will
nonetheless be provided.
Figure 4.3 shows the rise of the total number of data protection rules identified in
this research. It shows that in 1994, so one year before the adoption of the Data Directive
in Europe, there were only 19 rules in existence and being applied by either public or
private regulators. These largely represent the rules found in the OECD guidelines
and negotiated by the United States and the European Union in 1980. As of 2017,
this research identified a total of 71 data protection rules that a privacy regulation can
potentially include. None obviously contains all of them. In fact, the GDPR adopted
in 2016 has the second-highest number of rules with 48. The only regulation with more
rules was created by the Europrise certification program primarily aiming to explain
how private companies should implement the GDPR and includes 52 rules. Importantly,
few tend to have as much. As the black line on figure 4.3 shows, active public and
private regulations today include just over 20 rules on average. This number needs to be
considered carefully. Regulations that are active today include some that were adopted
in the mid-2000s and included significantly fewer rules than more recent ones that tend to
be more comprehensive. In 2017, the four regulations adopted by industry associations,
for example, included 38 rules on average.
Interestingly, it can also be observed that the growth of data protection rules
appeared to reach a relative plateau in the mid-2000s, which could seem to echo the
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Figure 4.3: Sum of data protection rules promoted by public and private actors in the transat-
lantic space (1994 - 2017)
same phenomenon occurring in the number of active regulations over time as seen in
figure 4.1. Here, it should first be recalled that the manual coding used most certainly
does not allow to capture the full breadth of regulatory innovations in the transatlantic
privacy system. Self-imposed restrictions in the complexity of the codebook necessarily
led to the exclusion of rules that some actors might have created and yet did not stand
out in a significant way. This is most likely the case for rules that were not shared
by many actors or that worked by further specifying preexisting ones, which are two
characteristics that more recent rules are likely to have. As they did not have the same
time to be widely shared and will often specify preexisting ones, some were likely omitted.
With this caveat in mind, it should not be thought that this slowdown in the creation
of new rules is the mere result of the coding limitations of this research and rather
reflects the non-linear nature of regulatory innovations. New rules are simply not evenly
distributed over time and neither among regulations. Indeed, a few regulations tend to
have a lot and many none at all as depicted in figure 4.4. As a single entity, the European
Commission has been, and by far, the most innovative actor. The Data Directive and
the GDPR together account for 38% of all new data protection rules adopted since 1995
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in the transatlantic area. As mentioned above, some of these innovations and especially
those in the Data Directive might partly come from regulations previously adopted by
European member states. The rest is divided among a relatively small number of public
and private regulators.
Figure 4.4: Sum of regulatory innovations in public and private regulations
These regulatory innovations importantly follow the second, but equally impor-
tant process driving the evolution of complex governance systems: the ‘exploration’ of
new strategies (Duit and Galaz 2008; March 1991). Again looking at the evolution of
trade rules, Morin and his colleagues define exploration as “efforts to create future ca-
pabilities by means of ‘search, variation, experimentation, and discovery’, and implies
venturing into the unknown, introducing chaos to a system” (2017: 372). Over the years,
this specific process has often been linked to the work of highly skilled individuals (Morin,
Pauwelyn and Hollway 2017: 375). This is particularly evident when looking at popular
accounts behind the development of recent technologies in which people like Elon Musk
and Steve Jobs are mythologized for their role in the creation of Tesla or the iPhone.
The complex system approach that is taken here however pushes us to recast the process
of exploration as a social process and system output.
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From an observer’s viewpoint, it is generally easy to attach the development of
an object or idea to a well-known figure rather than trying to understand the complex
process that led to its creation. For the innovators, it is also more rewarding to emphasize
their own roles rather than detailing the contribution of everyone that might have had
an input. Yet, when looking more closely at their breakthroughs or ‘eureka’ moments we
can clearly see that they never happen in a vacuum. Any creators or innovators build
on the preexisting work of others. Mariana Mazzucato (2011) forcefully made that point
looking at the very case of the iPhone. She importantly highlighted that out of twelve
key technical components (e.g.: GPS, Internet, touchscreen, Siri, microprocessors, etc.)
making the iPhone what it is today, all had been created by previous research funded
by the American government (see also Weiss (2014)). This is yet not specific to the
technology sector as any type of novel idea needs to start from something. As Dra-
hos and Braithwaite eloquently put discussing the adoption of public policies in various
jurisdictions around the world:
Creative geniuses tend to be plagiarists, clever at appearing not to be so and deluding
themselves that they are not so. The ancients, who appear the most original of all
scholars, may only appear so because the work of those they imitated has been
destroyed. (2000: 584)
To be clear, the process behind the exploration of new ideas, or in this case new
rules, should never be seen as simple plagiarism as that would be closer to the strategy
of exploiting existing resources discussed in the previous section. It is, however, a much
more relational process where innovations emerge from the recombination of preexisting
ideas or technical elements. (Carstensen 2015; Pagliari and Wilf 2020). Recent studies
on the adoption of patents in the United States precisely show that new ones will almost
always make references to multiple preexisting ones (Youn et al. 2015). In other words,
innovations, be they technological or regulatory, “are never created from nothing” (Arthur
and Polak 2006: 23).
Far from undermining the role of innovators, this relational lens portrays them
as working as part of an ecosystem that shapes the development of their new ideas.
It requires recasting their work in the environment in which they operate and what
information an actor has had access to and integrated into its work over time. When
asked what led to the creation of new data protection principles, one interviewee replied:
“They came from my head. [These] are based on my 20 years or so of experience in
this field” (Interview E37, done on May 14th, 2019). This seemingly trivial sentence
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is illuminating and aptly describes the crucial relationship between the innovator and
its environment. The interviewee was indeed prone to attribute the innovative elements
to his/her own work. As pointed out, it is more than normal for innovators to do so.
Retracing the complex process that led them to their result is an uneasy task and it is
more rewarding for them to emphasize that they were the central element in it. The
second part of the interviewee’s answer is, however, precisely hinting at the simple truth
that it was also the result of a specific system of interactions and, more precisely, the
one in which he/she had evolved for 20 years. Understanding the origins of the data














Figure 4.5: Innovation cycle
Figure 4.5 summarizes the relational process behind the exploration of new rules
and highlights its circular nature. As discussed in the previous section, actors will most
of the time prefer to exploit the rules of actors with which they have interacted when
developing their regulations. As one interviewee explicitly recognized:
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[Industry groups and certification providers] could add new obligations, but in prac-
tice we don’t see that very much. [...] It is just such a big job to decide how to
interpret their existing obligations and they do not want to make their jobs harder
than it already is. (Interview E26, done on March 22nd, 2019)
In effect, being innovative requires time and resources. It is also a risky endeavour
as the actual effects of a new rule can never be entirely known. How it will be interpreted
and applied in relation to other rules is never as clear as those that have been promoted
by other actors for a relatively long time. Faced with these different costs and risks, many
regulators thus often want to ‘make their job easier’ and exploit what already exists as
discussed in the previous section. Exogenous shocks or negative feedback, however, create
a demand for new rules from time to time. The former more precisely describes events
occurring outside the regulatory system that create a pressure for change (e.g., Snowden’s
revelations) and the latter events occurring inside the regulatory system that highlight
inadequacies in the current rules (e.g., data subject’s complaints). Faced with either of
these situations, actors will draw on the preexisting set of rules they are aware of and
combine them to innovate. By combining two or more preexisting rules, they will more
precisely develop new ones. In their work on environmental norms in trade agreements,
Morin and his colleagues give the example that the combination of “a norm calling for
a broad public participation to the adoption of domestic environmental measures [and]
a norm on the regular assessment of the trade agreement’s environmental impact [can]
give rise to a norm providing for a broad public participation to the impact assessment
of the trade agreement” (2017: 378-9).
Importantly, it is understood that the boundaries of a system are open to external
influences and that actors can even be part of multiple systems at the same time. Actors
that sit on the frontiers of multiple systems indeed have the opportunity to combine
ideas coming from the different systems they are part of and can result in giving them
a special “arbitrage” role through which they decide what external new ideas come into
the regulatory system (Seabrooke and Tsingou 2014). The specific nature and role of
actors bridging different systems will not be further investigated here. For this research,
it should only be kept in mind that the combination of ideas does not have to only
come from inside one regulatory system. As complex systems progressively become more
coherent over time as actors exploit known strategies (or similar rules), the inclusion of
external ideas can be crucial to innovate. This possibility to draw from external resources
was notably made evident in an interviewee’s answer to what sources of information had
been instrumental in their work to develop new privacy guarantees:
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One was the work of the [Individual Referential Service Group] at the end of the
1990s. [...] The second is really, in the United States, the experience of the stock-
market meltdown where security exchange started to require that external non-profit
organizations govern the self-regulatory programs and codes of conduct developed
by exchanges. (Interview E37, done on May 14th, 2019)
While the former source of inspiration mentioned by the interviewee was the work
of an industry organization that developed a code dealing with privacy issues, the latter
were changes occurring in the financial sector and not specifically related to privacy. One
source was thus from within the privacy regulatory system, while the other was coming
from outside. Once created, new rules can finally be exploited by other regulators and
serve in the process of forming new ones. In other words, they become the raw materials
for other regulatory innovations to emerge.
This relational or systemic view of regulatory innovations should still not be
equated to a kind of natural process. Just as the exploitation of preexisting rules, the
exploration of new ones is clearly not devoid of politics nor merely driven by the structure
of the system. The interests of the regulators are essential to consider in that process, but
they need to be looked at and understood in the context of their interactions over time.
The fact that the European Commission has been the single most innovative regulator
is, for example, due to its constant desire to set a basic framework as seen in chapter
3. At the same time, when and how it ended up promoting regulatory innovations was
dependent on its interactions at a specific point in time and what already existed. In
other words, its regulatory actions need to be seen as being part of a specific structure
that shaped them. Chapter 6 will look deeper into how a specific system’s structure
interacts with the exploration of new rules by also focusing more on the role of private
actors in it.
4.6 Conclusion
Throughout this chapter, I argued that the transatlantic privacy system can be conceptu-
alized as a complex governance system. As opposed to its traditional depiction as being
composed of two jurisdictions evolving in isolation up until a formal negotiation or con-
flict occur every decade or so (Bessette and Haufler 2001; Drezner 2007; Dimitrov et al.
2007; Long and Quek 2002), it emphasizes and takes as a starting point that they have
actually been in constant interactions with each other. Even though the European Union
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and the United States clearly remain two separate legal entities, their respective public
and private regulators have indeed been constantly working together. While not all ac-
tors did so equally, all these interactions created bridges between the two jurisdictions
and fundamentally changed their respective regulatory processes.
Viewing the United States and the European Union as a complex governance sys-
tem fundamentally highlights two new dynamics that shaped the evolution of transat-
lantic data protection rules. There is first a tendency towards greater rule convergence
driven by a desire of regulators to exploit preexisting resources and simplify their job. In
addition to limiting the investment in time and resources that they have to make when
devising new regulations, they also minimize the risks of creating unwanted effects and
an increasingly difficult regulatory environment to navigate for private companies. As
regulators interact with each other, they quite straightforwardly take inspiration from
what their colleagues with whom they had exchanges have previously done. At the same
time, there is a second tendency pushing towards greater rule divergence supported by
regulators’ interest to respond to changes in the real world. By developing new rules,
they try to deal with the new information and events that come to challenge how privacy
is protected.
Seemingly contradictory, these two processes are what actually keeps the system in
a dynamic state of equilibrium (Haas 1982; Morin, Pauwelyn and Hollway 2017; Pauwelyn
2014). While the exploitation of known rules pushes the system towards more order,
the exploration of new ones introduces chaos (or diversity) in it. Significantly, it is
only possible to simultaneously recognize these two processes because of the multilevel
perspective embedded in this research. Indeed, it is by breaking each regulatory system
into the public and private regulations constituting them and, in turn, splitting them
into their constitutive rules that we can see how these two dynamics operate at the same
time. At the level of rules, there is now much more diversity than there used to be. There
are nowadays more rules spread across more regulations than ever before. Yet, seen as a
whole, all regulations have also never been as close to each other. As these two trends
continue to drive the evolution of transatlantic privacy regulation, it should be expected
that they will keep themselves in check and impede it from ever becoming a completely
fragmented or homogeneous system.
This first set of findings contribute to show the homeorhetic nature of privacy
regulation in the transatlantic space. As noted in chapter 2, complex systems tend to
evolve following a trajectory (i.e., homeorhesis) rather than going back to a specific state
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(i.e., homeostasis). In the present case, new regulations do not tend to move towards
the same constant set of data protection principles and rules. As time passes and new
connections are formed between public and private regulators, they both tend to explore
and exploit new sets of principles and rules. Thomas Oatley similarly defines this as the
non-ergodic nature of economic governance, which basically means that “it changes as
it moves through time” (Oatley 2019). While most governance scholars would probably
recognize that institutions and regulations do not remain the same over their entire
lifespan, they would traditionally view them as moving from one state of equilibrium
to another. Here, I also distinguish myself from previous studies by pointing out the
incremental nature of this process.
The next two chapters will now go deeper into the analysis of these two processes
separately and emphasize more clearly the politics behind them. Up to now, the actors’
interests in pursuing one of the two strategies behind these two trends (i.e., exploita-
tion and exploration) were highlighted but remained peripheral to the explanation. No
difference was moreover drawn between public and private actors. Just discussing these
trends in that way can easily leave the unsatisfactory feeling that one of the key ques-
tions for political science is left as a blind spot: who benefits from it and how (Kahler
2016: 836)? By focusing on the different forms of interactions between public and private
actors as well as their different relations with the broader structure forming this complex






It is remarkable that [the] global
profusion of laws has not led to
chaotic differences in standards: in
fact, it has resulted in a high level of
global convergence of standards.
Graham Greenleaf, 2018
In international privacy debates, convergence is one of the current buzzwords.
Speaking at the official events organized by the European Commission back in May
2018 for the launch of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), invited expert
Graham Greenleaf cited in epigraph marveled at the “remarkable degree of global con-
vergence” that had been achieved since the European Data Directive had been adopted
two decades earlier (2018: 2). One year later, the 41st International Conference of Data
Protection and Privacy Commissioners (ICDPPC), a forum connecting 122 privacy and
data protection authorities around the world, was specifically organized around the theme
Convergence and Connectivity as the number of countries with privacy laws reached new
heights with the adoption of multiple national laws supposedly modeled after the GDPR
like most recently in Nigeria (Chander, Kaminski and McGeveran 2020: 3). While not
new (Bennett 1992, 2010), this continuing trend towards greater regulatory convergence
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as the regulation of privacy becomes more comprehensive and detailed is truly notewor-
thy.
Notwithstanding, not everyone embraces the concept of convergence with the
same enthusiasm. In the United States, it is most notably viewed as a euphemism for
what really is a strategy of regulatory export by the European Union. As one American
interviewee quite bluntly argued, “the EU tries to export its framework globally, which
I found funny as they only represent 1/4 of the world’s population, but, OK, they used
to be the centre of the world” (Interview E27, done on April 4th, 2019). As opposed to
this, what American regulators often try to promote is the concept of ‘interoperability’
as noted in chapter 3. The latter supports the use of accountability mechanisms that
would “bridge approaches across disparate regulatory systems, by allowing countries to
pursue common data protection objectives through very different – but equally reliable
– means” (Bennett 2010: 13). While convergence means the adoption of increasingly
similar privacy rules and standards, this promotes a form of regulatory coordination
where different regulatory frameworks “recognize or accommodate” each other but do
not necessarily become closer over time (Drezner 2007: 11). This concept is now at the
heart of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Privacy Framework negotiated
by the United States in 2015 and was partially incorporated by the European Union in the
GDPR. As also discussed in conclusion to chapter 3, the decision to consider private codes
of conduct and certification programs as adequate means to transfer personal data across
jurisdiction interestingly echoes the American support for interoperability mechanisms
rather than the process towards greater legal convergence that adequacy decisions are
supposed to support.
In this respect, the finding presented in chapter 4 that privacy regulations adopted
in the transatlantic area have actually converged towards one another is even more signif-
icant. As this process of convergence was driven by industry self-regulations, it moreover
highlights that private forms of regulation have actually ensured that the American and
European privacy systems evolved as a whole rather than making them merely ‘interop-
erable’. In the remainder of this chapter, I build on this insight and argue that industry
associations acted as pathways for the exchange of data protection rules between both
jurisdictions in the two decades following the adoption of the European Data Directive.
While supporting the broader adoption of rules originally devised by themselves, they
basically became a “new institutional avenue to diffuse public rules” (Green and Auld
2017: 261; see also Turkina and Postnikov 2012, 2014). In doing so, they ended up ex-
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tending the influence of public authorities to areas where they would not have normally
enjoyed any. As the European Union was particularly active in devising new rules and
engaging with private actors, this more often than not meant that European rules were
diffused and became the de facto standard around which public and private regulators
in the transatlantic area converged, a result that the American government had precisely
hoped to escape by working with private actors. At the same time, this process was
not as unilateral as the recent literature on the Brussels’ effect maintained (Bradford
2012, 2020) and, as it will be shown, the United States was never a simple “receiver”
or “importer” of European rules. Rules pertaining to the protection of children, the use
of passive methods of data collection, and the education of individuals that were first
enunciated in the United States have notably made their way in Europe.
In addition to answering recent calls to give more attention to the interactions
between public and private forms of authority (Eberlein et al. 2014; Gulbrandsen 2014;
Green and Auld 2017) and providing a more nuanced understanding of how the regula-
tion of privacy has evolved than recent work prone to straightforwardly claim Europe’s
“success in the marketplace of idea” (Schwartz 2019: 146), this will also provide a more
in-depth description of the process of convergence by comparing the actual content of
privacy regulations adopted in both jurisdictions. In line with the multilevel perspective
adopted in this research, convergence will be evaluated based on the content of the rules
found in each of them. Up to now, previous studies tended to use the simple rise in the
global number of privacy regulations adopted around the world and at most the similarity
between their broad principles as a proof of convergence (Bennett 1992, 2010; Greenleaf
2018). By going one step further and breaking down regulations in their constitutive
rules, I show more clearly when exactly convergence occurs or not. I am indeed able to
highlight that when two regulations share a common principle they may not have really
converged.
The next section begins by explaining how the exploitation strategy used by pri-
vate actors was both driven by hierarchical and network relations, and how the latter
importantly ended up reinforcing public authority. It moreover details how a network
approach will be used to empirically locate when and how regulatory convergence oc-
curred in the transatlantic regulation of privacy since the adoption of the European Data
Directive in 1995. The following sections go on applying this analytical method to four
successive time periods ending up just before the European Commission started working
on the drafting of the GDPR.
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5.1 Public Authority and Private Networks
If anarchy is the traditional starting point in world politics, hierarchy is for national pol-
itics. State agencies are in effect considered to have the legal authority to arbitrate any
potential conflict of laws and to be the source of all legal obligations that private actors
have to respect. In the end, what matters are the principles that national governments
have developed and how they are applied. Private rules linearly follow these principles
and can be superseded by them at any time. In legal theory, this is famously modeled by
Kelsen’s pyramid of norms according to which clear relations of superiority or subordina-
tion exist between all sources of authority (Benyekhelef 2015: 30). Figure 5.1 depicts it
graphically and broadly presents how different norms are hierarchically related. Signifi-
cantly, not all states would necessarily have the same hierarchy. It is notably contentious
where international law fits in it. For most international legal scholars, it would come on
top of national laws. Yet, some constitutions only foresee it having an effect after being
incorporated in national law in accordance with the constitution and would thus see it
coming second in the pyramid presented below. One recent example of such debates
appeared when the German constitutional court rejected a previous decision from the
European Court of Justice and found that the European Central Bank had exceeded
its authority by allowing bond purchases (Karnitschnig 2020). For this research, it is
sufficient to point out that industry self-regulations would be seen as a contractual form
of law and almost always fall below legal rules in figure 5.1.
Just as the anarchic view of international relations has long been debated (Lake
1996; Onuf and Klink 1989; Zarakol 2017), the pyramid model of norms can, however, be
questioned. In line with the literature on private authority reviewed in chapter 2 (Avant,
Finnemore and Sell 2010; Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999;
Graz and Nölke 2008; Mattli and Woods 2009), this research indeed holds that principles
and rules do not have to follow a simple top-down process nor directly flow from state
authority. Private rules can emerge without being directly related to public laws and even
end up influencing them. In the absence of clear relations of superiority or subordination,
these different sources of law can be conceived of being part of a network of interactions
(Benyekhelef 2015: 693).
Adopting a network lens importantly does not mean that all legal sources are
equally influential. The network literature has for long pointed out that not all actors








Figure 5.1: Kelsen’s pyramid of norms
In networks, influence is understood as deriving from an actor’s particular position and
set of relations (Hafner-Burton, Kahler and Montgomery 2009). Those with more ties
or ties with specific actors are most notably assumed to have more potent resources to
draw from to achieve their aims (Carpenter 2011; Puig 2014; Seabrooke and Tsingou
2014). This represents a social form of power where an actor’s rules are not adopted by
another through direct imposition but freely taken up by actors interacting with each
other. This broadly fits with the definition of private authority that assumes influence to
be based on consent rather than through coercion (Green 2013b: 27-8). In the context
of this research, this means that actors will tend to exploit the rules of those with whom
they had direct interactions more than those with whom they had no previous contact.
Concomitantly, actors with more relations or linking different groups of actors will tend
to have more influence over the evolution of data protection rules.
At their core, the pyramid and network models thus represent two modes of
organization in which power and influence are expressed differently. While the former
focuses on a ‘command-type’ of power, the latter emphasizes a more ‘co-optive’ or social-
type of power (Lavenex 2014: 889, see also Barnett and Duvall 2005). Unsurprisingly, the
network one has been more usual in the international realm as formal hierarchies are often
considered to be absent. Meanwhile, the traditional recognition of the existence of such
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hierarchies in national legal orders has made the pyramid model the choice to study it.
Putting aside the question that these categorizations represent ideal-types that have never
been absolute, globalization processes have made them increasingly difficult to separate
(Benyekhelef 2015; Davies 2010; Sparke 2013). National legal systems are nowadays
permeated by transnational networks creating their own sets of rules (Braithwaite and
Drahos 2000). Far from being free of hierarchies, though, public and private actors
populating these networks are increasingly embedded in multiple hierarchical relations,
and this is also true for all those making the transatlantic regulation of privacy a complex
governance system. Exploitation strategies behind the regulatory convergence previously
observed were indeed shaped by these two types of interactions between public and
private regulators. From here onward, I will specifically emphasize how these two types
of interactions came together to shape the choice of the rules that industry associations
ended up exploiting and how it sometimes supported the diffusion of public rules.
As shown in figure 5.2, industry associations have progressively formed a col-
laboration network transcending the jurisdictional boundaries of the United States and
the European Union since 1997. The nodes represent industry associations for which a
regulation including at least one data protection rule was found (see section 4.2). Ties
indicate when two have officially worked together to develop data protection rules, ei-
ther through shared membership in another organization or collaboration on a specific
project. Ties were moreover assumed to last over the years, except when it was specifi-
cally indicated that two associations had stopped collaborating. This could notably be
because one association disappeared or stopped being an active member of the other.
This data was collected from publicly available information found on the website of all
industry associations1.
As it can easily be seen, this network became denser over time. In social network
analysis, density represents the proportion of existing ties compared to all potential ones
and can be summarized in an index going from 0 (network with no connections) to 1 (fully
connected network) (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 101). In the present case, the network
densities were respectively 0.06 in 1997 and 0.1 in 2017. The relatively small difference
should be understood in light of the different sizes of both networks. As new industry
associations joined the network, the number of potential connections rose exponentially,
which would generally tend to push towards a lower network density. Previous studies
1As for the collection of all data protection regulations used for this study, the Internet archive
accessible with the Wayback Machine tool was used to access the websites of all organizations as far
back as 1997.
122
Figure 5.2: The evolution of network of interactions between industry associations (1997
- 2017)
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indeed found that the density of many networks tended to become lower over time as
new actors joined it (Cunningham, Everton and Murray 2016: 283). The increase is
thus more significant than it may seem and indicates that there have proportionally been
more new interactions than new actors joining the network over these twenty years.
At the same time, a density of 0.1 in 2017 remains relatively low and reflects the
sometimes competitive nature of the interactions between industry associations. It is
not uncommon to find that industry associations looked at in this research fight for the
same members. As one interviewee stated, there “is always competition. [...] It is sort of
like the empires of the antiquities. Everybody claims the same things. We fight for the
same members” (Interview E21, done on March 8th, 2019). Another interviewee was also
critical of the tendency of another organization to copy their “work for free to monetize
it” (Interview E32, done on April 25th, 2019). This, in turn, limited the propensity
of these organizations to work with each other as they found themselves selling similar
services to the same companies. While this particular relation indeed appears to have
had some limitation effects on exchanges between private associations, it has not entirely
impeded it. In the end, the tendency of private associations to focus their activities
on a specific sector (i.e., marketing, entertainment, e-commerce, etc.) made it easier
for most of them to collaborate. By establishing a ‘niche’ for their regulatory activities,
private associations clearly hoped to fend off themselves from direct competition (Abbott,
Green and Keohane 2016). Public agencies also sometimes helped private actors to work
together by organizing events and even funding their activities as it will be discussed at
greater length in chapter 6.
Through these network interactions, industry associations importantly learned
and socialized themselves to the rules available and that they could potentially exploit
(Auld 2014, Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; more specifically on institutional isomorphism
see DiMaggio and Powell 1983). As one interviewee held, “there is always a lot of cross-
fertilization when [joint projects] like this happens” (Interview E36, done on May 10th,
2019). Central actors in this network thereby ended up having a greater influence on
the evolution of the system. While they could not force others to adopt their rules, they
had more opportunities to make them broadly adopted. European associations working
with American ones and vice-versa moreover had the very particular capacity to act as
bridges between both jurisdictions. Even though their relationships can sometimes be
weaker as they may have less regular interactions than with their national counterparts,
these specific ties can be particularly influential as they connect different groups of actors.
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This echoes the famous claim of network theorist Mark Granovetter (1973) that weak ties
can matter even more than strong ties. In his work, he more precisely showed that ties
with distant or old friends were often more useful for individuals looking for work as they
allowed them to learn about opportunities outside of their close circle of friends. In the
present case, industry associations with links to their counterparts in other jurisdictions
can play a key role in the convergence previously observed due to their special position,
and even though their interactions might not be as strong as with associations active in
their jurisdiction of origin.
These private interactions importantly still operated in the “shadow of hierarchy”
(Gulbrandsen 2014: 76; see also Newman and Bach 2004, Abbott and Snidal 2009b and
Graz and Nölke 2008). As one interviewee clearly noted: “When we prepare [our] criteria,
we always start with the law” (Interview E19, done on March 5th, 2019). This statement
may seem more obvious than it actually is. When industry associations create rules,
they certainly cannot contradict what public laws require. Yet, they could also create
additional or different rules to the legal obligations their members already have to respect
as explained when reviewing the literature on private authority in chapter 2 (see section
2.3). The majority of interviewees for this research nonetheless indicated that the main
purpose of their work was to help their members be compliant with national laws, even
in the United States where there is not as of now a comprehensive law covering both the
public and private sectors.
Various reasons explain this choice. In line with the exploitation strategy, it is less
costly and risky to build industry self-regulations using the rules already developed by
public actors. Instead of having to create a whole new set of rules that could create a lot
of confusion, it is in effect easier to say to their members that companies implementing
their rules will be compliant with the law in a given jurisdiction. This provides them with
legitimacy and a clear selling point to their potential users (Green 2013a; Gulbrandsen
2014). As such, many industry self-regulations are specifically built to demonstrate
compliance with national laws. Finally, it must be remembered that private companies
pay to say that they respect these industry self-regulations, either directly or through
their membership fees. This evidently limits the incentive of these industry associations to
move away from already existing legal requirements as they have to find a balance between
creating strict requirements and making their services attractive to their members. As
one interviewee noted:
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I think that we have developed requirements that go beyond what is required by
the law, but our ability to do so is limited by the fact that at the end of the day it
is a voluntary program. Not only voluntary, but that companies pay to use. There
is thus a limit to what we can ask. [...] It is really important to keep in mind, and
it is probably true for any voluntary and paid program, the impact can only be so
great and you can only impact the companies that decide to join the program. The
more you add requirements that go beyond and above the law the harder you make
it to join. This is particularly the case when your competitors do not necessarily
recommend them. (Interview E34, done on May 6th, 2019)
In that process, industry associations are evidently not limited to the law of the
jurisdiction where they are primarily active. They can combine different sources of law to
help their members respect multiple legal frameworks at the same time. Following that
line of thought, one interviewee noted that regulation put forward by his organization
was “a mix based on a whole variety of things, like the fair information practices, OECD
guidelines, global best practices, APEC and others” (Interview E31, done on April 24th,
2019). This is interestingly what the literature on the market power of Europe (Damro
2015) or Brussels’ effect (Bradford 2012, 2020) assumes will happen when it argues that
companies will find it easier to align themselves with the most stringent rules of jurisdic-
tions with large markets. The previous list of public regulations named by the interviewee
yet strikingly misses the ones these theories would have predicted to be included: the
European Data Directive or the GDPR.
In line with the broadly held view that the European Union is currently winning
privacy debates (Schwartz 2019), most interviewees, including those representing Ameri-
can organizations, in fact mentioned the global influence of European rules in their work.
Asked what was the most important regulatory change to have occurred in recent years,
almost all also pointed out the adoption of the GDPR in Europe. At the same time,
many representatives from non-European associations also maintained that they specif-
ically did not aim to integrate European rules in their regulatory frameworks as they
were seen as being too restrictive and unnecessary cumbersome for their members that
might not have any ties with Europe. As the interviewee cited above stated, “[w]e try to
limit our program to a specific [legal] framework as we don’t want to make compliance
more difficult for a company that doesn’t need it” (Interview E31, done on April 24th,
2019). Interestingly, this phenomenon is not limited to the European Union. Another
interviewee specifically indicated that they were both careful of not integrating too many
rules coming from Europe as well as the United States:
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We need to mention a lot of the GDPR’s content, but then we are getting criticized
in other markets. We have to be careful not to be too US or EU. [...] Otherwise, it
will be seen as a tool to bring GDPR in other countries. [...] It was the same for
the US with COPPA [i.e., the American law on the protection of children privacy
online]. (Interview E25, done on March 15th, 2019)
Some privacy commentators have also pointed out that instead of including Euro-
pean rules in their privacy practices, large private companies sometimes prefer to create
different categories of users with different data protection guarantees. This is the case
of Microsoft and its online service LinkedIn that now indicates that users outside of
“designated countries” (i.e., Europe) can be subject to different data collection practices
(LinkedIn 2020)2. It is thus not a given that either industry associations or private com-
panies will exploit rules emanating from a jurisdiction where they do not find themselves
in a hierarchical relation with its public agencies. This directly contradicts the ‘Brussels
effects’ argument that considers that non-divisiblity of a regulatory object (i.e., personal
data in this case) as a necessary condition for it to happen.
The transatlantic network relations depicted in figure 5.2 can here supplement
and, in a way, further extend these hierarchical relations. As mentioned above, European
and American industry associations that have direct interactions with each other can
socialize each other to the respective regulations that they promote and exploit rules
from their respective primary jurisdiction. In other words, their specific position in the
network structure, and concomitant social influence, come to serve public authorities
by helping their rules be taken up outside of their original legal realm. In addition,
industry associations can amplify the impact of internationally agreed agreements. Both
the Safe Harbor and Privacy Shield Agreements negotiated between the United States
and the European Union to allow the transfer of personal information between the two
jurisdictions foresee that companies will self-certify their compliance with their data
protection rules. Originally intended to be limited to companies that needed to move
personal data from Europe to the United States, industry associations that exploited
these rules in their self-regulations also had the opportunity to more broadly promote
these rules in the United States through their own networks. As stated by one interviewee,
this all means that through these interactions, companies can end up following “higher
requirements than what is foreseen in their national law, which in turn help ensure a
consistent application of data protection globally” (Interview E22, done on March 11th,
2This was originally identified by Wolfie Christl in a Twitter post on the day that LinkedIn updated
its privacy policy (January 6th, 2020).
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2019). Significantly, and as will be discussed below, public authority can also play a role
in the shaping of the network structure and creation of these bridges. Governments can
notably support the work of private organizations working together through financial or
administrative means (Gulbrandsen 2014).
This tendency to exploit pre-existing rules relates and yet differs in several ways
to the mechanisms identified in the diffusion literature reviewed in chapter 2. It first
emphasizes the importance of direct interactions as opposed to indirect ones based on
market or social power (Lavenex 2014). Instead of focusing on how a specific socio-
economic environment can lead actors to adopt a particular behaviour, it emphasizes the
role of direct network or hierarchical relations. This helps avoid the easy slip towards
a form of “passive voice functionalism” (Kahler 2016: 828) often intrinsic to market
explanations reifying the natural logic of the system and making ideas and interests of
actors largely irrelevant. Both network and hierarchical relations are moreover viewed as
operating together rather than separately. While recognizing the crucial role that public
authority plays, it does not see it as linearly imposing its preferences. It can attempt
to influence and steer the content of industry self-regulations and how rules move across
jurisdictions, but this is partly contingent on how these industry associations decide to
work together. Private actors are viewed as having real agency and the capacity to
influence the process of rule convergence by both promoting the rules that they develop
and the ones of public authorities. Finally, the process of exploitation is not understood
as being constant over time. Actors having influence will change as new relations are
formed.
Following the argument in chapter 4 that the transatlantic space can be conceived
as a complex governance system, this transnational explanation attempts to give a richer
representation of how rules have converged. At the same time, it must be reemphasized
that this remains a simplification. Not all interactions are hereafter considered. Trans-
governmental relations and interactions between individuals are most notably excluded.
Various interviewees (e.g., E17, E31, E35) discussed the importance of the International
Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP) in their work and how they sometimes shared
their regulatory approaches there. Again, complexity theory does not aim to build a
model the replicates the actual world but to emphasize phenomena emerging from the
interactions of multiple heterogeneous and interconnected elements making up a system3.
3See section 2.5 on this point.
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In this specific case, the emergent phenomenon is the process of exploitation driven by
the interactions between public and private actors causing this regulatory convergence.
To demonstrate how private networks have supported the convergence of data
protection rules found in the American and European models as well as those developed
by industry associations, the next sections will proceed with a careful historical com-
parison of the content of industry self-regulations adopted in the European Union and
the United States with an analysis of the evolution of the network structure. Cases of
specific rules adopted following new or repeated interactions between two industry associ-
ations will be used as confirmatory evidence of this process of exploitation. As previously
mentioned, ties will illustrate situations where two industry associations have officially
worked together to develop data protection rules, either through shared membership or
specific projects. Information on ties was collected as it was to prepare figure 5.2 above.
Time will finally be used “to dissociate [it] from homophily” (Gilardi 2012: 457). When
using network data to explain specific outcomes, one needs to be particularly careful
about the meaning of the observed relations. Instead of representing a relation of influ-
ence (‘exploitation’), a tie between two actors can very simply show that two actors had
similar preferences in the first place (‘homophily’). To account for this, the content of the
regulations of two collaborating industry associations will be compared before and after
they had their first interactions. Changes occurring after their first direct interactions
took place will be taken as a sign of exploitation rather than homophily. When possible,
interview data and information from official reports will be supplemented to make the
argument stronger.
5.2 Limited Convergence After the Data Directive
From 1995 to 2000, seven private associations put forward a self-regulation dealing with
privacy issues in the United States4. Next to the sectoral laws adopted at the American
federal level and introduced in chapter 3, these contributed to set out the data protec-
tion rules in various industries and included: the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants’ (AICPA) Webtrust program; the BetterBusinessBureau’s (BBB) Online
privacy program; the Direct Marketing Association’s (DMA) Ethical marketing guide-
lines; the Internet Alliance’s (IA) Code of conduct for online businesses; the Individual
4See section 3.3 and 3.5 for a reminder of how these organizations were found as well as those discussed
further on in this chapter.
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Reference Services Group’s (IRSG) Privacy principles; the Online Privacy Alliance’s Pri-
vacy guidelines; and TrustArc’s (then-called TRUSTe) Privacy program. A comparison
of all these self-regulations with the European and American models of rules is reported in
table 5.1, except for TrustArc as it was impossible to find the text of their self-regulation
before 2000. The revised versions of the AICPA Webstrut program in 1999 and IA code
in 1998 were included to show the early dynamic nature of these regulations. The OECD
guidelines of 1980 were again added as a reference point. Each cell then indicates the
number of rules that each industry self-regulation had in common over the total number
of rules that they included. The total number of rules present in the OECD guidelines,
the European Data Directive, and the FTC guidelines are specified below each one to
highlight the actual ‘pool’ of rules that they could have potentially tapped in. In paren-
thesis, the thematic similarity index5 shows the average proportion of rules that two
regulations have compared to their respective total number of rules6.
Table 5.1: Comparison of Number of Shared Rules Between Early Industry Self-Regulation and
American and European Rule Models*
OECD Privacy Guidelines
(1980) - 13 Potential Rules
European Data Directive
(1995) - 30 Potential Rules
FTC Fair Information
Practice Principles (1998) -
20 Potential Rules
AICPA Webtrust 1997 2/8 (0.150) 4/8 (0.32) 4/8 (0.35)
AICPA Webtrust 1999 9/18 (0.60) 13/18 (0.60) 11/18 (0.58)
BBBOnline Privacy Program 8/29 (0.44) 15/29 (0.53) 16/29 (0.68)**
DMA Ethical Guidelines
1997
2/5 (0.158) 4/5 (0.47) 2/5 (0.155)
IA Code 1997 5/14 (0.38) 8/14 (0.45) 12/14 (0.76)**
IA Code 1998 6/18 (0.40) 9/18 (0.42) 14/18 (0.76)**
IRSG Principles 1997 9/23 (0.55) 13/23 (0.53) 13/23 (0.62)**
OPA Guidelines 1999 7/13 (0.54) 11/13 (0.62)** 11/13 (0.70)**
* Thematic similarity index shown in parenthesis; ** Similarity index higher than 0.60
Looking at table 5.1 reveals several things. First, there was an important diversity
in the content of these regulations. Some contain very few rules and as little as five for
the ethical marketing guidelines adopted in 1997 by the DMA, while others were already
more comprehensive like the BBBOnline privacy program or the privacy principles of
the IRSG that had even more rules than the FTC guidelines. This broadly reflects the
early nature of these self-regulatory attempts and that they were still trying to define
what should be acceptable data practices. None is moreover a perfect reflection of the
5See section 4.4 for a reminder on how this similarity index is calculated.
6In practice, the AICPA Webtrust 1997 similarity index of 0.15 with the OECD guidelines is found
by doing the following calculus: 0.5*(2/8 + 2/13).
130
American or European set of rules, nor even of the OECD guidelines that were adopted
close to twenty years before and were supposed to represent a broad consensus. This
again points to the fact that many were still experimenting with their codes and were
not following one clear model yet. That being said, they generally tend to be closer to
the American model as shown by the IA code of conduct, the IRSG principles, and the
OPA guidelines having a similarity index with the FTC guidelines of more than 0.6.
This number should be carefully considered and does not mean that they are more
than 60% identical. Again, this similarity index calculates the average proportion of rules
that two regulations share compared to their respective total number of rules. The OPA
guidelines thus have a higher similarity index with the FTC guidelines than with the Data
Directive even though they have the same amount of shared rules. This importantly
reflects the fact that it could have taken up more rules if it had really embraced the
European model rather than the American one. In other words, the index gives weight
to the size of the pool of potential rules that a regulation could have exploited. The
generally high level of similarity is finally caused by the preexistence of a relatively
consensual set of rules. Almost all rules that these industry self-regulations have in
common with the European ones are in effect the same ones that they share with the
OECD and FTC guidelines. This shows that although none perfectly took on-board the
OECD guidelines, they generally tended to use a similar starting point to devise the
content of their self-regulation.
At the same time, they practically never contained the new rules introduced in
the Data Directive that truly distinguished the European model. None notably included
a rule requiring personal data not to be kept for longer than necessary or the requirement
to ask for the explicit consent of individuals when dealing with sensitive data. Neither
did any included rules specifying that the processing of personal data needs to be fair and
in accordance with the law, which has long been a staple characteristic of the European
model that comes from their idea that the processing of personal data needs to have a
legal basis (Schwartz and Peifer 2017: 127). Only the revision of the AICPA Webtrust
program in 1999 moreover included a specification that individuals could ask for wrongful
data to be deleted. Yet, it did not add the obligation for companies to communicate any
correction or deletion of personal data that they may have shared with third parties.
One interesting exception is the inclusion by the AICPA Webtrust program, BBBOnline
privacy program, DMA ethical guidelines, and IA code of conduct of rules dealing with
the disclosure of personal data to third parties, which were not part of the OECD or
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FTC guidelines. This actually explains why the DMA ethical guidelines of 1997 have
a much higher similarity index with the European Directive than the other two. Out
of the only 5 data protection rules that it had, it included two on the exchange of
personal data that were in the Data Directive. One was more specifically requiring private
companies to obtain individuals’ consent before sharing their personal data with third
parties. The other relatedly stated that individuals must be informed of the fact that their
personal data may be shared. Far from representing the exploitation of the ‘European’
rules, though, it actually highlights the influence of American private associations in the
development of data protection rules in Europe through private networks before the time
period for this research even started.
Since the early 70s, the DMA has operated what is known as a ‘suppression list’
or ‘Robinson list’ offering the possibility for individuals to refuse that their personal data
be used and shared for direct marketing purposes (Direct Marketing Association 2020;
Tempest 2007). Over the years, this practice also became increasingly used in Europe
and was even included in the law of some European countries before finally being added
to the Data Directive (Art. 14 (b)). Retracing the exact pathway through which these
rules on data transfer moved across both jurisdictions is outside the scope of this research
as it was before the time period looked at for this research. It is nevertheless significant
that private actors in the United States and the European Union have been influencing
their regulatory practices before the European Data Directive was even adopted. As a
matter of fact, the oldest industry self-regulation dealing with privacy issues found for
this research, which is the 1994 code of marketing and social research practice jointly
adopted by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the European Society for
Opinion and Marketing Research (ESOMAR), included the same provision. Collabora-
tion between direct marketing associations in both jurisdictions was moreover formalized
with the adoption of an agreement on the use of suppression list in 1996 by the Interna-
tional Federation of Direct Marketing Associations (Tempest 2007: 136).
With regards to the self-regulations of the AICPA, BBB, and IA, it is more difficult
to be sure if their inclusion of rules on data disclosure was influenced by the Data directive.
As they were not specifically marketing associations, it is not clear if it is their previous
knowledge of the work of marketing associations or pressure from the European Data
Directive that led them to add these rules on disclosure. At the same time, the language
used in their self-regulation is very similar to the one used by the DMA. The IA code of
conduct even talked of a ‘suppression’ mechanism. The BBB had also been operating a
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self-regulatory program on children advertising developed with an advertising association
for years, which specifically included rules on the disclosure of personal data to third
parties (Aftab and Savitt 1999: 7). Perhaps more importantly, though, the AICPA and
IA’s self-regulations did not include other rules found in the European Directive on the
disclosure of personal data. The BBB was the sole exception in that respect and included
a rule also found in the European Directive requiring companies to ensure subcontractors
with whom they share personal do not process it for other purposes than those for which
it is shared with them.
In sum, all available industry self-regulations adopted before 2000 in the United
States did not show any real sign of convergence with the rules promoted in Europe.
Even codes that were revised or adopted after 1998, the year the Data Directive came
into force, did not include rules that particularly distinguished the European model
from the American one. Overall, they were even lighter than the FTC guidelines as
they almost all included significantly fewer rules than the latter. Only the BBBOnline
privacy program and the IRSG privacy principles had a more comprehensive set of data
protection rules. It is actually noteworthy that they were closely tied to the work of the
FTC. In the first case, the BBB was asked by the American administration to develop an
online privacy code. It had been identified as a good candidate because of its previous
experience in building a code for online advertising to children. The latter had itself been
instrumental to the FTC’s work leading to the adoption of the law on the protection of
children’s privacy online in the United States (Hertzel 2000: 437). In the second, the
ISRG privacy principles were presented to the FTC at a workshop in 1997 and were
explicitly mentioned in its guidelines as a good example of self-regulation (Gellman and
Dixon 2016: 55). The main discrepancy between the two interestingly came from the
absence of rules on the protection of children’s personal data as they were adopted by
the American government one year after the IRSG principles were devised. This also
explains their absence in other self-regulation adopted before 1998 and supports the idea
that all of them were even closer to the American sets of rules promoted by the American
federal agencies when they were devised than the similarity index shown above suggests.
The BBBOnline privacy program and IRSG principles otherwise included a couple of
more detailed rules than the FTC guidelines, but they overall remained largely aligned
with it.
This decision of private actors in the United States to mostly exploit rules pro-
moted by American public authorities can be partly explained by the fact that the
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European Data Directive only entered into force in 1998. The incentive for industry
associations to quickly harmonize their rules with the European ones was not necessarily
as strong as it would become in the following years. It is worthwhile to remember that
the members of these private associations are not all large corporations with the financial
means that we today associate with companies like Facebook or Google. These might
thus have preferred to keep their compliance costs down, especially as some of their mem-
bers did not deal with personal data from Europe at all. It is still noteworthy that not
even one engaged with the European rules, which were at the time seen as a significant
disruption in the regulation of privacy worldwide. Studies published in the early 2000s
in fact repeatedly emphasized the importance of data flows between the United States
and the European Union (Farrell 2003; Kobrin 2004; Long and Quek 2002). It could thus
have been thought that industry associations developing code in the United States could
have been more interested in helping their members to prepare for it, even without the
legal obligation to do so.
This lack of exploitation of European rules yet also reflects the lack of counterparts
for American private actors to interact with. Although the Data Directive specifically
aimed at creating one harmonized set of rules for all its member states, significant dis-
crepancies remained in its application long after it was adopted (Bamberger and Mulligan
2015: 9; see also Korff 2002) and this was especially true in the early days of the Di-
rective. Some countries, for example, continued to rely on different forms of consent for
the use of personal data for direct marketing (Tempest 2007). Faced with still diverging
national systems and a lot of uncertainty in the application of the Directive, American
industry associations did not always know what they should advise their members to do
depending on where the personal data was precisely coming from in Europe. Instead
of embracing the rules in the Data Directive, they appeared to adopt a wait and see
strategy. This was similarly true for associations in Europe. As one interviewee pointed
out:
I don’t know how much you know about this, but a directive is not a law or at least
a law that directly applies to companies. It needs to be implemented in national
laws. [...] Member states need to transpose it in their legislation. [...] The issue
is that there is significant legal room in the implementation of a directive. [...]
For companies, 28 different sets of rules is unmanageable. (Interview E21, done on
March 8th, 2019)
Before 2000, this research identified only one British-based association, the Inter-
active Media in Retail Group (IMRG), that had developed a code on e-commerce dealing
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with privacy issues and that was intended to be used in multiple European countries.
Even though national ones existed and had probably interacted with American ones as
previously noted, there were yet to have European-wide codes and this obviously limited
interactions with American associations.
Figure 5.3: Transatlantic private network in 1999
This is depicted in figure 5.3, which presents the state of the interactions between
American and European associations that had adopted a code in 1999. While the IMRG
was the only private association with an active self-regulation used in multiple European
countries, figure 5.3 shows that American associations were already working together and
influencing the content of their respective self-regulations. The OPA that clearly stands
out as the most central actor was an initiative created by many leading companies in the
tech sector or with a strong interest in it (i.e., Apple, Disney, DELL, eBay, HP, Microsoft,
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etc.) to develop shared practices7. Many associations that had previously adopted self-
regulations were also members of it and contributed to its work. In addition to these
direct interactions that are illustrated as ties in figure 5.3, some of the companies that
founded the OPA were themselves members of other private associations. Acxiom, which
is to this day one of the biggest aggregators of personal data for marketing purposes, was,
for example, also a member of the IRSG and the DMA. Additional interactions between
these organizations thus happened at a level not shown in figure 5.3. These, in turn, help
explain the already high level of similarity between their regulations. Except from the
earliest adopted in 1997, they all embraced the core set of rules in the FTC guidelines
as shown by their respective high level of similarity with it in table 5.1.
In sum, the early years following the adoption of the European Data directive
show a relative absence of convergence between the rules promoted in the United States
and Europe. Industry self-regulations in the United States remain by far closer to the
‘American’ model as represented by the FTC guidelines. Interactions between them re-
inforced this trend and generally pushed them to exploit the same core set of rules. In
contrast, they had few clear exchanges with European actors, which then limited even
more the potential influence of the Data Directive in the United States. As American
associations had no clear counterparts in Europe, they similarly did not have the oppor-
tunity to share rules found in the American legal system. Both regulatory systems thus
had a minimal influence on the other in the first few years following the adoption of the
Data Directive.
5.3 American and European Interactions after the Adoption
of the Safe Harbor Agreement
At the turn of the millennium, the regulation of privacy in the United States and the
European Union was drastically altered with the adoption of the Safe Harbor Agreement.
As just discussed, the adoption of the Data Directive did not right away result in a
convergence of rules across European countries. Yet, one important thing that it did
achieve is the unification of market access decisions (Bach and Newman 2007). Through
its “adequacy decision” procedure (Art. 25 of the Data Directive, now art. 45 of the
7Information an the OPA was retrieved from its now-closed webpage (the version of August 2000)
through the Internet Archive accessible through the Wayback Machine. These webpages were saved and
are on file with the author.
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GDPR), the European Union in effect reserved itself the right to block companies from
jurisdictions considered to have an inadequate level of protection from using European
personal data, except if they relied on additional guarantees like binding corporate rules
or an individual’s explicit consent. In other words, this mechanism gave the European
Union the institutional capacity to leverage its market size and pressure other countries
in adopting its data protection rules.
The term ‘adequate’ obviously left a lot of room for interpretation and was only
clarified as meaning ‘essentially equivalent’ in a recent case (Maximillian Schrems v Data
Protection Commissioner, 2015). At the same time, it was pretty clear that the noticeably
different regulatory approach and set of rules promoted in the United States made it
impossible for it to receive an adequacy decision. Following protracted negotiations,
the Safe Harbor Agreement was adopted in place of a full-fledged adequacy decision
(Farrell 2003). Instead of recognizing the entire American privacy system as ‘adequate’,
it indicated that companies self-certifying to be abiding by the principles set out in this
agreement and being potentially subject to FTC enforcement in case of their violations
would be considered to be ‘adequate’ and allowed to use personal data of Europeans. As
the name of the agreement clearly indicates, this new mechanism was directly inspired
by the American use of safe harbors and notably by its federal law on the protection of
children’s privacy online as specifically noted in chapter 3 (see p. 71).
In practice, the Safe Harbor Agreement represented a partial adequacy decision
that allowed companies dealing with personal data from Europe to continue to do busi-
ness as usual. Depending on the authors, this was either a proof of ‘no coordination’
(Drezner 2007) or ‘mutual recognition’ (Farrell 2003; Newman and Posner 2015) between
the United States and Europe. Without further discussing their slightly diverging under-
standing of the impact of this agreement (see section 1.2), it is clear that they respectively
agreed that it had a limited influence on how these two jurisdictions decided to regulate
the use of personal data. Far from supporting a broad convergence, the Safe Harbor
Agreement was at most seen as leading them to recognize their respective approaches.
On the European side, this meant successfully requiring that private companies using
European data to follow the rules found in the Safe Harbor Agreement. Whereas, on
the American side, it meant having the European Union accept that privacy guarantees
offered by the private sector could be an acceptable form of regulation. According to
these authors, none had accepted to broadly embrace the data protection rules of the
other through that agreement.
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When giving greater attention to the content of industry self-regulation adopted
in each jurisdiction, it can however be seen that this agreement spurred a real regula-
tory convergence between the two jurisdictions. First, it must be noted that various
industry associations or companies offering privacy certification services were prone to
offer Safe Harbor certifications. This trend was actually reinforced by the fact that the
Safe Harbor Agreement required American companies to sign up to an alternative dis-
pute resolution mechanism generally offered by these very same industry associations or
private companies. In effect, the AICPA, BBB, DMA, and TrustArc mentioned in the
previous section all became Safe Harbor providers. They were additionally joined by
the Entertainment Software Rating Board (ESRB), which adopted its first code in 2000
also guaranteeing compliance with the Safe Harbor Agreement8. Importantly, instead of
promoting multiple regulations or certification services, they almost all included the Safe
Harbor principles in the one they offered to all their members or users. The BBB, for ex-
ample, stated on its webpage promoting its services that “BBBOnLine Privacy Program
participants meet the EU ‘safe harbor’ requirements”9. This obviously meant that these
different programs, which were supposed to be the prime mode of privacy regulation in
the United States, increasingly came to promote the use of ‘European’ rules by all their
members. Only TrustArc decided to offer a different service if a company did not want
to self-certify to the Safe Harbor.
Table 5.2 presents all five Safe Harbor providers and show their respective inclu-
sion of rules found in the Safe Harbor Agreement that were not part of the FTC guidelines
but were in the European Data Directive. The first revised version of their self-regulation
available after the adoption of the Safe Harbor Agreement in 2000 was used. TrustArc’s
privacy certification service offered to all companies is presented in table 5.2, not the one
offered to those wishing to only self-certify with the Safe Harbor principles. Interestingly,
almost none included all the rules founds in the Safe Harbor Agreement. This is perhaps
normal for TrustArc as it was not aiming to offer a Safe Harbor certification in that
specific privacy program. At the same time, they very clearly included more rules than
other certifications offered at the same time in the United States.
Table 5.3 shows the inclusion of the same set of rules by non-Safe Harbor providers
that had an active self-regulation dealing with privacy issues in the years following the
8The list of Safe Harbor providers was found on the now-defunct webpage (the version of August
2003) of the FTC for the Safe Harbor Agreement accessible through the Internet archive offered by
Wayback Machine. This specific page is now on file with the author.
9Claims made on the BBBOnline service webpage (the version of November 2006) accessed using
Wayback Machine tool of the Internet Archive. This specific page is now on file with the author.
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Table 5.2: Inclusion of ‘European’ Data Protection Rules found in the Safe Harbor Agreement























04. Use limitations 04.01 Origi-
nal purposes























• • • • •
Total 8/8 4/8 5/8 5/8 3/8
* TrustArc’s privacy program offered to companies not necessarily wishing to self-certify to the Safe Harbor.
adoption of the Safe Harbor Agreement. As opposed to Safe Harbor providers, they
clearly included almost no European rules. When considering the fact that the rule on
the need to have the consent of individuals before disclosing their personal data with
third parties (05.01.01) was not in the FTC guidelines, but already in most industry self-
regulations in the United States before 2000 as discussed in the previous section, the table
would actually be practically empty. It is also noteworthy that all these regulations were
either adopted before the adoption of the Safe Harbor or one year after at the latest. This
evidently made it harder for them to include rules from the Safe Harbor Agreement. Yet,
these rules were already in the European Data Directive and, as such, they could have
been picked up by them since 1995. More importantly, though, these regulations could
have also been revised after the adoption of the Safe Harbor Agreement. Indeed, most
industry self-regulations looked at in this research were regularly modified to account for
legislative changes or recent events. The fact that in this case they were not should thus
be viewed a conscious decision not to include ‘European’ rules. These finally covered
companies that were highly likely to use personal data from Europeans. The Electronic
Commerce and Consumer Protection Group (ECCPG) was an association founded by
large American companies like Visa, Dell, IBM, Microsoft, America Online, and AT&T
clearly having business activities in Europe. SquareTrade was similarly an online service
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developed in collaboration with eBay, one of the largest e-commerce platforms at the
time.
Table 5.3: Inclusion of ‘European’ Data Protection Rules found in the Safe Harbor Agreement

















































Total 1/8 2/8 1/8 1/8 1/8 1/8
Industry associations or certification companies providing Safe Harbor certifica-
tion services were also more likely to include in their regulations rules not found in the
Safe Harbor Agreement but the European Data Directive. In effect, it should be remem-
bered that the Safe Harbor was a negotiated agreement between the United States and
the European Union. As such, it only included a subset of the rules found in the Euro-
pean Data Directive. Notable exclusions included the requirement to indicate the origins
of collected personal data (01.04 Data Source), to contact third parties with whom they
shared personal data if they correct or delete it (07.04 Notification of third parties), to
maintain special security measures for the collection and use of sensitive data (08.03 Spe-
cial security measures), and to keep personal data for longer than necessary (11. Data
Retention). These with all other rules found in the Data Directive, but not the Safe
Harbor nor the FTC guidelines are listed in table 5.4.
At first, this table is evidently more sparse than table 5.2. Clearly, private asso-
ciations were not as prone to adopt rules from the Data Directive that were not in the
Safe Harbor. This tends to show that private forms of regulation will generally need to
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be subject to the direct influence of public authority to further extend it. In other words,
it is not only because the government of a country with a large market has adopted some
rules abroad that private actors will converge towards them. They will generally need to
be directly put in contact with them. As mentioned, associations offering Safe Harbor
certification services were not forced to include Safe Harbor rules in their self-regulatory
programs offered to all their members. TrustArc is an example of this. Yet, the proximity
with these rules created by the direct public influence raised the likelihood of seeing them
use or, using the terminology previously introduced, ‘exploit’ these rules when devising
their self-regulatory programs. As previously discussed in chapter 4, it allowed them to
save time and resources, as well as minimizing the risks of creating an unwanted conflict
of rules.
Table 5.4: Inclusion of ‘European’ Data Protection Rules outside of the Safe Harbor Agreement
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• •
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and lawful
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08. Sensitive data 08.03 Spe-
cial security
measures
• • • •
11. Data retention 11. Data re-
tention
• •
Total 5/11 3/11 3/11 4/11 2/11
* TrustArc’s privacy program offered to companies not necessarily wishing to self-certify to the Safe Harbor.
As their interaction was first with the rules in the Safe Harbor, it is unsurprising
that they mostly exploited those found in this agreement and not all those found in the
European Data Directive. At the same time, it obviously created a bridge between them
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because the Safe Harbor and the Data Directive were obviously closely tied together.
Applying the former would have thus generally meant looking at the content of the
latter. If the number of rules in table 5.4 included in self-regulations of Safe Harbor
providers is not as important as rules found in the Safe Harbor, it is still strikingly more
important than by non-Safe Harbor providers. Among the latter, only two included the
rule requiring to indicate individuals where their personal data was collected (01.04). It
must also be considered that some rules in table 5.4 were specific to the European context
and would have been a great proof of convergence. Yet, American private associations
probably felt that they did not really need to include them as they did not apply to their
context.
This is, for example, the case of the right to object (02.07). The latter foresees
that when data collection and use is not based on explicit consent but a legitimate
objective, individuals can request that their personal data stop being used for these
purposes (art. 14 of the Data Directive and now 21 of the GDPR). This rule makes sense
in the context of the consent system established by the European Union, which foresees
that the processing of personal data should be primarily based on an individual’s explicit
consent but often ends being processed on ‘legitimate grounds’. The latter has historically
been understood very broadly and can even include marketing purposes. Faced with this,
the right to object gives the possibility to contest the use of personal data that is often
done without the explicit consent of individuals. In the United States, this specific rule is
a bit redundant considering their use of an opt-out form of consent. Again, the opt-out
form of consent means that individuals are presumed to have accepted the collection
and use of their personal data when using the services of a company, but they can at
any time opt-out and request that their personal data stop being used. Including the
right to object would thus make sense if industry self-regulations in the United States also
adopted the European consent system. This would again be a great proof of convergence,
but it is also a very high bar to set to observe it as it would practically require an almost
complete overhaul of how their privacy regulations function. In practice, both consent
systems often moreover work similarly. One interviewee for this research actually noted
that the European Union interestingly believed that the European Union was using the
same consent system as the United States:
The primary differentiator before and after [the GDPR] is the move away from
explicit consent and the creation of the right to object. They effectively turned
themselves into an opt-out regime as in the United States. [...] They moved away
from affirmative consent to a kind of opt-out regime, which however limits the
142
purposes for which data can be collected and processed. (Interview E27, done on
April 4th, 2019)
More accurately, the GDPR did not create the right to object but expanded it by
removing the need for an individual to justify its request. It is now the company or any
other private entity processing personal data that needs to explain why it has a legitimate
ground to do so without the individual’s consent. It might thus have effectively moved
the European Union closer to the American opt-out system, but private companies in
Europe have since the early days of the Directive often operated based on a kind of opt-
out mechanism as it is less constraining. This is all to say that it would have been quite
surprising to see that specific rule adopted in the United States and that its absence
should not preclude us from recognizing that industry associations providing safe harbor
certifications have supported a convergence between the ‘American’ and ‘European’ rules.
A somewhat different but similar explanation could be made for the rules on the transfer
of personal data to private entities in third countries (05.04) and automated processing
(02.07 and 07.07).
In that vein, the inclusion by the AICPA Webtrust program, ESRB Privacy cer-
tified, and DMA guidelines of a rule indicating that the use (04.02) and, for the first
two, the collection (03.02) of personal data should be fair and lawful is particularly note-
worthy. It might seem quite straightforward that the actions of private companies need
to follow the law. In an American context where the overarching principle is that in-
dustry self-regulation should lead the way, this is, however, not something that needs
pointing out. This rather reflects the European approach, which at its heart requires
a legal basis for the processing of personal data (Schwartz and Peifer 2017: 127). This
specific mention is thus an important example of a case where American associations
converged towards rules that are at the heart of what distinguishes privacy regulation in
the European Union and the United States.
By successfully negotiating an international agreement with the American govern-
ment, the European Commission showed its capacity to use its hierarchical position and
legal authority to push private actors in the United States to exploit its rules. Impor-
tantly, it does not mean that private actors were all passive in this process. As pointed
out, not all private associations decided to embrace the rules found in the Safe Harbor
even though many American businesses were already dealing with the personal data of
European citizens. More significantly, though, the decision to exploit European rules not
found in the Safe Harbor Agreement as well as to promote them to American companies
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that did not necessarily need to follow them show how industry self-regulations amplified
the reach of European rules. A second way through which they did so is through the
formation of private networks allowing for the exchange of their respective practices.
5.4 Transnational Trustmarks and Private Networks in the
Early 2000s
Just as the European Union and the United States were actively negotiating the Safe
Harbor Agreement, private actors started to increasingly work together as depicted in
figure 5.4. In contrast to the 1999 network previously shown in figure 5.3, we can observe
that there are now multiple European private actors that had adopted a code dealing
with privacy issues. Moreover, most actors have at least one tie, indicating their increas-
ing tendency to collaborate. Unsurprisingly, we can see that American and European
associations still tended to work with associations from their home jurisdiction. This
reflects the natural and geographical proximity that they share. At the same time, there
were already some links between the American and European actors, which created early
on opportunities for exchanging practices between these two communities of actors.
Yet, what probably stands out the most when quickly glancing at this figure is the
closely tied nature of a small cluster of actors. This importantly exhibits the work being
done in the early 2000s to develop an European trustmark to help harmonize protections
offered to consumers online. The term trustmark here qualifies an industry self-regulation
that specifically aims to allow a company to advertise a seal on its website to raise trust in
its services. In practice, most codes of conduct, guidelines, or sets of principles previously
discussed allow their members or users to post an online seal. This was notably the case
of the BBBOnline and TrustArc privacy programs. The possibility for companies to
advertise their goodwill or good data practices remains today one of the main selling
points to develop and use industry self-regulations. Importantly, the number of active
certifications is often inversely proportional to their success in providing trust. As their
number grows, they tend to create confusion and undermine themselves. At the turn of
the 2000s, this was notably the case as the number of trustmarks dealing with e-commerce
and data protection rose exponentially. It must be remembered that this research only
includes associations active at the European level or in multiple European countries.
As such, there are almost the same number of European and American private actors
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Figure 5.4: Transatlantic private network in 2001
in figure 5.4. There were, however, many more codes and trustmarks at the Member
State level in Europe. A preliminary tally for this research found close to 70 codes or
trustmarks promoted in Europe and this most likely still missed some. As one interviewee
explicitly noted of that situation:
There were too many logos. Was it helping? Not that much. It was confusing for
consumers. (Interview E7, done on February 4th, 2019)
This concern was shared by the European Commission that had early on been
adamant that the development of the digital economy should not lead to the creation of
new regulatory barriers that would undermine its single market. Back in 1994, a high-
level group chaired by then-European Commissioner for the Information Society, Martin
Bangemann, specifically stated the need for a “regulatory response [...] at the European
level in order to maximize the benefits of the single market for all players” (European
145
Commission 1994: 21). As mentioned above, the integration process of European data
protection rules was not going as smoothly as hoped by the European Commission. The
varying application of the Data Directive was moreover being reflected in the development
of multiple national trustmarks with different sets of data protection rules. In light of this,
the European Commission notably thought it would be good “to examine the potential
for drawing up some common guidelines” for the development of codes of conduct and
trustmarks at the European level (European Commission 2000).
Following this idea, the European Commission supported the creation of an “e-
confidence forum” in 2000 where private associations were expected to work together to
build a European trustmark. This specific project more specifically involved important
associations like the Federation of European Direct Marketing Association (FEDMA),
EuroCommerce, and the consumer organization Which that had previously developed an
industry self-regulation or were working on one at the same time (European Commission
2004). They are all part of the small hub of actors presented as interacting in figure
5.4. Importantly, this project also included representatives of businesses outside of the
European Union and the United States. As noted in the introduction to the forum,
participation was “not limited to European participants [and it specifically welcomed]
international participation in order to get a better appreciation of the different initia-
tives in different countries”10. Apart from important American private companies, like
AOL, Ford, Intel, and Microsoft, it notably included the Global Business Dialogue on
e-Commerce (GBDe) and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), two industry
associations that adopted international guidelines with data protection requirements in
the early 2000s. These can also be seen as part of the small group of actors with close
ties to each other in figure 5.4.
By working with private actors, the European Commission was viewing an oppor-
tunity to promote a greater level of harmonization than it was able to achieve through its
traditional legal means. This interestingly echoes the role that American private associa-
tions were at the same time playing in the United States and shows how co-regulation has
early on been a feature of both European internal and external regulation of privacy. In
the end, the development of a single European trustmark did not bear fruit. The Union
of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (then known as UNICE, now
called BusinessEurope) and the European Consumer Organization (BEUC), which were
10Information retrieved from the now-closed webpage dedicated to the e-confidence Forum and accessed
through the Internet Archive using its Wayback Machine tool. This specific page (July 2000) is now on
file with the author.
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leading this project, were unable to agree on its implementation. Despite being praised
for their collaborative work and actually agreeing on a set of requirements, they were
unable to find common ground on the actual enforcement mechanism of the trustmark
(European Commission 2004: 8-9).
This failure to create a European trustmark yet does not mean that the e-
confidence forum entirely failed to promote greater regulatory convergence. By bring-
ing distant organizations closer to each other, it was an important space where they
could influence their respective decisions of which rules to include in their industry self-
regulations. For the two non-European associations, it notably meant adopting data
protection rules originally found in the European Data Directive. The ICC’s 2001 code
on direct advertising and the GBDe’s 2000 privacy guidelines for e-commerce respectively
had a thematic similarity index of 0.68 and 0.55 with it. For the ICC, this was signifi-
cantly higher than its previous code adopted in 1999 (0.47). While there is not the same
point of comparison for the GBDe, its similarity index was generally higher than other
industry self-regulations adopted in the United States in the years before (see table 5.1).
This European influence can also be seen by looking at their inclusion of ‘European’ data
protection rules found in the Safe Harbor Agreement as presented in table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Inclusion of ‘European’ Data Protection Rules found in the Safe Harbor Agreement
by the ICC and GBDe
Principle Rule GBDe Privacy guidelines
(2000)
ICC Code on Direct Market-
ing (2001)
03. Collection limitations 03.01 Purpose limitations •
04. Use limitations 04.01 Original purposes • •
05. Disclosure
05.01.01 Consent • •









As can be seen, both the GBDe and ICC had incorporated many European rules
just like the Safe Harbor providers (see table 5.2 above). Just like them, they also included
other rules found in the European Data Directive that were not in the Safe Harbor, like
the rule requiring not to keep personal data for longer than needed (11. data retention) or
the need to have a fair and lawful basis for the collection and use of personal data (03.02
and 04.02). While these two organizations were not purely ‘American’, this move towards
the European model remained significant. The global nature of these organizations meant
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that they were in themselves important forums for rule harmonization As a matter of
fact, the GBDe was created by private companies primarily based in the United States
and the European Union to help minimize their growing divergence of views of how to
regulate the electronic marketplace (Green Cowles 2001). Moreover, both represented
prominent American companies. Among the representatives of the GBDe during the
e-confidence forum were, for example, people from the American computer company
Hewlett-Packard.
The participation of these two associations as well as of other American private
companies significantly did not only support the exploitation of European data protec-
tion rules by American actors. As noted in the official description of the e-confidence
forum cited above, the participation of foreign (in practice principally American) private
actors was notably aimed at obtaining a better understanding in Europe of the regu-
latory approach taken in other jurisdictions. This is reflected in the codes adopted by
the European associations that took part in the e-confidence forum and included rules
found in the FTC guidelines but not the Data Directive. This process of exploitation of
American data protection rules is reported in table 5.6.
Just as for American associations exploiting ‘European’ rules, the exploitation of
‘American’ rules by European associations was never complete. Indeed, none include
all the different data protection rules found in the American industry self-regulation
part of the e-confidence forum. This partly reflects the social nature of the process of
exploitation. As noted in the first section of this chapter, exploitation indeed does not
portray a relation where one straightforwardly imposes its will onto the other. It reflects
a more ‘co-optive’ form of influence where regulators choose to follow rules as they learn
about and become socialized to them. These will evidently evolve over time as different
regulators gain a better understanding of their respective sets of data protection rules. As
these were still early interactions, it should indeed not have been expected that European
industry associations would perfectly replicate ‘American’ rules. It must also be pointed
out that the rules with which the European associations were interacting were not directly
those developed by the FTC guidelines or other American federal agencies, but those that
had been created by the ICC, GBDe, and other American industry self-regulations. In
fact, the 1999 ICC direct marketing guidelines only included the rules requiring to notify
the use of passive data collection methods (01.09), to limit the collection of personal data
from children (09.02), and to gain parental consent before collecting personal data from
children (09.04), which are three of the most often taken up by European associations
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Table 5.6: Inclusion of ‘American’ Data Protection Rules by European private associations part





























































• • • • •
Total 5/10 6/10 6/10 2/10 5/10
* Text of the European trustmark jointly developed by BEUC and UNICE as part of the e-confidence forum, which ended up
never being formally adopted.
in table 5.6. This importantly shows that if private actors can help diffuse public rules,
this is always mediated by what private actors actually decide to include in their self-
regulatory programs. Private actors can notably exclude some rules that they do not
find to be in their interest if they are not mandatory or vague. This seems to be what
happened for the requirement to use reputable sources of personal data and cross-verify
personal data from a third-party source (03.03), which was a rule found in the FTC
guidelines and that can be particularly cumbersome for marketing companies represented
by the ICC, GBDe and many European associations part of the e-confidence forum.
Having said that, the exploitation of ‘American’ rules by the European asso-
ciations part of the e-confidence forum was generally more substantial than other as-
sociations operating trustmarks in Europe at the same time. This research found three
associations promoting a trustmark or code of conduct in the early 2000s in at least more
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than one European country and that were not actively contributing to the e-confidence
forum. Table 5.7 shows how each exploited data protection rules only found in the FTC
guidelines and clearly indicates that they did not tend to so. Indeed, they all merely
share the rule requiring private companies to notify individuals of the use of cookies or
other passive data collection methods before they are being used (01.09). Considering
that this requirement became part of the European Directive on privacy in electronic
communications in 2002, this might not even be a sign of a direct American influence.
Table 5.7: Inclusion of ‘American’ Data Protection Rules by European private associations not
part of the e-Confidence Forum
Principle Rule IMRG Code 2003 Trusted Shops Crite-
ria (2001)
Tuv Sud Safe Shop-
ping Certification
(2001)


























Total 2/10 2/10 2/10
Apart from the initiative to develop a European trustmark, interactions between
FEDMA and two American associations presented another important avenue through
which private actors supported the exploitation of data protection rules in one jurisdiction
by the other. As seen in figure 5.4, FEDMA was more specifically working with two
American-based private organizations: the US DMA and the BBB. In the case of the
former, FEDMA had long before the e-confidence forum been collaborating with its sister
organization in the United States. In addition to working through the International
Federation of Direct Marketing Associations on the use of suppression list even before
the adoption of the Safe Harbor (see section 4.4), they were notably funding research on
how to comply with data protection rules. This included a comparative analysis of codes
of conduct on direct marketing around the world in 1997 and a study on the European
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data protection rules in 200111. This work with the US DMA can help explain why
FEDMA was the association that included the most American rules in table 5.6 and
conversely why the DMA became one of the Safe Harbor providers in the United States.
Their respective relationship was spurring them to exploit the rules found in each other’s
primary jurisdictions. This influence importantly persisted after the initial pressure of
the negotiation of the Safe Harbor progressively faded away. The US DMA, for one,
added the right to request the erasure of personal data (07.03) and the obligation not to
maintain personal data for longer than necessary (11) respectively in its 2007 and 2011
version of its code of conduct. These two originally ‘European’ rules had before then
failed to be incorporated in it.
In the early 2000s, FEDMA was working and even signed an official partnership
with the BBB to develop a global trustmark. At the time, these two organizations
indicated that they hoped to push a greater number of companies around the world to
follow “consistently high online standard” based on a “single, internationally recognizable”
emblem (Saliba 2001). At this specific point in time, the relation between the two was
largely one of homophily. Rather than pushing themselves towards each other, they
actually appeared to work together because of their preexisting similarity. In fact, the
version of the BBBOnline privacy program in 2000 and FEDMA’s code for e-commerce
adopted in 2000 had a thematic similarity index of 0.71. Both had thus already moved
towards the rules promoted in each of their respective jurisdictions. The BBB was
already a Safe Harbor provider and FEDMA had been interacting with American actors,
including the US DMA, as just discussed.
If their early collaboration did not in itself led to greater harmonization, it did
end up doing so by contributing to the creation of a transnational organization as of
today promoting a global trustmark. After presenting their work and launching the
Global Trustmark Alliance at a summit organized by the GBDe in 2004, they merged
their initiative with the Asia-Pacific Trustmark Alliance in 2007 and contributed to
the creation of the World Trustmark Alliance (WTA). The latter helped promote an
increasingly unified model of data protection rules for companies doing business online.
Besides promoting American and European rules to Asian and Latin American countries,
it also created new relations between European and American actors as depicted in figure
5.5.
11The list of publications funded by FEDMA and the US DMA was retrieved from FEDMA’s website
using the Internet archive’s Wayback Machine tool. This specific page (April 2001) is now on file with
the author.
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Figure 5.5: Transatlantic private network in 2008
TrustArc was most notably involved in the creation of the WTA. As the United
States was working with APEC countries to develop its privacy framework (2005) and
cross-border privacy rules system (2011), this provider of Safe Harbor certifications in
the United States had already been working with the Asia-Pacific Trustmark Alliance
that merged with the initiative of the BBB and FEDMA. While contributing to shaping
the rules promoted by the WTA, it created another venue where European rules could
influence the work of TrustArc. As a reminder, it was the sole provider of Safe Harbor
certifications that had decided to operate different services depending on if companies
using its services were planning to deal or not with the personal data of Europeans. Its
basic certification program was unsurprisingly the one including the fewest European
rules found in the Safe Harbor Agreement. In 2012, its revised version of its most basic
privacy program offered to all companies in the United States was significantly closer to
European rules than its version of 2004 as shown in table 5.8.
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Table 5.8: Inclusion of ‘European’ Data Protection Rules by TrustArc and the World Trustmark
Alliance
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Total 2/8 5/8 4/8
* TrustArc’s privacy program offered to companies not necessarily wishing to self-certify to the Safe Harbor.
As the revised version of TrustArc’s privacy program was not right after the
creation of the WTA, it is hard to maintain that it is necessarily this sole event that was
the turning point for it. Between 2008 and 2012, there were potentially other sources
of influence that could have led TrustArc’s representatives to exploit European data
protection rules. In the United States, the existence of other American associations that
had done so for quite some time clearly raises this likelihood. With that in mind, the
fact that TrustArc did not follow its American counterparts for many years tends to
indicate that they were probably not the defining factor in its decision. The exploitation
of the almost identical set of ‘European’ rules in the WTA’s global trustmark of 2008 and
TrustArc privacy program of 2012 moreover sustains the idea that the former played a role
in the content of the latter. In the end, it can be assumed that there were probably other
sources of influence but working to build a global trustmark with European associations
was most likely a contributing factor to the exploitation of European rules by TrustArc.
This work of FEDMA in the early 2000s with the US DMA and the BBB as well
as its broader impact on other industry associations is yet another example of how inter-
actions between private actors can become an avenue for rules found in one jurisdiction
to be exploited in another and, in turn, amplify the influence of public authorities outside
their traditional boundaries. By exchanging and encouraging each other to adopt similar
practices, they effectively supported the development of a joint and common set of rules
that included what each of their governments had previously set forth. The involve-
ment of the European Commission in the development of the e-confidence forum and the
ensuing transnational network moreover highlighted how close the shadow of hierarchy
sometimes remain from these private initiatives. While not in a position to legally force
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them to include specific rules, the presence of European regulators in the process of de-
vising a potential European trustmark certainly ensured that rules found in its European
Data Directive were at the forefront of any discussion. In a way, the internal struggle to
ensure that the same set of data protection rules are applied throughout Europe ended
up shaping how European rules were exploited globally. This echoes arguments that the
diffusion of the European comprehensive model of privacy law was a result of “issues that
it faced internally” (Schwartz 2019: 138, see also Newman 2008).At the same time, the
creation of these forums allowed American rules to cross over Europe. This also shows
that private networks are not tools that public authorities entirely control. Depending
on private actors’ decisions to create new relations, they will not have the same effects.
This can similarly be seen when looking at how deliberate actions taken by American
authorities to solve issues raised by the digital advertising industry had similar effects
and further supported the exploitation of both European and American data protection
rules.
5.5 Self-Regulatory Principles for Digital Advertising and
Private Networks in the Late 2000s
Back in 2008, the ad-tech industry was on the rise. After having largely disappeared
following “the burst of the dotcom bubble” in the early 2000s, companies were increasingly
developing new techniques to track individuals’ behaviour online and send them what was
increasingly called behavioral (i.e., individualized) advertising, raising many concerns for
public authorities (Federal Trade Commission 2009: 7). Following the organization of a
Town Hall in 2007 by the FTC, the general agreement was that self-regulatory practices
in online advertising were moreover failing to protect the privacy of individuals (Dixon
2007; Federal Trade Commission 2009). The Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) that
had adopted a code in 2000 following a previous workshop also organized by the FTC
was especially criticized for its promotion of an “opt-out cookie” policy (Gellman and
Dixon 2016: 59). The latter allowed companies to place a tracking device on everyone’s
computers without their explicit consent and often without clearly informing them about
it. In this context, the FTC called for the development of new self-regulatory principles
for online behavioral advertising, which was first answered by the creation of the Digital
Advertising Alliance (DAA) and the adoption of its first industry self-regulation in 2009.
154
The DAA was in itself the result of the work of various associations already
working on these issues and previously mentioned like the BBB, DMA, and NAI (Federal
Trade Commission 2009: 14). As such, the DAA helped reinforce and create new links
between many previous American associations. Speaking of the DAA, one interviewee
noted that it had precisely been a great opportunity to learn “about what some of [its]
colleagues were doing” and emphasized the ongoing nature of this project. As opposed
to their previous interactions, which had often been a “one-off project”, the interviewee
mentioned that the work being done at the DAA was still today shaping their own work
(Interview E36, done on May 10th, 2019). As of now, it continues to develop new industry
self-regulations.
While the result of the collaborative work of many preexisting associations, the
DAA’s first industry self-regulation was equally inspired by the work of the FTC. The
latter had published a set of four principles that they thought should form the core of
any self-regulatory initiative, which then formed the core of the DAA’s rules for online
behavioral advertising (Federal Trade Commission 2008). These more precisely included:
(1) transparency and consumer control, (2) security and data retention, (3) affirmative
or express consent for material changes to privacy policies, and (4) affirmative or express
consent for the use of sensitive data. (Federal Trade Commission 2008). These were all
part of the DAA’s 2009 code on online behavioral advertising and interestingly reflect
some rules that were previously identified as originating from Europe. The requirement
to not process sensitive data without the express consent from an individual and to not
retain personal data for longer than needed (i.e., data retention) are two examples of
rules that were absent of the original guidelines of the FTC but in the Data Directive
back in 1995.
It is not entirely clear how these four principles were chosen, but they were clearly
written based on discussions that the FTC had with members from the industry and
consumer groups. In a transcript of the FTC’s 2007 Town Hall organized on this issue,
it is evident that the FTC tried to get a good grasp of what were the preexisting self-
regulatory initiatives in the marketing space. As such, it notably ended up discussing the
work of the DMA, which had been operating a self-regulatory program including many
provisions from the Safe Harbor since the beginning of the 2000s (see table 5.2). The
DMA privacy guidelines thus seemed to played an important role in the development of
these four self-regulatory principles by the FTC. This would also fit the indication by
then-NAI’s director according to which his organization had been inspired by the work
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of the DMA when submitting a revised version of its code of conduct following the FTC’
Town Hall (Hughes 2008). In effect, the DMA’s guidelines included all the rules found
in the FTC’s proposed self-regulatory principles and almost all those found in the NAI
Revised code of conduct.
The only rule absent from the DMA’s guidelines and included by the FTC was
the one on data retention. The latter was in fact part of the European Data Directive but
had yet to be largely taken up by American private associations. As it was not part of
the Safe Harbor Agreement, most associations that had promoted a code including many
rules from it did not include it (see table 5.4). This changed with its inclusion in the
FTC’s proposed principles and then the DAA’s code. In effect, most associations that
worked on the DAA’s program ended up including a rule on data retention in their own
codes of conduct or guidelines afterward. Figure 5.6 shows this upsurge in the adoption
of this specific rule after 2008.
Besides supporting greater rule harmonization in the United States, the DAA’s
work was moreover influential in Europe. As similar concerns to those raised during the
FTC’s Town Hall in 2007 were being voiced towards the marketing industry in Europe,
industry associations there decided to develop a similar initiative: the European Digital
Advertising Alliance (EDAA). One interviewee that was close to the creation of this
new organization in Europe indicated that they knew about the DAA’s work through
their members that were part of this American initiative (Interview E21, done on March
8th, 2019). The Interactive Advertising Bureau in Europe that took the lead in the
creation of the EDAA was similarly exchanging with its sister organization in the United
States and thus had the opportunity to learn first-hand about the DAA from one of its
founding members. Once created, the EDAA and the DAA moreover started to have
direct exchanges with each other and have continued to shape their work since then
(Interview E21, done on March 8th, 2019). These new interactions between European
and American actors are shown in figure 5.7. It also highlights the central position that
the DAA progressively came to have in the United States.
Unsurprisingly, the rules included in the EDAA self-regulation adopted in 2012
are very close to the one of the DAA adopted in 2009. They actually share all the same
basic principles and have a very high thematic similarity index of 0.72. The content of
their rules actually only slightly differ with regards to the implementation mechanisms
and the transfer of personal data to third parties. Apart from this, they are almost a
replica of each other. This allowed for the further exploitation of the data protection
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Figure 5.6: Total number of active industry self-regulations including a rule requiring to
maintain personal data for no longer than needed
rules promoted in each jurisdiction. This is notably evident when looking at the cases of
two rules.
First, the DAA integrated into its original self-regulation the requirement previ-
ously found in the codes of other American associations, like the DMA, the IRSG, and the
NAI, to educate consumers about their data practices. In addition to transparency rules
originally found in the FTC guidelines and European Data directive, these ‘education’
rules require private companies to make outreach efforts to explain to the public how they
use personal data to send targeted advertising. This specific policy became one of the
core components of the DAA self-regulatory program in 2009 through its promotion of
an AdChoice Icon that is now almost always found in the corner of online advertisements
seen on major websites like Google and Facebook. By clicking on this specific icon, users
will be briefly explained why they see a specific publicity and what personal information
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Figure 5.7: Transatlantic private network in 2012
might have been used to identify them. Based on the principles of choice and control,
individuals are then allowed to express their wish to remove it and potentially change
how their data is used. How the latter is actually implemented, however, varies according
to the companies implementing it. For example, Google and Facebook apply the DAA
rules but do not offer the same tool to make choices.
With that in mind, the same rule on education was included in the EDAA’s
self-regulation and has made its way in one of the other European associations that
worked with it. Figure 5.8 shows that some of its founding members, like the IAB in
Europe, even did so before the EDAA was officially created in 2012. Nowadays, the same
AdChoice icon as the one originally developed in the United States is in effect visible by
Europeans when receiving online advertising. They can similarly use it to manage the
publicity they receive and complement previous privacy guarantees that they had. For
many privacy activists, this is not much as it does not impede companies from collecting
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Figure 5.8: Total number of active industry self-regulations requiring companies to edu-
cate individuals about their data practices
personal data nor using it to send targeted advertising. Yet, it has forced companies to
be more transparent. This is a first essential step to subsequently ensure that individuals
actually make use of some of their other privacy protections, like the possibility to object
to the use of their personal data for marketing purposes or to request the erasure of their
personal data.
A second interesting case is the rule on the need to have affirmative or express
consent before collecting or using sensitive data. As previously mentioned, this was
a requirement found early on in the Data Directive and, in fact, it had already been
included by many of the associations that offered Safe Harbor certifications in the early
2000s (see table 5.4 above). At the time of its inclusion by the DAA, it was thus not so
new anymore in the United States. It was similarly not a new rule in Europe, but it had
not been widely included in industry self-regulation. In effect, there were significantly
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Figure 5.9: Total number of active industry self-regulations requiring to gain the affir-
mative or express consent before collecting and processing sensitive data
more American associations incorporating this rule in their self-regulatory programs than
in Europe before 2011. It can always be said that private companies still had to respect
it anyway, but it is still striking that it was not part of the rules that private associations
were promoting. This absence of most private regulatory instruments in Europe can help
explain why it was not included in the global trustmark created by the World Trustmark
Alliance (see table 5.8). The creation of the EDAA and the adoption of self-regulation
by some of its founding members largely replicating the original self-regulatory program
of the DAA, however, led more European associations to include this rule as shown in
figure 5.9.
This finally shows that by interacting with private actors in the United States,
European associations were sometimes even led to exploit rules originating from Europe.
This reversed influence further demonstrates that when working together, private asso-
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ciations do not merely project the rule of the public authority with which they would
normally be in direct relation of hierarchy. They promote what they have spent years
developing based on their previous interactions with public and private actors. While
amplifying the exploitation of public rules, it once again shows the real agency that they
have in this process. Recognizing this also helps explain cases where rules have been less
likely to be shared between both jurisdictions, which notably includes those covering data
breaches. Since 2002, multiple states in the United States have adopted laws requiring
private companies to inform their users when they lose their personal data following a
security breach. Although this regulatory activity did not originate at the federal level
in the United States, it is a prime example of American leadership in privacy regula-
tion. As such, it is striking that only one self-regulation in Europe was found to include
rules on data breaches. This, however, mirrors their similar absence in most industry
self-regulations in the United States and notably the one of the DAA, which was one the
latest cases of direct interactions between American and European industry associations
before the European Commission started drafting the GDPR.
5.6 Conclusion
As of today, the United States and the European Union continue to follow different
regulatory approaches to privacy protection. While the European Union doubled down
on its preference for a comprehensive system with the adoption of the GDPR in 2016,
the United States still does not have a federal privacy law covering both the public and
private sectors. If the adoption by the state of California of such a comprehensive law in
2018 gave the impression that the United States would soon adopt one, the decision by
the Trump administration to abandon the project of a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights
that the previous administration had spent four years developing show how uncertain
it is to see it happening in the near future. Despite this lasting difference in their
regulatory approaches, I showed that data protection rules in both jurisdictions have
in practice became increasingly similar following direct interactions between public and
private actors.
Far from a situation of no coordination (Drezner 2007) or even merely mutual
recognition (Newman and Posner 2015), there has actually been a regulatory convergence
going on. In effect, private companies on both sides of the Atlantic increasingly exploited
the same data protection rules in their respective industry self-regulations. Important
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divergence remains and not all companies today apply the same set of rules. In fact, it
was repeatedly shown that since the adoption of the European Data Directive in 1995,
different self-regulatory programs promoted different sets of rules. These have moreover
rarely included all those found in the ‘American’ or ‘European’ models introduced in
chapter 4. At the same time, they generally tended to become increasingly similar and
to approximate those of public and private actors with which they previously interacted.
In turn, actors creating links between the two jurisdictions have been seen to have a
special influence over the choice of which rules are applied in both.
These findings further point out that this is not simply a story of the European
Union imposing its standards globally. As it was demonstrated, European rules have been
increasingly part of the regulatory framework in the United States. To some extent, the
early adoption of a more comprehensive set of rules and its willingness to promote them
globally gave the European Union a first-mover advantage. As private actors were decid-
ing which rules to apply, they were naturally drawn towards these preexisting rules, even
more so the more actors promoted them. Yet, it is wrong to think that the United States
did not play any role in the evolution of data protection rules in the last twenty years.
Rules on the protection of children’s data, the use of passive data collection methods
(i.e., cookies), and the education of users are some examples of rules that were created
in the United States and found their way in Europe first through private interactions.
As opposed to previous explanations maintaining that private companies in the
United States have embraced European data protection rules (Bradford 2012, 2020),
I also maintained that the process of regulatory convergence was never complete. As
shown, industry self-regulations never adopted the complete set of data protection rules
promoted by either the United States or the European Union. This is notably the cases
of rules on data breaches that were first adopted in the United States and that were not
included by most industry associations in both jurisdictions. Their inclusion in the GDPR
should act as a reminder that private networks are not the sole pathways through which
regulatory convergence can occur. Cooperation occurring through transgovernmental
networks or between individual experts are two other types of relations that support
greater regulatory convergence. As recognized early on, I did not attempt to account
for all these potential interactions that took place between European and American
actors. I showed that industry associations contributed to this phenomenon by tending
to include the rules of their counterparts with which they had previously worked. As
entities that themselves represent multiple private companies and are closer to how data
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protection rules are applied ‘on the ground’, this process of regulatory convergence is in
itself significant.
In making this last point, I argued that private actors had a real agency in shaping
the regulation of privacy in the last twenty years. If public authorities were often key in
supporting the creation of forums where private networks came to exist, private actors
were free to decide which rules they wanted to exploit and include in their self-regulations.
In many ways, they mediated as much as they amplified the impact of public rules in
one jurisdiction to the other. Public rules that were more likely to be exploited were
indeed those that industry associations from the jurisdiction where they had first been
enunciated had integrated in their self-regulations. Similarly, industry associations and
certification companies that had a direct interaction with their counterparts from the
opposite jurisdiction were more likely to also includes public rules from it. With whom
private actors decided to interact thus had important consequences for public authorities.
All these different contributions provided a first detailed account of how the regu-
lation of privacy in the transatlantic has evolved as a complex governance system. They
showed how exploitation strategies in practice promoted greater regulatory convergence.
Moreover, they emphasized that not all actors were equal in that process. Those that
connected the two jurisdictions were seen as having a more influential role. While sharing
many insights with the literature on policy diffusion, they highlighted that it was not a
linear process. As new connections were formed between industry associations in both
jurisdictions, new opportunities for exploitation emerged and progressively supported
further regulatory convergence. This even allowed for a reversed influence where rules
originally coming from one jurisdiction came back to it through new connections between
private actors. The next chapter will now look at greater length at the second main pro-
cess introduced in chapter 4: exploration. It will more specifically question when and to
what extent do private actors also create data protection rules and further contribute to






You put together two things that
have not been put together before.
And the world is changed. People
may not notice at the time, but that
doesn’t matter. The world has been
changed nonetheless.
Julian Barnes, 2013
The convergence of data protection rules in the transatlantic area over the last
two decades has been and remains an important trend in the regulation of privacy. Even
though the United States has yet to adopt a comprehensive privacy law at the federal
level, many American private associations have progressively moved towards exploiting
rules first set out by European actors. While being incomplete, this convergence through
industry self-regulations is truly significant. As a matter of fact, the recent California
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) that has been touted by privacy experts as bringing
the United States closer to European privacy ideas (Schwartz 2019) and even dubbed
as a ‘GDPR-lite’ by some commentators (Alikhani 2019) lacks many rules that private
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associations had already incorporated in their regulations. Rules on collection limitations,
purpose limitations, or data retention exploited by private associations in the United
States were notably left out of the CCPA (Chander, Kaminski and McGeveran 2020:
19). Moreover, European associations have included rules first devised by American
actors and not originally part of the Data Directive. Rules on the protection of children’s
privacy online that were first enunciated in the United States are one noteworthy example.
Years before their inclusion in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), they
were indeed part of European industry self-regulations.
This is, however, only one part of the story behind the evolution of privacy reg-
ulation in the transatlantic area. In addition to converging towards each other, privacy
regulations in the United States and the European Union have grown in terms of the
number of privacy rules that they each promote. These have moreover not only came
from the exploitation of rules that were originally part of each other’s early model, but
also from the exploration of new ones as shown in chapter 4. By pushing towards greater
diversity, the creation of rules thus brought an important source of dynamism in the
evolution of the regulation of privacy. In effect, as new privacy regulations were adopted,
they never moved towards one single and definitive model (i.e., one fixed equilibrium) but
instead constantly approximated an evolving one. Far from negative, this helped ensure
that they kept up with changes in the world and new issues being raised by the growing
use of personal data. The absence of regulatory innovations would otherwise mean that
the same set of privacy guarantees would be applied to companies using personal data
today than in the mid-1990s. Although various regulations nowadays aim and maintain
to be ‘technology neutral’1 as stated in recital 152 of the GDPR, it is often harder to
achieve than to say.
No regulator obviously has a crystal ball to know what technologies will emerge in
the future and what new problems they will pose. Even with the best intentions, there
can be situations where new data collection or processing techniques can difficulty be
addressed by preexisting rules. With that in mind, the disruptive nature of new tech-
nologies should still not be overemphasized. It is often easy to fall for the argument that
new technologies create unprecedented problems that previous regulations do not cover.
The decision of how to apply them can in itself be an innovative act that can even end up
1Technological neutrally here means that the application of specific rules or requirements is not
dependent on the technology being used.
2Recitals provide official information on how the articles of the GDPR should be interpreted and
applied.
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being codified as a new rule. The recognition of the ‘living’ nature of privacy regulation
and any other regulatory standards may seem evident, but it is actually disregarded in
most studies dealing with regulatory cooperation (Krasner 1991; Drezner 2007; Young
2015a). Explicitly or implicitly based on the ideas of coordination games, they view
different models of regulation as static equilibrium competing with each other. As such,
change is observed when an actor adopts the rules of another (i.e., harmonization) or
recognizes them as equivalent to its own (i.e., coordination). Change coming from the
introduction of new rules in the governance system of a given issue-area falls outside of
the scope of their research as noted early on in chapter 2. The complex system approach
developed in this research meanwhile brings attention to the endogenous process driving
the evolution of a system and innovations that come from within it. By viewing the
United States and the European Union as forming a complex governance system, we can
more precisely see how interactions between their public and private regulators shaped
the process of exploring new data protection rules. Who and what exactly drove this
trend is the topic of this chapter.
One common argument is that private associations enjoy more flexibility in devel-
oping new rules than public actors (Abbott, Green and Keohane 2016; Overdevest and
Zeitlin 2014). The relatively low degree of legalization of industry self-regulations com-
pared to public laws is broadly seen as allowing “private regulators [to] more easily change
the rules in response to new information or circumstances than can public regulators”
(Green and Auld 2017: 270). Depending on the institutional framework, the adoption
of public regulations moreover may be subject to multiple veto points and make the
adoption of new rules increasingly difficult by public authorities (Newman 2008). Var-
ious studies have highlighted the potential of private authority to complement or fill in
gaps in public laws (Auld 2014; Green 2013b; Renckens 2020). One interviewee for this
research upheld such a line of thought:
When you look at the GDPR, it adopts a very prescriptive approach. It goes
some much into details that it may already need to be updated. You think about
blockchain, AI and it’s not clear how the GDPR will apply. That’s where codes are
so important. They can adapt so much faster than the law can. (Interview E15,
done on February 19th, 2019)
Depending on the perceived legitimacy of these private regulatory actions (Bern-
stein and Cashore 2007), this can both be seen positively or negatively. Specifically
looking at the digital economy, Spar (1999) and Ibanez (2008) were notably critical of
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the risks of seeing large American companies becoming the de facto regulators while
leaving a limited role to public authorities. In this chapter, I look at this question from a
different angle and discuss the extent to which private actors contribute to the regulation
of privacy by actually creating new data protection rules. I more precisely examine why
the multiplication of private actors adopting data protection rules has actually not led to
more regulatory innovations. The latter are once again understood as the inclusion of a
rule that prescribes or proscribes a behaviour for the first time in the regulatory system.
Following the argument developed in chapter 4 (see especially section 4.5), I high-
light that regulatory innovations are always the result of an assemblage of preexisting
components or, in this case, rules. While this normally means that the multiplication of
regulatory instruments can help bring more diversity and thereby support a more innova-
tive environment, I will significantly show that fragmentation caused by the multiplica-
tion of private regulations actually limited the interest of private actors in experimenting
with new rules and thus ended up being a sub-optimal outcome. While public authori-
ties can help by proactively engaging with private actors and notably pushing them to
coordinate themselves, I will point out that it will often mean further limiting their role
as a regulatory innovator. As public involvement in the development of industry self-
regulations can help achieve a greater level of rule compliance, public authorities could
nevertheless find it a good trade-off.
This argument is developed throughout the next five sections. The first briefly
explains how fragmentation, which is traditionally viewed positively in complexity theory
and as a kind of necessary condition for the exploration of new ideas, can actually become
an impediment to it and even lead to a form of regulatory capture when considering the
role of private regulators. From there, the second section shows how different regulators
have created new rules over the years. The third then highlights that despite not being
null, regulatory innovations put forward by private regulators were less important than it
could have been expected or sometimes even argued. The fourth then details how rather
than innovating, many industry self-regulations precisely became tools of regulatory cap-
ture. The fifth section shows that the American and European public authorities were
able to limit this result through proactive actions. This, however, often meant limiting
their creation of new data protection rules as especially seen with the case of the Euro-
pean Union which, tended to adopt a more hands-on approach to industry self-regulation
than in the United States.
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6.1 Complexity, Regulatory Innovations and Private Rule-
Making
As explained in chapter 4, a complex system approach pushes us to rethink the concept of
innovation as a relational and systemic phenomenon (Carstensen 2015; Morin, Pauwelyn
and Hollway 2017). While individuals or organizations are not inconsequential in that
process, the new ideas that they explore are always contingent on what previously existed
and became aware through their previous interactions. Again using the example of
the iPhone, it basically means that the latter could not have been invented before the
Internet, the GPS, and all its other technical components were and came to interact in
the work of Steve Jobs and engineers at Apple. In the transatlantic privacy system, new
rules can similarly only be based on what regulators behind them were made aware of in
their past interactions. As it will be discussed at greater length in the next section, the
‘right to be forgotten’ could not have been created if the right to erasure had not already
existed, which notably allowed to think that it was feasible to request that personal data
be destroyed or, at least, be made inaccessible.
An important correlate of this systemic view is that innovating is a non-linear
process. As depicted in figure 4.5 (see p. 112), the innovation process takes the form of a
cycle where what used to be an innovation can always become a potential component for
another. What distinguishes an innovation from a component in one is not their level of
complexity nor a hierarchy between them. It is the time of their adoption. As time passes
and innovations are created, there is hence an increasingly large set of basic components
(i.e., technological parts or rules) that can be used to innovate again. Using data on
patents filing in the United States, Hyejin Youn and his colleagues thereby show that the
number of patents filed each year grew exponentially as the number of new technologies
grew each year (2015: 4). In plain terms, the more innovations there are at a specific
point in time, there more potential recombinations and, therefore, innovations there can
be later on. A simple calculus can help demonstrate this. The total number of potential
connections (p) between two individual components of a system is given by multiplying
their total number (n) by the same number minus one (n-1 ) and dividing it by two:
p =
n ⇤ (n  1)
2
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When applying this equation to a complex system made up of multiple compo-
nents, we quickly find out that the number of potential innovations becomes intractable.
If we take the present transatlantic privacy system for which this study found 71 rules,
there would be 2485 potential combinations. Here, the components are the existing rules
and each connection or link represents a possible innovation. As new connections are
formed, new rules are added, and the number of potential new recombinations progres-
sively grows larger. This is not even counting potential combinations involving more
than two preexisting rules. In all fairness, not all combinations would necessarily make
sense. Yet, many that now appear straightforward were not necessarily earlier on. The
combination of a mobile phone with a GPS may now seem evident to most people but
was certainly not as much in the early days of both technologies. It is often impossible
to know what potential combinations will make sense at a future point in time as this
will importantly depend on the context creating a demand for the exploration of new
ideas or, in this case, rules. As noted in chapter 4 and 5, regulators will generally find
it easier to exploit preexisting rules up until being faced with an exogenous shock or
negative feedback. An exogenous shock here mainly refers to an event occurring outside
of a given regulatory system and a negative feedback to an event occurring inside of it
that lead regulators to reconsider how they see their object of regulation (see section 4.5).
Depending on what this new information will highlight and the previous interactions of
an actor, different new connections will become conceivable.
It is worth noting that this view of innovation closely relates to the concepts
of “path dependency” and “increasing returns” that are both central to the historical
institutionalist literature (Ma 2007). Indeed, it largely agrees with the idea that choices
made today are influenced by those made yesterday and that regulatory changes may
have larger effects than their original input3. In the latter case, it occurs as one regulatory
innovation becomes a component in other ones and thus has a greater impact than the
regulator behind it had originally envisioned. Yet, it differs in that it does not look at
the political context or institutional characteristics to explain regulatory changes, like the
presence of veto points or the room for rule interpretation (Mahoney and Thelen 2010:
19). It instead considers how the pool of existing rules and the interactions between
the regulators behind them affect the creation of new ones over time. As such, it does
not aim to distinguish between the forms that regulatory change can take (i.e., drift,
displacement, layering or, conversion) but rather aims to explain how it relates to the
3This should perhaps come as no surprise as one of the main economist, Brian Arthur, credited for the
concept of increasing returns in the neo-institutionalist literature in economy is also a leading complexity
scholar (Ma 2007: 65).
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broader structure of the regulatory system in place. This is in line with the aim of the
complexity approach to comprehend the relation between the “whole and the parts” of a
system as discussed in chapter 2.
The emphasis on the possibility for one rule to become the source of others (i.e.,
increasing returns) does not mean that the rate of innovations will constantly accelerate.
As clearly seen in figure 4.3 (p. 109), the number of new rules created actually slowed
down since the mid-2000s. As opposed to the billiard ball metaphor of linear system, a
good metaphor for non-linear systems is the one of a sandpile (Cederman 2003). While
the former envisions a system where every input has a proportional effect on the output,
the latter sees a system in which small changes might have almost no effect or a much
larger one than its creator can even anticipate. In the present case, this notably means
that one regulatory innovation could lead to the creation of no other data protection
rules, while another one could trigger the creation of many.
In this light, the multiplication of privacy regulations and data protection rules
can be seen positively. Far from being a source of disorder or ‘chaos’, it ensures that
a given regulatory system has the internal capacity to keep up with a changing world.
As legal scholar J.B. Ruhl rightfully points out,“[r]obust legal systems must evolve” and
be “capable of responding to changing context by changing itself”, otherwise they are
bound to “die” just as any other social or natural systems (2014: 574). By providing
more resources that regulators can tap in to explore new ideas, the multiplication of
regulations and rules precisely helps ensure this. Indeed, previous research emphasized
that institutional redundancy and diversity did not have the negative effects that effi-
ciency proponents will traditionally attribute to it (Kelley 2009; Kellow 2012; Low et al.
2003; May, Levin and Sugihara 2008; Ruhl 2014). More than being a costly repetition
of resources, it helps ensure the system is both more flexible and adaptive (Keohane and
Victor 2011; Pauwelyn 2014). In the present case, it potentially allows more connections
to be made by a more diverse set of regulators than if there were only one regulator and
one regulation in charge of setting data protection rules for the whole transatlantic space.
With that in mind, it is puzzling that the regulation slowed down as much as it did since
the mid-2000s. Although it should not be expected that the rate of innovations remains
constant over time, the fact that very few new rules were created still opens up several
questions as the collection of personal data became increasingly widespread and its use
controversial. As industry self-regulations were moreover supposed to provide an even
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more flexible form of regulation, it is quite surprising that there were not more regulatory
innovations in recent years.
What actually stands out is that the resulting fragmentation from this multiplica-
tion of rules can produce negative effects too. Discussing the growing body of research on
regime complexity, Drezner (2009) emphasizes the risks that a fragmented international
system can notably pose for weaker states. As he points out, the flexibility provided
by the existence of multiple institutions will often work to the advantage of states with
sufficient resources to navigate the growing complexity of global governance issues. It
may also help powerful states to go around their agreed obligations by allowing them
to create and exploit incoherencies among various institutions, thereby undermining the
very role that institutions are supposed to play according to liberal scholars: promoting
international cooperation (Keohane and Martin 1995). In the rest of this chapter, I em-
phasize yet another negative outcome of a fragmented system when taking into account
the role of private actors. As it will be further discussed below, fragmentation can become
a hindrance to the creation of new rules by private actors by producing “second-order
information asymmetries” (Renckens 2020: 41).
One of the goals of industry self-regulations is to solve information asymmetries
by allowing companies to signal their good practices to consumers or business partners
with which they interact (Prakash and Potoski 2012; Vogel 2008). By making use of
these tools, they can build up their reputation and attempt to gain or minimally main-
tain market shares. As noted by one interviewee for this research, “privacy seals main
use for consumers is to show that the companies they interact with had their services
tested and that they are reliable. It is a bit of a question of prestige too” (Interview E19,
done on March 5th, 2019). Similarly, another interviewee explained the choice of devel-
oping an industry self-regulation by “the need to preserve public trust” (Interview E22,
done on March 11th, 2019). Following this line of thought, various business strategists
and representatives from the private sector touts that privacy can be seen as a business
opportunity (e.g., Garber 2018; Hoffman 2014). In effect, good data practices can be
sold as an added-value to consumers. We see this with the rising number of applications
or software that present themselves as being privacy-friendly. As the number of self-
regulations and concomitant certifications rise and make the market more fragmented,
the signalling value of these private regulatory programs, however, progressively decreases
due to ‘second-order information asymmetries’. The latter occur when the multiplica-
tion of industry self-regulations make it “unclear (or unknown) how [they] compare in
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terms of the stringency and scope of their standards, internal governance procedures, or
compliance verification processes” (Renckens 2020: 41). In that situation, consumers or
businesses are faced with a traditional market for lemons (Akerlof 1970) as they cannot
easily distinguish the bad from the good.
Even though the shadow of hierarchy or the threat of regulation (Büthe 2010;
Green 2010) may continue to push private actors to develop codes of conduct or other
self-regulatory tools, private actors lose their incentive to go beyond legal compliance
and innovate (Bartley 2014; Cashore and Stone 2014; Prakash and Potoski 2012) as they
will not make any real reputation gains of doing so. When they do create new rules,
they can also find it easy to not implement them. By reducing the clarity of one’s
obligations, the multiplication of regulations and rules dealing with privacy often makes
it easier to renege them at the implementation stage (Alter and Meunier 2009). Instead
of supporting greater dynamism, fragmentation then ends up limiting it and can lead to
regulatory capture. This sub-optimal outcome is here understood as a situation where
the regulatory process is controlled “ by those whom it is supposed to regulate or by
a narrow subset of those affected by regulation, with the consequence that regulatory
outcomes favour the narrow ‘few’ at the expense of society as a whole” (Mattli and
Woods 2009: 12). This can more specifically mean the absence of regulation, lenient
regulation, or unenforced regulation. As it will be seen, these can occur simultaneously
and involve both public and private forms of regulation. While sometimes limiting the
positive ‘experimenter’ role that private regulation can play (Bartley 2011; Green and
Auld 2017; Overdevest and Zeitlin 2014), public interventions then appear essential to
solve this situation. This was at least the case in both the United States and European
Union, even though to different degrees. Before turning to this, the next section will
empirically demonstrate how the combination of preexisting data protection rules led to
the creation of new ones in the transatlantic area since the adoption of the European
Data Directive in 1995.
6.2 Regulatory Innovations in Transatlantic Privacy Regu-
lations
As per the findings of this research, the total number of data protection rules has gone
from around 40 in 1995 to 70 today. These include rules on cookie notice and consent
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discussed previously and that are now widely adopted, as well as more recent rules on
data portability and the ‘right to be forgotten’ recently added in the GDPR. Going over
all these new rules would be too long. Not all are moreover equally interesting. Six
regulatory innovations will hereafter be presented to showcase how the innovation cycle
introduced in section 4.5 (see p. 112) and just discussed operates. These were selected
to reflect the regulatory activity of both public and private actors over time. Special
attention was also given to discuss recent rules that have been touted as significant in-
novations, notably by the European Commission (2015), to highlight their important
lineage with previous rules. This specific selection was importantly not meant to allow
for a generalization of the process innovation through recombination as the previously
cited study on patent could (Youn et al. 2015) but to provide an in-depth understanding
of how it practically operates (Della Porta 2008). Table 6.1 summarizes these six inno-
vations, who were behind them, and what were the previous principles or rules that they
combined. The rest of this section reviews each of them.
Table 6.1: Six regulatory innovations since 1995







01.01 Privacy statement & 01.03
Data types and purposes
1997 03.03 Third-partysource IRSG Private
03 Collection limitations & 06
Data quality
1997 14 Education IRSG Private 01.01 Privacy statement & 07Individual participation
2002
12.03 Data breach no-
tification to the data
subjects
California State Public 01.01 Privacy statement & 10.01Commitment to data security
2016 07.03.02 Right to beforgotten
European Court
of Justice Public
07.03.01 Right to erasure & 06
Data quality
2016 07.10 Data portability European Com-mission Public
05.01 Sharing with independent
controller & 07.01 Access and re-
view &
* All in these organizations adopted the same new rule in their regulations adopted the same year.
The first innovation worthy of mention is the requirement to notify users that
their personal data is being passively collected. Again, when visiting a website or using
an online application, companies behind them will often collect information about their
users (e.g., IP address, geographical location, etc.). As opposed to an active form of
data collection, it occurs without the data subject being always aware of it. No forms
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or questionnaires are completed. It simply happens in the background as a website or
online service is being used. This specific form of data collection is nowadays prevalent
and poses a problem to the “privacy as control” dominant paradigm in Europe and the
United States introduced in chapter 3. Without knowing that our personal data is
being collected, it is evidently hard to control its future use. Following their creation
in the mid-1990s, there were repeated calls by various activists to make the use of such
tools more transparent (Hill 2001). Interestingly, some industry associations were the
ones innovating in this case, not public authorities. In 1997, three industry associations
(i.e., the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), Internet Alliance
(IA) and Individual Reference Services Group (IRSG) included a rule in their respective
privacy regulations requiring that companies notify their users that their personal data is
being collected through passive means. The code of the IA was the most straightforward
formulating this requirement in the following way:
In addition to the types of information collected, online operators should make clear
how personal information is collected. For example, disclosure should be made as to
whether the information is collected automatically or affirmatively . (IA Code
1997: 1; emphasis added)
Here faced with a new technological development, these three private associations
used previous transparency requirements to create a new rule. The need to have a privacy
statement explaining their data practices (01.01) and to explain what type of data they
collect (01.03) are two rules that all three had already incorporated and could have served
as a basis for the three associations to indicate that their members should also explain how
they collect personal data. This is significant and shows that private actors can indeed
experiment and go further than their legal requirements. Not all private associations
were in effect as prone to do so as this particular form of data collection was at the heart
of the business model of many online companies in the early days of the Internet. Chiefly,
the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) that represented some of the biggest users of
cookies and other passive data collection methods did not include such rule in their 2000
code of conduct, which already existed at that point. It was nevertheless adopted by the
FTC Fair Information Privacy Principles (FIPPs) as noted above and later on became
exploited by most public and private regulators. Since 2013, the NAI even includes it in
its code of conduct.
A second regulatory innovation that merits attention relates to the source of
personal data. Up to now, this research has mostly talked about data collection as being
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closely connected with a specific data subject. Private companies have, however, for long
exchanged personal data and built up profiles on individuals by using information from
third-party sources. An entire industry was actually built around this business interest.
Companies named data brokers aggregate personal data from various sources and develop
increasingly accurate personal profiles that they then sell to other companies (Pasquale
2015: 30-1). One source of concern is that it was not always clear where the information
being exchanged is originally coming from and if it can be trusted. As a matter of fact,
mistakes in the combination of personal can end up causing severe harm when such data
is used for making sensitive decisions, like credit decisions for a mortgage. To resolve
this situation, leading companies in the data brokerage industry represented by the IRSG
specifically indicated that they should actively assess the source of personal data before
considering it:
Individually identifiable information shall be acquired from only sources known as
reputable in the government and private sectors. Reasonable measures shall be
employed to understand an information source’s data collection practices
and policies before accepting information from that source. (IRSG Code 1997: 2;
emphasis added)
This is a second example of the capacity of private actors to innovate. While still
vague4, this requires to go further than what other public or private regulations were
asking at the time. In need to prove to American public authorities that they could self-
regulate themselves (Gellman and Dixon 2016), they added this rule by combining two
principles that have been at the heart of the protection of privacy since the adoption of the
OECD guidelines in 1980: the need to limit data collection (03 Collection limitations)
and ensure the quality of personal data (06 Data quality). When going through the
code of the IRSG, the rules related to these two principles are presented next to each
other and it is clear that a strong link is drawn between the two. Interestingly, this
regulatory innovation was not widely exploited. Only 9% of all 124 public and private
regulations coded in this research included it. Indeed, not all innovations ended up having
a large impact on the complex governance system for privacy. In line with the argument
presented in the previous chapter, this depends on the position and the interactions
of the actor(s) promoting it. In the case of the IRSG, despite representing important
4In fairness, new rules adopted by public authorities also often start by being quite broad and become
more precise over time. The early enunciation of the FIPPs by the FTC was very broad and the language
was not particularly constraining. Although rules in Europe tend to be defined in more constraining
terms, the Data Directive was similarly much vaguer on how many rules should be implemented than
the GDPR is today.
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companies, it had limited interactions with other public and private regulators following
its creation. Its existence was also short-lived as the companies behind this initiative
ended it in 2002 and had been inactive for a few years before that (Gellman and Dixon
2016).
A third regulatory innovation by private actors and again introduced by the IRSG
relates to the education of individuals about privacy and business data practices. One
broad issue with the protection of privacy is that data practices are often obscure to
individuals. Just as the sources of personal data are not always clear, the uses and
decisions made based on it are also often not obvious for most people. This generally
contributes to the broad feeling that we have given up our privacy in this online world.
One way to fix this is by educating individuals about data governance and how they
can control their information. This is what the members of the IRSG precisely engaged
themselves to do back in 1997:
Individual reference services shall individually and through their industry groups
make reasonable efforts to educate users and the public about privacy
issues associated with their services, the types of services they offer, these
principles, and the benefits of the responsible flow - of information. (IRSG Code
1997: 2)
In this case, this rule builds on the previous obligations of private companies
collecting personal data to be transparent about their data policies (01.01 Privacy state-
ment) and offer choices about how personal data is being used to data subjects (02.01
Original consent). In the end, the goal of educating individuals is to inform them about
how they can express their preferences and control their information. This is perhaps
most evident in how the NAI formulated its own requirement to educate consumers in its
code of conduct of 2000, which indicates that its members should educate their users “in
[their] privacy statements” to “facilitate consumer awareness and provide a convenient
mechanism for consumers to exercise choice regarding such data collection and/or use”
(NAI Code 2000: 9). Although both organizations did not officially have direct interac-
tions with each other, the exploitation of this rule seemed possible by the fact that these
two organizations still shared similar members (e.g., Acxiom). Since then, many private
associations representing advertising companies, like the Direct Marketing Association
(DMA) and the Interactive Advertising Bureau, included a rule requiring their members
to educate their consumers about their data practices. This ended up being part of the
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code of conduct developed by the Digital Advertising Alliance and in turn being exploited
by European associations as discussed in chapter 5.
A fourth important novel rule since 1995 is the one requiring private companies
to notify individuals on whom they have personal data if they were affected by a security
breach. As opposed to the previous three examples, this specific rule was created by
a public authority and, more specifically, the government of the State of California.
With the rise in the collection of personal data came growing risks of identity theft.
Following previous security breach scandals, including one incident involving 265,000
California state employees, Californian legislators decided to adopt a law that would
require private entities to be more transparent about security breaches (Burdon 2010;
Preston and Turner 2004).
A person or business that conducts business in California, and that owns or licenses
computerized data that includes personal information, shall disclose a breach of
the security of the system following discovery or notification of the breach in
the security of the data to a resident of California (1) whose unencrypted personal
information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unautho-
rized person, or, (2) whose encrypted personal information was, or is reasonably
believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person. (California Civil Code
s. 1798.82(a))
As made evident by the wording of the obligation, it combined two principles that
were at the heart of the regulation of privacy in the United States since the early formu-
lation of fair information practices in the 1970s: notice and security. Up to that point,
that minimally meant that private companies would inform consumers of their privacy
policies (01.01 Privacy statements) and commit themselves to protect the personal data
of their users (e.g., 10.01 Commitment to data security). These were part of the FTC
FIPPs and most industry self-regulations in the United States. When put together, they
form the basis of the obligation to notify users of potential security breaches affecting
their personal data. Since then, few American private associations have, however, in-
cluded this requirement in their industry self-regulation and limited its exploitation by
their European counterparts as pointed out in chapter 5. Nevertheless, it still made its
way in Europe first through its Directive specifically aimed for the telecommunications
sector (e-Privacy Directive) and then in the GDPR.
Back in 2002, similar concerns than in the United States over identity theft and
misuse of personal data led to the inclusion of a requirement in the e-Privacy Directive
to inform users of potential security breach risks associated with their services (art.
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15(2)). This slightly differs from the rule developed in California as it pertains to “an
unrealized contingency, not a realized security breach” (Preston and Turner 2004: 468),
and interestingly shows that faced with similar problems and set of original resources, two
actors may still not come up with the same innovation. The GDPR has now embraced
the American rule and provides that companies should notify the individuals affected
by a data breach. It even goes further by defining data breaches more broadly and,
notably, including not only the case of a security breach but ‘unauthorised disclosure’
and ‘accidental destruction or loss’ that would make it impossible for individuals to access
their personal data. In the latter case, it is an example where the new rule became a
component of another new one by combining it with the rule requiring companies to allow
anyone to have access to their personal information hold by a private entity (07.01 Access
and review). This perfectly exemplifies the non-linear process of regulatory innovation.
The fifth regulatory innovation that has attracted a lot of attention in recent years
is the famous ‘right to be forgotten’ included in the GDPR. As previously mentioned (see
chapter 4), the Data Directive importantly already provided that data subjects could ask
for their personal data to be erased. The big change in the GDPR is that it allows for
more grounds to ask for it. Rather than only allowing individuals to ask for the erasure
of erroneous data, they can notably require “the controller the erasure of personal
data” that “are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they were
collected or otherwise processed” (GDPR art. 17(a)). These two elements that form
the new ‘right to be forgotten’ clearly draw from the previous rule allowing individuals
to request the erasure (07.03) and the previous obligation of private companies to only
maintain accurate and useful data (06 Data quality). This was actually explicitly said in
the decision by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that drew the contour of the right
to be forgotten two years before it was included in the GDPR (Google Spain SL and
Google Inc. v AEPD and Mario Costeja Gonzalez, 2014 Case C-131/12). In paragraph
94 of its decision, the ECJ specifically uses article 6 of the Data Directive relating to the
principles of data quality to explain that “initially lawful processing of accurate data may,
in the course of time, become incompatible with the directive where those data are no
longer necessary in the light of the purposes for which they were collected or processed”
and make legitimate a request for its erasure.
As a relatively new rule, it has yet to been widely exploited and re-used to create
other new rules. At this point, there is notably still few private actors that have moved
forward and included it in their own regulation, and especially in the United States.
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TrustArc and Verasafe are two exceptions. These two American certification companies
have indeed included it in their latest self-regulations (TrustArc 2018 Enterprise certi-
fication standards & Verasafe 2017 Privacy Certification Program). This might not be
stranger to their known interest to act as certifiers for the GDPR (Interview E31 and
E33), a new role that private actors can now play by indicating that specific companies
comply with the GDPR. While no private certificators have been recognized by the Eu-
ropean Commission or its Member States, the potential interest of being among the first
ones to play this potentially lucrative role seems to have led both of them to include the
new ‘right to be forgotten’ in their global certification service as well as other rules found
in the GDPR. As a matter of fact, they now both make multiple references to the GDPR
in their respective privacy programs. This interestingly highlights a new pathway for
the exploitation of European rules by American private actors. Rather than occurring
through their interactions with their European counterparts or an international agree-
ment delegating tasks to them, the European Commission can give them an official role
in the implementation of its rules globally.
The sixth and last new data protection rule created in the last 20 years and here
reviewed is the right to data portability. Just like the ‘right to be forgotten’, it raised
great interest following its inclusion in the GDPR (art. 20). One rising concern in the
data economy is the accumulation of data by a few large companies that could lead
to competitive bottlenecks (Stucke and Grunes 2016; Srnicek 2017; Zuboff 2019). This
issue was specifically recognized by then-Vice President of the European Commission
responsible for Competition Policy, Joaquin Almunia, while introducing some of the new
rights in the early commission’s legislative proposal for the GDPR. In his speech, he
noted that a right to data portability specifically aimed to ensure that any individuals
de not become “locked in to a particular company just because they once trusted them
with their content” (Almunia 2012: 4). To fix this, the right to data portability foresees
that:
[T]he data subject shall have the right to receive the personal data concerning
him or her , which he or she has provided to a controller, in a structured, commonly
used and machine-readable format and have the right to transmit those data to
another controller
This specifically builds on two previous rules found in the Data Directive. First,
and as duly noted by the participants to the FabLab workshop on the application of the
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GDPR by the Article 29 Working Party5, it extends the preexisting right to access that
was part of the Data Directive of 1995 (Article 29 Working Party 2016), which specifically
indicated that individuals could require to have communicated to them “in an intelligible
form of [the] data undergoing processing” (art. 12). The second part of the right to
data portability adds to the right of access by requiring that data subjects received their
personal data in a format allowing them to transmit to another controller of their choice.
This combines rules on data transfer that had up to then only been applied between
data controllers. Interestingly, this novel combination also appears linked to the rule on
the portability of phone numbers that was part of the European regulatory framework
since the adoption of the Universal Service Directive in 2002 (Article 29 Working Party
2016). The latter foresees that consumers can change service providers and still keep their
phone numbers. This represents an example where an outside source of information also
contributed to shaping a new rule.
Just like the ‘right to be forgotten’, the right to data portability is still new, and
almost no private actors have added to their industry self-regulation. TrustArc, which
again has shown an interest in being a GDPR certifier, is one of the sole exceptions and
has included it in the 2018 version of its Enterprise certification standards. It remains to
be seen how it will be exploited in the future, but the fact that the right to access is one
of the most widely adopted, present in 90 of the 124 coded regulations for this research,
is certainly a sign that it could be taken up by many.
These six examples of regulatory innovations each show how the innovation cycle
depicted in figure 4.5 (p. 112) operates. Following a negative feedback or an exogenous
shock creating a demand for exploring new solutions, regulators combined preexisting
rules to create new ones. Once created, these new rules became additional resources that
could be exploited by others and be used to produce other regulatory innovations. They
also showed that both public and private actors could innovate and actively support the
development of privacy regulation. Out of the six innovations reviewed, half were in
effect the result of the work of private associations in the United States as displayed in
table 6.1. This should, however, not be taken to mean that both have been contributing
in the same way to the evolution of data protection rules. The next section will provide
more details on the nature of private regulatory innovations and how they relate to public
ones.
5Once again, the advisory body created by the Data Directive to follow its implementation throughout
the Member States (see chapter 3 and more specifically section 3.5.
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6.3 Private Regulators: Innovative Rulemakers?
As just seen, the creation of data protection rules has not been the sole purview of
public authorities since the European Data Directive was adopted in 1995. At different
points in time since then, private actors have been innovative and have gone further
than merely exploiting public rules in the development of their industry self-regulations.
Varying interviewees for this research representing both the public and private sector
have recognized this explicitly. When asked if private actors were going beyond legal
compliance, some notably held:
[Codes] must go a little bit further than the law. [...] There must be an added-value
and it cannot be a simple reflection of what the GDPR is requiring. (Interview
E12, done on February 11th, 2019; translated from French)
Every seal has the law as its base, but you always need something on top.
You cannot simply repeat the law. (Interview E19, done on March 15th, 2019)
It does create new obligations. That’s why it is called self-regulation. [...]
You need to do more than what the law requires you to do. (Interview E21, done
on March 21st, 2019)
I would actually say that this [private] regulatory sandbox is incredibly valu-
able. It can better keep pace with the technological change that hard law ever can
and it brings a flexibility that public authorities lack. (Interview E28, done on
April 10th, 2019)
This capacity to innovate is confirmed by the data collected for this research.
Figure 6.1 shows that out of all the rules found in this research (i.e., 36) to have been
created after the adoption of the European Data Directive, more than half (61%) were
created by private actors. When adding the rules found in this research as existing before
1995 and significantly those in the European Data Directive, we get the reverse picture
where it is public actors that have been most innovative by the exact same margin
(61%). These findings already highlight that industry self-regulations have not been
merely applying public laws and confirm previous works that had identified that specific
rules, like on the protection of children’s privacy online (Lascoutx 2002: 649) or requiring
the creation of a data protection officers (Thoma 2012: 277), had first been enunciated
by industry groups or private companies. At the same time, they demonstrate that it
is far from a given that private actors are necessarily more innovative or experimenting
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with more new rules than public regulators are, and this actually varies depending on
the time period considered.
Figure 6.1: Sum of data protection rules first enunciated by public and private actors after 1995
The level of innovativeness of private actors must, however, be further qualified.
This broad depiction of their capacity to create new rules in effect does not assess the con-
tent of their regulatory innovations nor where and when they tended to innovate. Taking
these elements into consideration is essential to evaluate the contribution of private ac-
tors to the regulation of privacy and consider and if it indeed supported the development
of a more comprehensive regulatory approach in the public interest. In other words, the
contributions of public and private actors should be assessed both quantitatively and
qualitatively.
A first important specification to make is that the rules created by private actors
have largely aimed at bringing clarity on the application of preexisting principles. As
noted when introducing the database used for this research in section 4.2, principles
are understood as broad expressions of a goal to achieve and rules are more specific
prescriptions of how to achieve it. As opposed to technical standards, rules remain,
however, vague on how they should be technically implemented. Out of the 14 broad
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principles according to which the different data protection rules identified for this research
are divided, only three were originally put forward in an industry self-regulation. These
are the rules that pertain to the development of private compliance mechanisms, the
education of individuals, and the protection of children’s privacy. All of the other broad
and well-known privacy protection principles, including transparency, consent, individual
participation, security, and collection and use limitations, were first found in either a
law or public guideline. This was identified by considering which type of actor first put
forward a rule for each of these principles and, in many cases, they go back to the adoption
of the early report on Fair Information Practices by the United States Department of
Health, Education and Welfare in 1973 or the OECD Guidelines in 1980.
This denotes one key characteristic of private forms of regulations, which is that
they rarely aim to create broad new principles but instead work to help their members
or certified users to respect broad regulatory goals previously set by public authorities.
In the United States, where no comprehensive privacy law is in force at the federal
level, private actors still largely implement public principles. This is something that con-
stantly came up when discussing the role of private rules with multiple interviewees for
this research and even led to sometimes seemingly contradictory answers. Indeed, many
interviewees were prone to simultaneously maintain that their industry self-regulations
were going further than the law but were not creating new legal obligations. One in-
terviewee, for example, stated that self-regulations “needed to go further than law”, but
that “they do not create rules” (Interview E12, done on February 11th, 2019). Similar
thoughts were held by one interviewee from the private sector who held that industry
self-regulations were going “beyond what is required in the law” and still maintained that
their “role is to try to implement, not create rules” (Interview E34, done on May 6th,
2019).
This terminology issue is both inconsequential and telling. On the one hand, it
speaks to the different understanding that the concept of rule can take and which is
understood broadly in this research. Many interviewees tended to equate the concept of
rule to ‘legal rules’ or those enacted by governments. In turn, the regulatory activity of
private actors was not seen as the same as rule-making. There are, however, many differ-
ent and broader ways to understand the concept of rule, and the fact that a requirement
aims to operationalize a broader principle or specify another rule does not impede it from
being characterized as a rule. For one, the ‘right to be forgotten’ is here considered to be
a rule and is a specification of how private companies should manage the broader right
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to erasure that individuals have. On the other hand, it does point to the important fact
that if private actors actively contributed to the regulation of privacy, their regulatory
innovations were often more limited in scope and generally tended to specify public ones.
As another interviewee specifically mentioned, the creation of “principles very broadly,
that is for privacy laws. What we do is working with the technical specifics. That’s
where there is a room to develop new rules” (Interview E40, done on May 14th, 2019).
In line with this, this research found that the specific list of information that pri-
vate actors need to disclose in their privacy statement was partly determined by industry
self-regulations. This reflects the simple fact that governments knew they wanted to
promote the principle of transparency, but they did not necessarily know from the onset
what were all the different types of information that private companies could and should
share with individuals from whom they collect personal data. While being a valuable
contribution, these types of innovations can be viewed as being qualitatively less signif-
icant than the creation of the requirement to have a privacy statement. Going back to
the definition of principles and rules given in chapter 4 (see p. 93), while changes in rules
will generally mean a change within the boundaries of the current privacy system and
continuity, change in principles are more disruptive and could even lead to a change in the
privacy paradigm in place. Previous scholars already emphasized that we are unlikely to
see a pure form industry self-regulation system emerging without any state intervention
(Börzel and Risse 2010: 116). This additional finding highlights that we are moreover
unlikely to see fundamental changes in the regulation of an issue-area being spurred by
private actions.
A second element to point out about the regulatory innovations put forward by
private regulators relates to the time of their adoption. As previously indicated, one
common argument in favour of industry self-regulation is the more flexible form of gov-
ernance that they can offer to public form of governance (Abbott, Green and Keohane
2016; Overdevest and Zeitlin 2014). This is one of the reason the European Commis-
sion in effect has early on decided to give a role to private actors to deal with various
issues, including privacy protection that it takes to be a fundamental right (European
Commission 2001b). Flexibility can significantly mean different things and it was often
described by interviewees for this research as allowing private actors to tailor broad prin-
ciples and rules to specific sectors. This certainly fits the type of regulatory innovations
just described.
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Offering the opportunity to adapt the way rules should be applied to a specific
sector is yet only one way private actors can provide flexibility. Another is by taking
stock of negative feedback or changes to adapt their regulations accordingly. As it is well-
known, the process of modifying public laws can be long and cumbersome. The GDPR
modified a Directive that had been adopted twenty years before6 and took four years
to be adopted after the European Commission (2012a) first proposed a comprehensive
reform of the European privacy system. In the United States, this assumed flexibility
of industry self-regulations has been and remain one of the main selling points for it as
discussed in chapter 3 (see especially section 3.3).
Looking at the time when private actors have innovated interestingly tells a dif-
ferent story. Figure 6.2 shows that far from being constantly in the process of exploring
new rules and displaying great flexibility, regulatory innovations by private actors have
largely been circumscribed to specific time periods where public pressure was particu-
larly high and often close to when regulatory innovations by public regulators appeared.
Indeed, most rules created by them was at the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, a time
where the European Commission was working hard to ensure its Data Directive was
thoroughly applied and the United States was actively trying to push private actors to
show they were able to self-regulate themselves as it was negotiating the Safe Harbor
Agreement with Europe (Farrell 2003: 290). The organization of workshops by the FTC
and the clear threat that public regulations could be adopted in the absence of actions
on their part notably led American industry associations to showcase their goodwill. As
time passed and public scrutiny diminished, they progressively stopped exploring new
rules and mainly relied on exploiting rules that had notably been created in Europe. As
discussed in the previous chapter, the cost of doing so was lower and private actors had
no real interest in going further.
This is not to say that private actors have done nothing after these first few
years. As just indicated, many continued to exploit rules that other public and private
organizations had developed. They also sometimes aimed to apply their self-regulations
to new technologies or techniques of data collection and use. For example, some developed
codes of conduct or certifications specifically for data practices using mobile phones. Yet,
they did not create new data protection rules, even though they would regularly hold
6Importantly, other directives like the ePrivacy directive were adopted in between contributed to
complement the European Data Directive, but it was generally for a specific sector and there was a big
change in the European privacy system between the European Data Directive and the adoption of the
GDPR.
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Figure 6.2: Sum of new data protection rules by type of actors and years
to have a better understanding of what are the challenges with protecting the privacy
of individuals as many interviewees for this research still held. It is noteworthy that we
cannot expect the development of new rules to be continuously high as it depends on
the presence of negative feedback or exogenous shocks to spur demand for it. Having
said that, the almost complete void of innovations for a decade is quite significant and
especially as it goes hand in hand with the rise of the digital economy.
Seen in this light, the contribution of private actors to the creation of new data
protection rules is not anything, but certainly not as significant as it may seem at first
sight. For one, it does not so much attempt at creating new obligations than specifying
those that public authorities have already set forth for them. Moreover, they do not
appear to be so flexible and adaptive that they would regularly create new rules. In
the ten years before the adoption of the GDPR, almost none did so. Considering that
they sell themselves as better to cope with change than public laws, the fact that their
role in exploring new rules is not that much more significant is particularly noteworthy.
The next section will argue that instead of becoming a potential source of creation, the
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multiplication of industry self-regulations and rules actually limited the interest of private
actors to explore new rules and even spurred a form of regulatory capture.
6.4 Fragmentation and Regulatory Capture
Despite contributing to the exploration of new data protection rules, industry self-
regulations have in many ways not fulfilled their promise of offering a more flexible
and adaptive form of governance than public authorities. In addition to having a limited
impact on the development of most of the core data protection principles and not being
really active for the decade leading to the adoption of the GDPR, many even ended
up not truly supporting greater privacy compliance. Over the years, multiple reports
indicated that codes of conduct and private certification services were not properly im-
plemented and had not provided the guarantees that they were supposed to. In many
ways, various industry self-regulations appeared to act as regulatory decoys used to give a
false impression that they make the regulation of privacy more robust while they prevent
further regulation by public authorities.
In the United States, one case epitomizing this perfectly is the IRSG, which is
actually the most innovative private regulator according to the findings of this research.
With the inclusion of eight new rules, its 1997 principles are in effect the industry self-
regulation that included the most regulatory innovations (see figure 4.4 on p. 110).
Among the three principles first created by an industry self-regulation, it was also behind
the one requiring the development of private compliance mechanisms. Indeed, it was one
of the first two industry groups to foresee that its members would have to go through an
annual ‘assurance review’ verifying their compliance with their data protection rules. As
one interviewee with close knowledge of this early initiative explained, it was supposed
to be “the first self-regulatory framework that had teeth behind it” (Interview E37, done
on May 14th, 2019). In practice, though, it largely ended up being a tool used by the
industry to stop the American government from further regulating -their activities rather
than really aiming at improving the regulation of privacy. Following its inception, it did
not make public the reports on its members’ compliance that it was supposed to do
following their assurance review. It was thereby never possible to verify if its principles
were actually implemented (Gellman and Dixon 2016: 55). More so, it stopped all its
activities five years after it had developed its principles citing the adoption of the Gramm
Leach Bliley Act as making its services useless even though none of its members were
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financial institutions covered by this law (Gellman and Dixon 2016: 56). In addition
to leaving many of its members free to act as they wished with the personal data in
their possession, it also limited the broader impact of its regulatory innovations. As it
ended up its activities quite quickly and did not build as many interactions with other
regulators as others did over the years, some of them were not largely exploited as it was
mentioned while discussing the six examples of regulatory innovations given above.
Over the years, many other industry associations or certification companies having
put forward a code of conduct or privacy certification less innovative than the IRSG were
also found to have failed to enhance the privacy guarantees offered to individuals. As one
of the leading providers of privacy certifications in the United States, TrustArc (formerly
TRUSTe) has, for example, only produced two regulatory innovations. Yet, on multiple
occasions, it made the headlines for its various regulatory failures. Back in 2000, it
notably gave its seal to the company RealNetworks, even though the latter was collecting
personal information on individuals without them being aware of it (Haufler 2001: 102).
The fact of the matter is that TrustArc’s certification was limited to RealNetwork’s
website and, as such, did not apply to the software of the company that was used to
collect personal information. Despite extending its program to data collection practices
from software following the public outcry, it repeatedly failed to conduct annual re-
certifications as its certification program stated it should have been doing (Federal Trade
Commission 2014). One interviewee for this research even held that for a long time
TrustArc looked as “if it aimed to make things more cloudy for consumers” (Interview
E37, done on May 14th, 2019). The NAI is another oft-cited example of the disappointing
contribution of industry self-regulations (Dixon 2007: 37; see also Hoofnagle 2005). Since
its creation in 2000, this research only found two regulatory innovations in the different
codes it adopted over the years. Meanwhile, oversight of its members’ data practices was
repeatedly found to be lacking. In its early years of activity at the turn of the millennium,
reporting on its members progressively stopped and the number of active participants
dropped significantly (Gellman and Dixon 2016: 59-60).
While both TrustArc and the NAI underwent changes following these criticisms
and now maintain to more adequately check the compliance of their member companies,
there are still important concerns to have. TrustArc merely indicates in its certifica-
tion program that private companies using its services must “monitor, and periodically
assess and audit the effectiveness of controls and risk-mitigation initiatives” (TrustArc
Certification Assessment Criteria 2018: 33). How and to what extent this is done is not
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specified. Meanwhile, the NAI does go further and publish a report assessing its mem-
bers’ compliance with its self-regulatory program every year. There is, however, little
information about the actual data practices of its members in it. Most of the time, it indi-
cates that “evaluated members” have fulfilled detailed questionnaires indicating that they
were respecting its code of conduct. Taking into account that its 2018 code of conduct
still exclude many prominent rules found in other public or private regulations, like that
data collection should be limited to specific purposes (03.01 Purpose limitations), that
the transfer of personal data to third-parties should be based on an individual’s consent
(05.01.01 Consent) and that individuals should have the right to request to have their
personal data deleted (07.03 Erasure), the NAI’s contribution to making the regulation
of privacy more robust appears even more questionable.
On the European side, similar instances of such regulatory failures were not as
common, but conflicts over how to enforce industry self-regulations also drew a lot of
attention and actually led to many never being formally adopted. As previously dis-
cussed (see chapter 5), business and consumer representatives that had worked with the
support of the European Commission on building a European trustmark that would have
established common rules for companies selling online ended up dropping this project as
they were unable to agree on how it should be enforced (European Commission 2004:
8-9). One interviewee for this research that had been working on this project specifically
noted that disagreement over the need for a third-party verification system was the main
source of disagreement (Interview E7, done on February 4th, 2019). More recently, two
codes of conduct developed with the financial support of the European Commission and
aimed at defining privacy rules in the cloud computing and health sector failed to be
adopted for similar reasons. In its opinion on the code of conduct for the cloud com-
puting industry, the article 29 working party specifically raised many issues with the
governance structure of the code and how it would check its users’ compliance (Article
29 Working Party 2015). These divergences over how industry self-regulations should be
enforced are evidently one reason why there has only been one code of conduct officially
approved at the European level in the twenty years separating the adoption of the Data
Directive in 1995 and the GDPR in 2016.
Overall, many industry self-regulations thus failed to enhance compliance and even
did the opposite. This contradicts one key argument in favor of industry self-regulations,
which was that they could help ensure better implementation of data protection rules. In
being closer to the regulatees (i.e., the very companies they represent or work with), they
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were presented as being in a better position to ensure private accountability and were
specifically included in the GDPR for that very reason. As one interviewee noted, the
European Commission “promoted these types of compliance tools in the GDPR. Again,
the keyword was accountability. People in specific sectors know best how to protect
privacy.” (Interview E23, done on March 14th, 2019). In practice, though, even in cases
where they developed new compliance mechanisms like the IRSG did with its annual
assurance review, they often did not apply them as they were supposed to and could
be seen as a form of ‘privacy-washing’, an attempt to present a service or product as
being more privacy-friendly than it actually is. According to the same interviewee, this
is actually evident when looking at how they have been drafted over the years:
Looking forward, I am however a bit skeptical. What I find is that many codes are
written not to protect citizens, but they are mostly written with a defensive attitude
towards themselves. It is for their own protection. [...] It is a common weakness
that codes are not really made to protect citizens. (Interview E23, done on March
14th, 2019)
This represents a case of regulatory capture where many of these industry self-
regulations were developed to benefit those they are supposed to regulate rather than
serve the broad public interest. Far from fostering a thriving ‘regulatory sandbox’ where
new data protection rules can be experimented with and explored, many indeed became
tools to escape the adoption of stricter data protection rules by public authorities and
limit the application of existing ones. The hybrid regulatory process, involving both
public and private actors, comes to serve the interests of private companies wanting a
more lightly regulated marketplace. The multiplication of regulations and rules that is
normally seen as key for regulatory innovations to emerge appears to have played a crucial
role in this outcome. By making the regulation of privacy more fragmented, it also made
it more opaque and reduced the interest for private actors to spend resources to explore
new rules. As one interviewee previously cited (see p. 145) noted, the multiplication of
certification marks or seals created a lot of confusion for individuals. In practice, few, if
any, would be able to distinguish them and know what each prescribes with regards to
the collection of their personal data.
This type of “second-order information asymmetries” (Renckens 2020: 41) was
further reinforced by the multiplication of data protection rules over the years. Previous
studies have notably pointed out that the text complexity of most privacy policies is too
high for most individuals. On average, the privacy policy of many popular companies
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requires a college education level to understand (Litman-Navarro 2019). Similar results
were in effect found for websites and applications that specifically target children (Calver
and Miller 2018). In light of this, there has been a growing push to reduce the use of
confusing legalese in privacy policies (Becher and Benoliel 2020). In its transparency
requirement, the GDPR specifically tackles this issue, indicating that companies should
use “clear and plain language” (art. 12) to describe their data practices. Following this,
the length of time needed to read the 2019 version of Google’s privacy policy was cut
almost in half compared to its version one year before per one journalist from the New
York Times (Litman-Navarro 2019).
Despite such attempts at bringing more transparency, the higher number of rules
found in today’s privacy regulations still tend to make them long and complicated docu-
ments to read. The 2019 version of Google’s privacy policy is still four times longer (+\-
18 mins) to read than its earlier version of 2004 (+\- 4 mins). This illustrates that as
the number of data protection rules grows, the length of public and private regulations
necessarily also tends to become longer. A recent study of 194 privacy policies of Ameri-
can private companies in effect found that their overall length had significantly increased
between 2014 and 2018 (Davis and Marotta-Wurgler 2019: 695). Although the language
used in privacy policies may become simpler and easier to read, the time to read them
thus remained the same or even increased. This means that according to previous esti-
mates, individuals with the right reading ability would need on average more than 200
hours per year to read all privacy policies affecting them (McDonald and Cranor 2008:
560). This obviously results in almost none being actually read. A direct consequence
of this is that it reduces the value of industry self-regulations’ signalling effect. Private
companies do not have a real incentive to experiment or go further than what is required
of them in the law because they all appear as being equivalent to individuals viewing
them.
This is notably made evident by the unfortunate fate of the Webtrust certification
program of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). The latter
was an industry self-regulation jointly developed by the American and Canadian associ-
ation of accountants and widely recognized in the early 2000s for its thoroughness. In
one previous research, one representative from a telecom company that joined this certi-
fication program explained its choice by specifically emphasizing its comprehensiveness:
“The WebTrust criteria were very complicated...The VP at that time said: this is the best
one, let’s go and get it! Make sure that we get the most impressive seal” (Boulianne and
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Cho 2009: 236). This is similarly confirmed by this research, which found that it was the
second most innovative private regulator, having enunciated for the first time six rules
in the different versions of its industry self-regulation over the years. By 2004, it was
also the American industry self-regulation with the highest number of data protection
rules (i.e., 41). This is more than twice the average number of rules included in privacy
regulations active in the transatlantic area at the same time and ten more than in the
European Data Directive of 1995. As a matter of fact, it was the American industry
self-regulation that had exploited the most ‘European’ rules (see 5.2 and 5.4 in chapter
5) by the mid-2000s with close to two-thirds of the rules found in the Data Directive.
Few American companies, however, ended up using the Webtrust certification and
it closed down in the United States7 in 2013 after all that had done so stopped using
its services. In contrast, TrustArc became one of the most popular certifications in the
United States, even gaining the support of major companies like Microsoft, despite its
multiple regulatory failures mentioned above and rarely exploring new data protection
rules. According to another representative of the telecom company that had been an
early adopter of the Webtrust certification, the high costs associated with operating it
and the lack of visibility gain from it were the key reasons behind this outcome (Boulianne
and Cho 2009: 239). By exploring new rules and creating an increasingly comprehensive
privacy regulation, the Webtrust certification indeed became more costly to implement
for companies. Its difficulty to stand out among all other seals visible online and privacy
policies disclosed on companies’ websites simultaneously made it an unattractive option.
Here the multiplication of regulations promoting different rules thus did not become a
source for further regulatory innovations, but an impediment to it by making it more
difficult for individuals to distinguish them.
To overcome this sub-optimal situation and promote the adoption of private regu-
lations in the broad public interest, both the American federal government and European
Commission have engaged with industry associations developing codes of conduct, cer-
tification programs, and other forms of self-regulations dealing with privacy. More than
simply using the threat of regulation, they took positive steps to ensure that industry
groups include a basic set of rules and indeed implement them on multiple occasions. This
more specifically included offering funding, feedback, and even official approval in some
cases. Interestingly, though, the level of engagement with the development of private
regulations has highly differed in the two jurisdictions. The next section will highlight
7At the time of writing, the Webtrust certification remains offered to private companies in Canada.
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this diverging trend and reflect on how it affected the process of creation of data protec-
tion rules by private actors and how different public involvement can produce different
results.
6.5 Harnessing Private Regulation in the Shadow(s) of Hi-
erarchy
As argued throughout this research, the American and European approaches to privacy
regulation are closer to hybrid forms of regulation than either pure self-regulation or
public regulation. On many occasions, representatives from both public agencies and the
private sector interviewed for this research in both jurisdictions maintained that they
preferred to talk of co-regulation instead of self-regulation (Interview E16, E24, E26,
E29, E39, E40). One notably corrected the use of the term self-regulation and indicated
that “[w]e don’t call these self-regulations anymore. It’s really more of a co-regulation or
multistakeholder approach” (Interview E37, done on May 14th, 2019). At the same time,
they did tend to diverge on the role that they respectively give them as well as how they
interacted with them in the rule-making process.
In the United States, the FTC is in many ways the de facto privacy regulator.
Over the years, this primarily meant that it acted as an enforcer or “backstop” for what
would otherwise merely be voluntary obligations that private actors set for themselves.
By making use of its statute prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts, it polices the extent to
which industry associations and private companies respect what they advertise to their
users in their privacy statements. It is notably on this very basis that in 2014 it sued the
company TrustArc (then known as TRUSTe) for repeatedly failing to adequately enforce
its self-regulatory certification program (Federal Trade Commission 2014). It used the
same legal authority to impose a $5 billion fine on Facebook for its role in the Cambridge
Analytica scandal (Federal Trade Commission 2019).
While very active at the implementation stage, the FTC has often played a more
marginal role in the process of devising rules by industry groups. As noted in chapter
3 (see especially section 3.5), it did sometimes play a role of agenda-setting and even
reviewing the content of private regulations, but this was more the exception than the
norm. Putting aside the specific case of the safe harbor program under the Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) that specifically requires the FTC to evaluate
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and approve self-regulations put forward by the industry, one notable exception was in the
case of the advertising industry that it pushed twice to self-regulate itself by organizing
workshops and events both in 1999 and 2007 (Dixon 2007; Gellman and Dixon 2016).
The latter led to the creation of the privacy principles of the NAI in 2000 and both the
revision of these principles and the creation of the DAA in 2008. Apart from these two
important cases, the FTC did not regularly engage with industry groups to modify the
content of their self-regulations. As one interviewee noted, FTC’s employees “would not
provide a lot of remarks to these programs. When a company that wants to build a
trustmark comes to them, they would probably point them to some of the case studies
that they have done on these topics, but they would not go in a great level of detail”
(Interview E38, done on May 14th, 2019).
In contrast, the European Commission has often been more active early on in
the process of rule creation by private actors. In addition to having set a clear legal
baseline with the adoption of its Directive and now Regulation, it regularly supported
the work of industry groups by offering funding (either directly or indirectly by offer-
ing organizational support), detailed feedback, and sometimes even officially approving
them. Table 6.2 summarizes the different ways the European Commission has supported
self-regulatory programs adopted in Europe and reviewed in this research. This informa-
tion was retrieved from the websites detailing each of these private regulatory initiatives
as well as various studies on the state of self-regulation in Europe over time (European
Commission 2001a, 2012b; European Parliament 2012). In total, it is close to half (42%)
of them that received official support from the European Commission in one or multiple
forms. Generally speaking, industry groups that saw their self-regulation formally ap-
proved also went through a revision process where they received feedback from European
officials. Funding and feedback can, however, occur separately and without necessarily
leading to a formal approbation by public authorities. It should finally be noted that
some of these regulations that were originally developed in one Member state also some-
times received public support from national authorities. This is notably the case of the
IMRG and TrustedShops’ codes of practice. Many of those that did not receive any form
of support from any European institutions finally deal with privacy as one issue posed
by the rise of electronic commerce and tend to be less detailed.
Through these different interactions, European regulators have significantly
shaped the content of industry self-regulations. Rather than leaving their development to
private actors, their early and continuing involvement has often meant that they worked
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Table 6.2: European Support of Industry Self-Regulations since 1995
Year Industry Self-Regulations Funding Feedback Approval
1997 IMRG’s Code of Practice
1999 Which’s Webtrader Code of Practice • • •
2000 Eurocommerce’s EuroLabel •
2001 UNICE - BEUC e-Confidence Project* • •
2001 Clicksure Quality Standard
2001 TrustedShops’ Quality Criteria
2001 TUV SUD Safe Shopping Standard
2002 EMOTA’s Convention
2003 SafeBuy’s Code of Practice
2003 FEDMA’s Code of practice • •
2005 ERA Europe Marketing Guidelines forElectronic Retailers
2011 EASA’s Recommendations on Online Be-havioural Advertising
2011 Europrise’s Privacy Seal • •
2011 IAB Europe’s Online Behavioural Adver-tising Framework
2012 EDAA’s Self-Certification Criteria forOnline Behavioural Advertising •
2015 E-Commerce Europe Code of Conduct
2016 Code of Conduct for Cloud ServiceProviders** • •
2016 Code of Conduct for mHealth Applica-tions** • •
2017 E-Commerce Foundation SafeShop Trust-mark
* This self-regulatory program was never formally adopted.
** These codes of conduct were submitted to the Article 29 Working Party, but were never formally
approved and adopted.
to ensure that regulations put forward by private actors closely followed their own reg-
ulatory standards. As one interviewee from the European side explicitly indicated: “We
try to drive them to include what we think should be in [a] code” (Interview E16, done on
February 20th, 2019). This is particularly evident when looking at the case of FEDMA’s
code conduct, which was the only self-regulation formally approved under the Data Di-
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rective8. After four years of exchanges with the Article 29 working party, its code of
conduct for the advertising industry closely approximates almost all the rules found in
the European Directive. Both actually have an index of thematic similarity of 80%9, one
of the highest found in this research. The difference mainly comes from the inclusion by
FEDMA of additional rules that it copied from its American counterparts, notably on
the protection of children’s privacy.
The codes of conduct for cloud providers and mobile health applications submitted
in 2016 to the article 29 working party were similarly extremely close to the then soon
to be adopted GDPR. They both had a thematic similarity higher than 0.75, which is
again extremely high and reflects their close interactions with European regulators. In
both cases, industry groups even received funding from the European Commission to
pay for legal counsel to help them devise their self-regulation. In the end, they were
not approved primarily because their enforcement mechanisms were judged insufficient
(Article 29 Working Party 2015). As the GDPR was close to enter in force and to change
the approval process, these projects were then put on hold. While representing a partial
failure for the industry to self-regulate itself, it does show that the European Commission
often strictly controls the evolution of industry self-regulations and attempts to limit the
risks of seeing them become tools of regulatory capture.
This can notably also be seen when looking at the case of the European In-
teractive Digital Advertising Alliance (EDAA). As opposed to the previous codes, this
self-regulation was never officially submitted to the article 29 working party. Yet, it ex-
tensively engaged with the European Commission as noted by one interviewee for this
research who was closely involved in the process leading to the creation of this self-
regulatory programme:
We had roundtables organized with the European Commission, 8 to be precise. [...]
I don’t know how familiar you are with this, but having 2 is already something big.
[...] When the commission agrees to do something like this, it is a huge thing. [...]
At one point, we were meeting every quarter. They wanted to follow very closely
our progress. Up to a point, where we didn’t have the time to digest what we were
reading anymore. (Interview E21, done on March 8th, 2019)
8In table 6.2, the Which’s Webtrader Code of Practice appears as having also been officially approved.
However, this was not through the process envisioned by the Data Directive. This was rather by the
directorate-general for enterprise and industry (DG Enterprise).
9For a reminder of how this index is calculated and its exact meaning, see section 4.2.
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The close involvement of European regulators played a crucial role in the devel-
opment of this private initiative. Like the Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA) in the
United States, the EDAA primarily operates an ‘AdChoices Icon’ aiming to educate in-
dividuals about how data-driven advertising functions and help them make choices on
how their personal data is used. The very specific nature of this industry self-regulation
has meant that its content requirement is not as detailed as many others previously
discussed. Rather than setting how a comprehensive set of data protection rules for
advertising companies, it largely limits itself to explain how to apply a specific set of
rules in combination with its ‘AdChoices Icon’. As such, it does not include many rules
traditionally found in the European regulatory framework and is almost identical in what
it requires to the self-regulatory programme of the DAA in the United States. One key
difference that precisely came from its interaction with the European Commission is its
compliance mechanisms. As the same interviewee indicated:
They [the representatives of the European Commission] always told us the same
thing. Listen, you are not doing the right thing. Unless you can prove that you have
grown up, we’ll have to regulate. [...] If you don’t police yourself, we will police you.
(Interview E21, done on March 8th, 2019)
In practice, the European Commission wanted to be sure that any self-regulation
would have real teeth and would not become a simple expression of goodwill as it some-
times became the case. In the end, the founding members behind the EDAA listened to
the European Commission and adopted a stricter procedure to check compliance early on
when a company wishes to join its self-regulatory programme. As of now, any company
that wants to self-certify with the EDAA has to go through an audit before being allowed
to showcase its trust seal. This significantly reverses how the DAA checks the compliance
of its members in the United States, which only occurs after companies have officially
joined it. Once admitted, American companies following its rules may be randomly se-
lected for a compliance check, but it is not guaranteed. By directly getting involved in
the creation of industry self-regulations, the European Commission thus again tried to
limit the risks of seeing it become a tool to avoid public regulations. Its different actions
have all contributed to ensuring that self-regulatory programmes created by the industry
closely align with its own rules and helped them being enforced throughout its single
market.
One consequence of this coordinated approach adopted by the European Commis-
sion has been to limit the creation of new data protection rules by private associations
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Figure 6.3: Sum of new data protection rules created by private actors in the EU and the U.S.
since 1995
in Europe. As figure 6.3 shows, almost all rules (95%) that were found to have been first
enunciated by private actors in the last twenty years were also found in a self-regulation
created in the United States. In other words, industry groups and companies operating
self-regulations in Europe have largely aimed to implement public rules rather than create
new ones. While industry self-regulations adopted in Europe can still attempt to innovate
when translating data protection rules in their respective “sector lingo” (Interview E22,
done on March 11th, 2019), the close involvement of European regulators generally push
them to stay as close as possible to the requirements found in the law. This is especially
true for those working to be officially approved by European authorities or national data
protection authorities. As they are specifically looking to see how public rules have been
incorporated, private actors often aim to remain as close to them as possible. As one
interviewee straightforwardly argued, it “is just such a big job to decide how to interpret
their existing obligations and they do not want to make their jobs harder than it already
is.” (Interview E26, March 22nd, 2019). What they then often end up doing is providing
examples of how specific data protection rules set forth by public authorities should be
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applied rather than so much adapt them. One interviewee working for an organization
that had specifically worked with European public authorities to develop their code of
conduct specifically mentioned that public authorities had praised their inclusion of ex-
amples: “What we were told when we were working on the last version of our code was
that the examples were very good” (Interview E17, done on February 21st, 2019). Simi-
larly, an interviewee from the public side discussing what industry self-regulation should
be doing was not to go “beyond compliance with the law, but [provide] more details,
more example of practices” of how to implement it (Interview E20, done on March 3rd
2019). For one interviewee representing an industry group, this was actually seen quite
negatively and as leaving almost no room to change anything as it would be seen as an
attempt to circumvent their obligations:
I was once told by the European Commission that if you ask questions [on how
to implement their obligations], it meant that you are trying to go around the law
and this is problematic. [...] If you want a dialogue, you area already on the edge.
(Interview E25, done on March 15th, 2019)
Far from being a defect, though, this reflects the overall view of European public
authorities that these private tools can best contribute to the regulation of privacy by
making their rules more operational as one interviewee for this research argued:
Private codes of conduct are there to help compliance. [...] A code translates the
rules of public laws for a specific sector. At the same time, they must got a little
bit further than the law. [...] Going further can mean different things and it can
take different forms. It can be the application of an higher standard, but it doesn’t
have to be. At a minimum, it must point towards good practices for a specific
economic sector or industry. It must clarify for the members of an association how to
implement the law by indicating clear steps to do so and offering a more operational
approach. (Interview E12, done on February 11th, 2019; translated from French)
This means that there seems to be a trade-off to the involvement of public au-
thorities in the process behind the creation of self-regulations. The more hands-on gov-
ernments are, the less innovative private actors appear to be. This is not necessarily a
negative outcome, though, and depends on how we define the role that private actors
should play. If it is expected as it sometimes argued that companies working in a specific
area know best how to regulate themselves, this is certainly unfortunate that private
actors are becoming less adaptive and flexible. As previously explained, this specific
argument has often been more assumed than empirically verified. Indeed, private actors
have often not been as prone to explore new data protection rules in that process as
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they often seem to maintain. Time and again, they also failed to implement the rules
they had set for themselves or even entirely stopped their activity when public scrutiny
disappeared. This was notably the case of the IRSG, which is the private association
that was found to be the most innovative and to have created the highest number of
new rules in the last twenty years. As one interviewee pointed out, this can even raise
competition issues as private actors can attempt to reinforce their market position by
establishing rules to their own benefit:
What we see is authors of a code that sometimes try to regulate themselves. This
can be problematic and even raise competition issues. The main players will try
to block access to the market to smaller players by institutionalizing their practice.
(Interview E16, done on February 20th, 2019)
In sum, codes and other softer forms of regulations created by private actors work
best when they complement the work of public agencies rather than try to replace them.
As the same interviewee maintained, it is precisely when the industry attempts to do the
latter that it becomes problematic:
[Data Protection Authorities] are enthusiast about codes because they know how
difficult it is for the market to implement data protection rules. It is good for
the operationalization of data protection principles. [...] During the GDPR, the
industry requested that European regulators do not over-regulate. Their argument
was that they knew how to regulate, much better than [data protection authorities]
and legislators do, and it is partly true. In my case, I am not an energy specialist
and I would have never thought that my work would lead me to study the energetic
sector, but it did. I did it, but I can’t do 70 sectors. [...] Co-regulation is private
regulation, which uses national or European laws as background for their codes. We
need co-regulation, but it sometimes end up as self-regulation.
This is clearly the approach that has been preferred in Europe where the European
Commission and other public agencies, like the Article 29 working party, specifically
worked to impede the adoption of industry rules that would not sufficiently engage with
national and European laws. In the United States, they tend to promote something
closer to a pure form of industry self-regulation, even though relying on the backstop
enforcement of the FTC. Yet even there, public authorities sometimes ended up having
to take action if they wanted private actors to do something as previously mentioned.
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6.6 Conclusion
Since the European Data Directive was adopted in 1995, the regulation of privacy in the
transatlantic area has gone through significant changes. In addition to the European
and American model of privacy regulation becoming closer to each other, I highlighted
throughout this chapter that each grew in terms of their complexity. The exploration
of new data protection rules in effect ensured that each became more comprehensive
and covered more data practices. Far from only being driven by public authorities,
private associations and certification companies developing various forms of industry
self-regulations also contributed to this trend. New rules on the use of cookies and how
personal should be collected were notably first enunciated by American associations.
At the same time, the number of new rules put forward by these private actors has
remained limited and was particularly low in the last ten years. Rather than becoming
a source of regulatory innovations, the multiplication of regulations and rules early on
appeared to have the opposite effect. By creating more fragmentation and making it
hard for individuals to know which companies follow which rules, it reduced the interest
of private actors to go much beyond what they are already required. While the rise
in complexity can often be seen positively by complexity scholars, this emphasizes one
potentially negative outcome and points out the importance of always considering how
interactions between the structure of a given system differently affect actors depending
on their preexisting interests. Indeed, it shows that although a more fragmented system
can offer opportunities to innovate for actors looking to do so, it can also diminish the
value of innovating for others and support a form of regulatory capture. The latter here
does not result from a public regulation that comes to represent specific vested interests.
It rather represents a case where stringent public regulations are replaced with lenient
or unenforced industry self-regulations.
At the same time, this should not be seen as an inevitable outcome. Due to their
hierarchical position and their capacity to proactively engage with the regulatory work
of private actors, public authorities can ensure that industry self-regulations are adopted
in the public interest. The European Commission was indeed seen as successfully having
pushed them to exploit its data protection rules by adopting a more hands-on or coor-
dinated approach towards industry self-regulations. While limiting the role of European
industry self-regulations in exploring new data protection rules, it also limited the risks
of them being used to avoid compliance as it sometimes became the case in the United
States. This finding concurs with previous studies (Cashore and Stone 2014; Gulbrand-
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sen 2014; Renckens 2020) showing that public interventions in the development of private
regulatory initiatives can help achieve better regulatory outcomes and emphasizes that
exploration of new rules and the concomitant flexibility that it can bring are not the only
benefit nor necessarily the most important one that industry self-regulations can provide
to the regulation of an issue-area. Making more operational public rules might actually
be a better contribution.
On a more analytical note, I also showed in this chapter the importance of going
further than merely looking at the emergence of private authority (Hall and Biersteker
2002) and of adopting a multilevel perspective. In effect, the multiplication of industry
self-regulations could have given a false sense of a thriving environment providing ever
more privacy guarantees to individuals when actually a comparison of the content of
these regulations would show that few bring anything new and many largely repeat what
you would find in public regulations. This moreover demonstrates that instead of being
a sign of a ‘retreat of the state’ (Strange 1996), the rise of private authority can enhance
the influence of public authorities either by potentially raising compliance as discussed
in this chapter or promoting greater regulatory convergence as discussed in the previous
one. It finally shows the difficulty to distinguish between ‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘delegated’
form of private authority as Green (2013b) recently tried to do. Even though industry
associations can show entrepreneurial signs in deciding by themselves to develop a private
form of regulation, they might exploit public rules more than explore new ones and, in
practice, be closer to a delegated form of authority. This is without mentioning that the
line becomes even more blurry as public actors become more and more active in their
drafting process.
Together with chapter 5, the contributions of this chapter help better appraise the
dynamic nature of the evolution of the transatlantic regulation of privacy as a complex
system. It again shows the crucial role that private actors have played in it and how
they affected the system’s capacity to adapt over time. Throughout this research, I
significantly talk of complex systems or complex governance systems. Another expression
often found in the literature on complexity theory is, however, the one of “complex
adaptive systems” (Harrison 2006; Holland 1998, 2006; Miller and Page 2007; emphasis
added). I consciously decided to forgo the qualitative adaptive as I do not consider
adaptation to be one of the necessary characteristics of complex systems but one of their
potential outcome. In other words, I see it as an empirical rather than a theoretical
question (Morçöl 2012: 42); see also Axelrod and Cohen 2000). As detailed throughout
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this chapter, a complex environment can in fact limit the adaptation capacity of a system
depending on the logic of the actors in it.
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Conclusion
We have never hidden that we want
to see more convergence when it
comes to the framework for data
protection [in the U.S.]. [...] We
would like to see on the American
side a federal law that would be
equivalent or similar to the General
Data Protection Regulation.
Vĕra Jourová, EU Vice-President in
charge of values and transparency,
2020
On July 16, 2020, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) struck down the Privacy
Shield Agreement in a decision reminiscent of the one it had reached four years before in
invalidating the Safe Harbor Agreement. According to the ECJ, the Privacy Shield did
not offer sufficient guarantees that the personal data of Europeans would be protected
from being accessed by American authorities, notably through one of its surveillance
programs revealed by Edward Snowden. Discussing this outcome, the European Com-
missioner for Justice from 2014 to 2019 and now EU Vice-President in charge of values
and transparency, Vĕra Jourová, pleaded for more convergence between the two transat-
lantic partners and for the United States to adopt a comprehensive federal privacy law
as cited in epigraph. According to her, the absence of such a law was impeding any real
integration of their respective data realms.
Both the Safe Harbor and the Privacy Shield Agreements were always second-
best options for two jurisdictions that diverged over how the use of personal data should
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be regulated. It is because the United States did not have sufficient legal guarantees
in place and thereby could not get an adequacy decision that these agreements had to
be negotiated in the first place. With this in mind, I contended in chapter 3 that both
jurisdictions are not irreconcilable and have more in common than it often seems. In
addition to starting from a similar liberal or ‘privacy as control’ paradigm, they both
actually involve private actors. Even in Europe, where public authorities are expected
to set a basic framework of how private companies can collect and use personal data,
industry associations have been repeatedly encouraged to develop codes of conduct and
certification programs. Following the demise of the Privacy Shield, these are one of
the remaining tools for data transfer in the United States allowed by the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR). Companies that will abide by a certified code of conduct
or certifications will indeed be permitted to transfer personal data between the United
States and the European Union.
Looking at these private forms of regulation being created in the European Union
and the United States, I argued in chapter 4 that before even becoming tools for data
transfers, they created new connections between these two regulatory systems that con-
tributed to forming a complex governance system. As opposed to the traditional ‘system
clash’ view embedded in the citation of Vĕra Jourová above, this led me to maintain that
the content of the regulations adopted in both jurisdictions was constantly being shaped
by decisions taken in the other. I more specifically maintained that this occurred through
two joint processes: exploitation and exploration. Exploitation was first defined as the
tendency to use preexisting resources, or rules in the present case, to achieve efficiency
gains. Exploration was meanwhile presented as the tendency to create new rules when
preexisting resources proved insufficient.
Using a combination of network and content analyses, I then demonstrated in
chapter 5 how the exploitation of preexisting rules by industry associations supported
a form of regulatory convergence. Even though the European Union and the United
States still do not share the same regulatory approach, the set of data protection rules
that they actually promote grew increasingly similar over the years. Codes of conduct,
certification programs, and other forms of private regulations here notably support the
exploitation of public rules and become an institutional avenue through which public
authorities’ influence can be expressed. Way before California adopted the first American
comprehensive privacy law in 2018, many provisions originally found in the European
Data Directive had indeed made their way to the United States through interactions
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between industry associations and firms developing these private regulations. Similarly,
rules first found in American sectoral laws at both the federal and state levels had been
integrated by private actors in Europe before they were taken up in the GDPR.
I finally showed in chapter 6 that convergence is only one part of the story. More
than simply sharing an increasingly large set of data protection rules, public and private
actors behind regulations dealing with privacy issues also tended to explore new data
protection rules by combining preexisting ones. In itself, this is one of the factors that
limited their regulatory convergence as new rules were obviously not instantly shared
by all. Far from a defect, though, this ensured that the regulation of privacy remained
dynamic and kept up with changes in data practices over the years. I then pointed out
that private actors played a role in that process and thereby contributed to providing a
more flexible regulatory environment. At the same time, their contribution was not as
substantial as it was sometimes argued. Industry associations and firms developing codes
of conduct or certification programs in effect tended to stay close to public requirements
and only go further at times of close scrutiny by public authorities. In the United States,
their regulatory initiatives even appeared to be about avoiding regulation more than
really making it more robust. I maintained that this was, in many ways, a by-product
of the rising of complexity that created information asymmetries and limited the public
interest in these private forms of regulation. Greater involvement of public authorities,
as regularly seen in the European Union, could help limit this sub-optimal outcome, but
it did seem to reduce the interest of private actors to explore and experiment with new
rules.
7.1 Original Contributions
Throughout this research, I show that the integration of national economies does not
merely, nor even primarily, lead to a clash of systems where one jurisdiction merely
attempts to make its regulatory standard adopted globally. As they become increasingly
interdependent, interactions between their regulators also become more prevalent and
progressively upend the process of rule formation. In that process, public authorities
are importantly joined and complemented by private actors that act as regulators in
their own right. The interaction between the United States and the European Union
over the regulation of privacy depicts this perfectly. Since the adoption of the European
Data Directive in 1995, neither straightforwardly exported its regulatory preference to
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the other. Yet, their exchanges, notably through private actors, continuously shaped the
content of the rules adopted in each jurisdiction, and it will most likely continue to be the
case as their respective models continue to evolve in the years to come. While making
this broad argument, I contribute to the literature on data privacy, global regulation,
and private authority.
First, I provide one of the most in-depth analyses of how the regulation of privacy
and, more precisely, data protection rules have evolved since the adoption of the European
Data Directive in 1995. The multilevel approach that I use to look at regulations as
collections of principles and rules instead of coherent policy documents specifically allows
me to go further than the so-called ‘American’ and ‘European’ privacy models up-to-now
distinguished in the literature (Long and Quek 2002; Newman 2008; Solove and Schwartz
2011; Schwartz and Peifer 2017). I actually show that despite agreeing on some broad
principles, they diverged over what should be their practical requirements. If this leads
me to point out that the European Commission indeed continuously aimed to be more
comprehensive in the content of the rules that it includes, I also highlight that the
United States is not simply lagging behind the European Union. As a matter of fact, it
developed rules that the European Union ended up integrating later on. This importantly
provides a more nuanced picture than the story of European global leadership or influence
currently dominating privacy debates (Bradford 2020; Greenleaf 2018; Schwartz 2019).
My fine-grained analysis of the content of privacy regulations in the United States and
the European moreover emphasizes the existence of both change and continuity in their
regulatory frameworks. While previous studies tended to focus on the continuity in
the regulatory approach preferred by the United States and the European Union (i.e.,
their continuous reliance on different regulatory approaches), I point out that important
changes still occurred over the years as new rules were created and adopted. At the same
time, I make clear that there is an important lineage in the content of regulations over
time.
Second, I offer a renewed understanding of how globalization and economic in-
terdependence are transforming national regulatory processes. I specifically move past
traditional distributive arguments that see states as either cooperating or fighting over
the share of the economic gains of globalization through regulation (Krasner 1991; Bach
and Newman 2007; Drezner 2007) and show that growing interactions between a diverse
set of actors fundamentally affect the process of rule formation itself. Rather than be-
ing purely driven by domestic actors, the decision to adopt or create rules is informed
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by what others have done in other jurisdictions. As opposed to the traditional view
of globalization as an exogenous shock that puts pressure on governments, it presents
it as a source of regulatory change in itself. In that regard, it complements the recent
literature charting a “new interdependence approach” (Farrell and Newman 2014, 2016,
2019a). While the latter emphasized that transnational connections were offering new
pathways for a variety of actors to assert their influence globally, I present how it shapes
the evolution of the “rules of the game” that define the behaviour of these very actors in
the first place.
This also leads me to complement the literature on policy diffusion by outlining
the interactive and incremental nature of regulatory change. Once again, my multilevel
perspective allows me to demonstrate that even though the United States and the Eu-
ropean Union stuck with their original ‘comprehensive’ or ‘limited’ policies, they both
grew more alike over the years. This finding echoes those in the literature on policy con-
vergence that had previously pointed out the actual similarities in the content of privacy
policies in both jurisdictions over the years (Bennett 1992, 2010). Yet, I maintain that
this is not merely the result of a tendency driven by the emergence of a common un-
derstanding of the issues raised by new technologies, but exchanges between public and
private actors that made them approach their object of regulation in a similar fashion.
I also go further by illustrating how these interactions do not only promote greater con-
vergence but also become a source of innovation as they become the basic components
of new data protection rules.
Third, my findings illustrate the complex relationship that exists between public
institutions and private authority. The point that I here try to convey is not that states
are in ‘retreat’ (Strange 1996). As repeatedly discussed, it has never been a story of either
one or the other. They actively build on each other. Even in the United States, which is
supposedly more inclined towards the use of market-based mechanisms to regulate the
digital economy, industry self-regulations were never the whole story. The Federal Trade
Commission and other regulatory agencies, like the Department of Commerce, played a
crucial role in enforcing the rules that private companies set out for themselves. While
not as commonplace as in Europe, these same agencies also openly interacted with in-
dustry associations to shape the content of data protection rules in public workshops or
through direct exchanges. Meanwhile, in the European Union, public laws were early on
supplemented by self-regulatory tools. Going back to the early days of the Data Direc-
tive, these were notably seen as potentially contributing to harmonizing the European
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regulatory framework. Since the adoption of the GDPR, they are now also considered to
be potential tools to allow for international data flows to take place and ensure greater
accountability. The extent to which public and private actors interacted with each other
even blurs the boundaries between the ‘delegated’ and ‘entrepreneurial’ form of private
authority described by Green (2013b). In practice, it often happens that public actors
enroll or give regulatory tasks to industry self-regulations that originally ‘entrepreneuri-
ally’ emerged. This is notably what the United States and the European Union did
when promoting the use of private mechanisms to solve their divergence of regulatory
approaches, and what the European Union did when attributing new regulatory tasks
to private forms of regulation in the GDPR. What can also sometimes appear as an
entrepreneurial form of authority can have in fact been actively influenced by public au-
thorities through the receipt of public feedback or funding, as especially seen in the case
of the European Union.
If it is not always clear if industry self-regulations draw their authority from public
institutions or themselves, they clearly tend to be layered upon public rules (Bartley
2011). The legal authority of governments means that their principles and rules will
be the (mandatory) starting point for private actors when devising their own sets of
rules. The fact remains that if these tools can sometimes be aimed at helping companies
differentiate themselves in the marketplace, they are also used to help them achieve
greater legal compliance and navigate complex legal environments. Codes of conduct
and certification services thus aim to include rules that will help companies say that
they respect their requirements in the various jurisdictions where they operate. Such
integration of public rules in industry self-regulations should matter for governments.
They can first help extend their own legal authority by promoting their rules outside
of their jurisdictions. As private actors exploited the rules of their counterparts, those
in Europe started to integrate rules originally devised in the United States and vice
versa. By combining these same rules and their knowledge of how personal data is being
collected and used, they can moreover provide some flexibility to public rules. At the
same time, my analysis cautions against ideas of “simply ‘let 1,000 flowers bloom’ and see
which rules appear robust” (Green 2013b: 174). The multiplication of private forms of
regulation can actually end up undermining their supposed flexibility while at the same
time giving a false impression that they make the regulation of privacy more effective.
Looking more specifically at the European Union, I then indicate that public con-
tributions to the development of private regulatory initiatives contributed to solving this
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sub-optimal outcome. I show that by providing funding, feedback, and even officially
approving or certifying industry self-regulations, the European Commission limited the
number of apparent cases of lax or unenforced rules by the industry. Its actions moreover
supported the creation of links between American and European associations, which led
to some of its data protection rules to be exploited by private actors in the United States.
While reinforcing them and more closely incorporating them in a public regulatory frame-
work, my evidence suggests that these European actions further limited the interest of
industry associations to explore new rules. In effect, almost no European industry asso-
ciations created new rules, and most attempted to closely approximate European public
rules. This apparent trade-off is not necessarily negative. While innovation is often
highly valued in our societies, the actual enforcement and implementation of existing
rules is in itself a crucial contribution.
7.2 Complexity and International Political Economy
All these different contributions are significantly tied together by the complex system
approach that I developed in dialogue with my empirical findings. The recognition that
we live in a complex world is hardly new (Keohane and Nye 1974, 1977). In this work,
I, however, join recent scholarship promoting the use of complexity as an analytical lens
rather than a mere metaphor (Bousquet and Curtis 2011; Kavalski 2007, 2012; Oat-
ley 2019; Orsini et al. 2019). The term complexity was indeed not meant to describe
a complicated phenomenon, but a system made of multiple parts displaying emergent
properties. To put it differently, viewing the transatlantic regulation as a complex gover-
nance system was not used to point out that it was becoming more difficult to manage,
but that it created dynamics that could not be fully understood without considering the
system as a whole. These were in this case the exploitation and exploration processes
analyzed throughout chapter 4 to 6.
These are not necessarily the sole emergent properties that complex systems can
display. Nor will they present themselves similarly across all complex systems. In fact,
this research has shown that the exploration of new rules was not necessarily as significant
as it could have been thought. The multiplication of regulators and regulations in effect
did not significantly support the growth of data protection rules. The regulation of
privacy was in turn not found to be as adaptive as other complex systems were sometimes
argued to be (Mitchell 2009). This importantly points out the highly contingent nature
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of complex systems. Depending on the actors (or units) involved as well as previous
interactions, two different systems will not evolve in the same way. In this case, the
specific logic of action of private actors was seen as limiting their interest in creating new
rules when the system was actually becoming increasingly complex.
A complex system approach thus does not necessarily offer a straightforward
indication of what will happen in the future. As noted in chapter 2, it forces us to
recognize that context and time matter (Cilliers 2001; Oatley 2019). For the broader
fields of international relations and international political economy, it presents a call to
be more sensitive to “uncertainty and unexpected consequences” (Kavalski 2007). The
diffusion of data protection rules across the United States and the European Union
was never entirely planned by the American government or the European Commission.
The creation of new rules like the ‘right to be forgotten’ was similarly not foreseen by
regulators creating the rules that would be later on used to constitute it. These are,
however, part of broad trends that both practitioners and researchers can recognize and
attempt to act upon.
Looking at the governance of socioecological systems, Oran Young (2017) chiefly
argues that governing them as complex systems should specifically involve using new
“steering mechanisms”. Pointing out that institutional arrangements are also complex sys-
tems that can change in unexpected ways as socioecological systems themselves change,
he maintains that one overarching goal of policymakers should be to devise institutions
that minimize the risks of a potential “problem of fit” over time (Young 2017: 113). To
ensure this, he favours the use of “goal setting strategies” and a “principled form of gover-
nance”. In both cases, the point is to leave more leeway in how broad goals or principles
are achieved as circumstances change. This somewhat echoes previous ideas expressed
in the literature on experimentalist governance interested in building institutional envi-
ronments prone to learning and capable to improve over time (De Búrca, Keohane and
Sabel 2014; Overdevest and Zeitlin 2014; Sabel and Zeitlin 2010).
While not disagreeing with this view, the present work has pointed out that
it should not be expected that implementation will straightforwardly follow from the
expression of broad principles. Industry associations and certification companies devising
self-regulations again did not always appear so much interested in making the regulation
of privacy more robust or adaptive. Close attention should thus also be paid to building
capacities to monitor and spur various actors to continuously aim to respect the goals
or principles set out early on, something again already hinted at in the literature on
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experimentalist governance. The involvement of European authorities in the development
of industry self-regulations was one example of such actions. Another not discussed in
the context of this research is the newly given possibility in the GDPR (art. 80) for
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to submit complaints in place of data subjects.
One recurring problem with the liberal or “privacy as control” paradigm espoused by
the United States and the European Union and discussed in chapter 3 is the continuous
difficulty for data subjects to monitor how their personal data is being collected and used.
NGOs working in the privacy space will now be able to act as kinds of watchdogs and
put pressure on private companies to improve their practices by filing lawsuits against
them. This mechanism could interestingly contribute to provide additional information
to regulators and help spur regulatory innovations. As noted in chapter 6, the right to
be forgotten was indeed originally enunciated following a lawsuit filed in Spain against
Google.
7.3 Practical Implications
My findings moreover have important practical implications for the regulation of privacy
and global regulatory debates. They notably show the importance for public authorities
to engage with private actors. Here, I do not want to plead in favor of a specific regulatory
approach. The different level of involvement of American and European authorities in the
development of private mechanisms used to regulate the use of personal data is obviously
no stranger to their preference for a more comprehensive or limited form of regulation.
At the same time, I argued that these very differences become more blurry when looking
at how privacy is protected in practice. One of my aim in this work was specifically
to move past these broad dichotomies and call attention to how interactions between
a diverse set of actors in the United States and the European Union was shaping the
regulation of privacy. No matter their preference for having a public law setting out
the requirements for the private use of personal data or primarily leaving companies
to self-regulate themselves, they can indeed both benefit from a greater engagement in
the development of private rules as this can notably end up promoting a more coherent
and enforceable regulatory framework. This is in line with recent arguments in favor of
rejecting an adversarial view of regulation or one solely based on the formal enforcement
power of the state (McGeveran 2016). By adopting a more supportive and coordinating
role, governments can harness the influence of private authority in the public interest and
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limit the risks of seeing it becoming a tool of ‘privacy washing’ or for merely avoiding
public regulation.
More broadly, it emphasizes the role of “intermediaries” in achieving regulatory
outcomes in a complex and global economy. The concept of intermediary very simply
relates to actors or institutions that operate between public regulators and their final
subject of regulation. As previous scholars have hinted at in the regulation of finance
and information technologies, these are actually quite common (Benkler 2011; Goldsmith
and Wu 2006; Farrell and Newman 2019b; Judge 2015; Tusikov 2016). Internet service
providers, online platforms, online payment companies, and clearing houses are just a few
examples. While all can sometimes be viewed as regulatees in their own right, they also
all have close interactions with other regulatees. These can be individuals (e.g., Internet
users, investors, etc.) or institutional actors (e.g., Internet companies, banks, etc.).
In the present work, industry associations and certification companies are yet another
form of intermediary that operates between public regulators and private companies
using personal data. Their role is again recognized both in the United States and in
the European Union where adherence to their rules can offer several benefits to private
companies. In the United States, companies following an approved code of conduct will
be assumed to respect the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA). Under
the GDPR, companies abiding by approved codes of conduct or certification programs
could also more easily transfer personal data.
Due to their close connection with the subjects of regulation, these intermediaries
can offer many advantages to public authorities. They notably tend to know better how
rules are or not applied as well as what are the potential practical issues of implementing
specific sets of rules. In the present case, industry self-regulations are indeed sold as
tools that can help translate public rules in a specific business context or economic sector
(i.e., advertising, research, e-commerce, etc.). The transnational nature or connections
of intermediaries with regulatees based in multiple jurisdictions can additionally help
public enforcement efforts across jurisdictional boundaries. Once again, the evidence
reviewed throughout this work does suggest that industry self-regulations dealing with
privacy issues in the transatlantic area contribute by pushing each jurisdiction to include
the same set of data protection rules through their interactions. This network argument
should, in turn, push public authorities to closely consider the position of these different
intermediaries in the regulatory system when engaging with them. By targeting those
that are particularly central or that have particular ties could help them promote their
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own regulatory framework. They can moreover actively contribute to the evolution of
the network structure by bringing potentially distant actors to work together. Examples
of such coordination were notably seen to have helped the European Union promote a
common set of data protection rules in chapter 5.
7.4 Prospects for Future Research
As the citation in epigraph highlights, the evolution of the regulation of privacy in the
transatlantic area is very much an ongoing process. As opposed to what the European
Commission would perhaps hope for, this will not necessarily only be towards greater
convergence around European data protection rules. As public and private actors con-
tinue to interact with each other, new data protection rules are bound to emerge and
change how the personal data from Europeans and Americans are protected. While keep-
ing track of how these broad trends will play out, future work could build and expand
on the present findings in three ways.
In this analysis, I consciously focus on two types of actors: public authorities
and industry associations (or certification companies) that create rules for other private
companies. While emphasizing how interactions between these two types of actors shaped
the regulation of privacy, a next step could be to add private companies to this picture
as I actually pointed out on a number of occasions. In the end, these are the ones that
apply and interpret the data protection rules described in this research. Just as industry
associations can contribute to refining the meaning of principles and rules devised by
public authorities, private companies can similarly do so through the final terms of use
or community rules that they adopt. What this addition of governance layer actually
means for the regulation of privacy and how it interacts with the other two are important
avenues for future research. The recent literature looking at ‘privacy on the ground’
(Bamberger and Mulligan 2015) has significantly started to look at what the move from
the law on the books to actual data privacy practices can mean, and they actually point
out that there are signs of convergence at this level too. How this fits with the trends
that I outlined in this work would be interesting to further investigate. There is also the
question of how the different levels relate to each other. Do they necessarily contribute to
bring themselves into balance or agreement, or could one tend to supersede or circumvent
the others? On this point, recent work on the interactions between multiple networks or
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layered networks could be a valuable starting point (Hollway and Koskinen 2016; Lazega
and Snijders 2016).
Additional research could moreover explore how public and private rules are lay-
ered upon each other. In this work, I show that private rules tend to be layered on top of
public rules. Another way to frame this is that the production of rules still follows a kind
of top-down process, starting with public actors and ending with industry associations
refining them. The reverse relationship where public rules are developed out of privates
ones is not truly investigated. As I duly point out, industry associations can, however,
create rules, which can even end up being taken up by public authorities. The GDPR
notably includes rules that were both first devised or that were at least first promoted
in Europe by industry associations. When does this occur and under which conditions
remain open questions at this stage. This reversed relationship (i.e., where public actors
learn from the regulatory activities of private actors) is an area that has still not received
a lot of attention in the literature on private authority (Schmid et al. 2020).
Future work could finally attempt to unpack how interactions between public and
private actors affect the formation of rules by distinguishing the different forms that they
take. As it was most clearly highlighted for the European Commission, its involvement
in the development of industry self-regulations has indeed varied over time. On different
occasions, it provided funding, feedback, and official approval to them. Others in the
literature on private authority also find other forms of involvement by public author-
ities, including benchmarking and procedural regulation (Gulbrandsen 2014; Renckens
2020). Meanwhile, among private actors, it was seen that their interactions could be
through shared memberships or collaboration on a specific project. For the purposes
of this research, these two different forms of interactions were both considered to offer
an opportunity for information exchange. Nonetheless, it could be hypothesized that
depending on the nature of the relation, the flow of information will not be the same.
This could importantly provide a more fine-grained understanding of when informational
exchanges are likely to matter. In the specific case of public authorities getting involved
in the development of a private regulatory framework, it could moreover help identify if
there are actually forms of interactions that could lead private regulations to act as ‘reg-
ulatory sandboxes’ and explore new rules while ensuring greater compliance with public
rules.
Once again, the core claim that I made in this research is that interactions between
heterogeneous actors active in multiple jurisdictions have upended the process of rule
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formation. Public and private regulators in effect tend to exploit the rules of those with
whom they had previously interacted and, when insufficient, to explore new ones based
on these very same interactions. These processes moreover do not respect traditional
jurisdictional boundaries, which offers new opportunities for transnational influence. By
engaging with one or more of the sets of questions that I just highlighted, researchers can
improve our understanding of these important dynamics by providing a more detailed
picture of the actors involved, the direction of the relations of influence, and the nature
of the interactions. This will help further demonstrate that the distinctions between
national and international politics are often fuzzier than they seem and that national
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ERA.Europe European Union Europe Guidelines 2005
ESOMAR Global




























Privacy Online Principles and
Guidelines
2006
EU-US Transatlantic area Safe Harbor 2000
EU-US Transatlantic area Privacy Shield 2016
EuroCommerce European Union Euro-Label 2000
EuroCommerce European Union Euro-Label 2002
European Com-
mission
European Union Data Directive 1995
European Com-
mission
European Union ePrivacy Directive 2002
European Com-
mission
European Union Data Retention Directive 2006
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General Data Protection Regu-
lation
2016
EuroPrise European Union Privacy Seal 2011
EuroPrise European Union Privacy Seal 2017
FEDMA European Union Code of Conduct for e-commerce 2000
FEDMA European Union
Code of Practice for the Use of




Code of Pratice with Annex on
OBA
2010
GBDe Global Privacy Guidelines 2000
GBDe Global Global Trustmark 2001
IA United States Code of Conduct 1997
IA United States Code of Conduct 1998
IAB United States Code of Conduct 2011
IAB.Europe European Union European OBA Framework 2011
ICC Global
Code on Advertising and Mar-
keting on the Internet
1999
ICC Global Code of Direct Marketing 2001
ICC Global




Consolidated Code on Advertis-
ing and Marketing
2011
ICDPPC Global Madrid Resolution 2009
IMRG United Kingdom Code of Practice 2000
IMRG United Kingdom Code of Practice 2003
IMRG United Kingdom Code of Practice 2004
IMRG United Kingdom Code of Practice 2005
IMRG United Kingdom Code of Practice 2008
IRSG United States Industry Principles 1997
Health Applica-
tion Developers
European Union mHealth Code of Conduct 2016
NAI United States Code of Conduct 2000
NAI United States Code of Conduct 2008
NAI United States Code of Conduct 2013
NAI United States Code of Conduct 2015
NAI United States Code of Conduct 2018
Continued on next page
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OECD Global Privacy Guidelines 1980
OECD Global Privacy Guidelines 2013
OPA United States
Guidelines for Online Privacy
Policies
1999
PwC United States BetterWeb Standards 2000
SafeBuy United Kingdom Code of Practice 2003
SafeBuy United Kingdom Code of Practice 2004
SafeBuy United Kingdom Code of Practice 2006
SafeBuy United Kingdom Code of Practice 2007
SafeBuy United Kingdom Code of Practice 2011
SquareTrade United States SquareTrade Seal 2001
TrustArc
(TRUSTe)
United States Privacy Program 2000
TrustArc
(TRUSTe)
United States Privacy Program 2004
TrustArc
(TRUSTe)
United States Privacy Program 2012
TrustArc
(TRUSTe)
United States Privacy Program 2017
TrustArc
(TRUSTe)
United States Privacy Program 2018
TrustedShops Germany Quality Criteria 2001
TrustedShops Germany Quality Criteria 2003
TrustedShops Germany Quality Criteria 2008
TrustedShops Germany Quality Criteria 2009
TrustedShops Germany Quality Criteria 2012
TrustedShops Germany Quality Criteria 2014
TrustedShops Germany Quality Criteria 2015
TUV SUD Germany Safer Shopping 2001
TUV SUD Germany Safer Shopping 2003
TUV SUD Germany Safer Shopping 2004
TUV SUD Germany Safer Shopping 2005
TUV SUD Germany Safer Shopping 2006
TUV SUD Germany Safer Shopping 2007
TUV SUD Germany Safer Shopping 2009
TUV SUD Germany Safer Shopping 2010
TUV SUD Germany Safer Shopping 2014
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US Government United States
Federal Trade Commission Fair
Information Practices Principles
1998
US Government United States CAN-SPAM Act 2003
US Government United States
Children’s Online Privacy Pro-
tection Act
1999
US Government United States
Children’s Online Privacy Pro-
tection Act Amended
2002
US Government United States
Children’s Online Privacy Pro-
tection Act Amended
2005
US Government United States
Children’s Online Privacy Pro-
tection Act Amended
2013
US Government United States
Fair and Accurate Credit Trans-
actions Act
2003













Which United Kingdom Webtrader 1999
Which United Kingdom Webtrader 2000
Which United Kingdom Webtrader 2002





How were the documents collected?
• This database includes publicly available regulations in Europe and the United
States dealing with privacy and data protection issues. The concept of regulation
was understood in a broad sense and includes laws, directives, guidelines, codes of
conduct and private requirements. The mere explanation of the sense of a law or
a code was however not considered to be a regulation in itself.
• Documents only dealing with technical matters of operating a website (e.g.: server
security or web architecture) were excluded. This database only focuses on data
protection rules, not technical standards.
• Both public and private regulations in the transatlantic area were included.
• The laws or regulations of U.S. federal states or EU Member States were not in-
cluded.
• Similarly, only the regulations adopted by private associations operating at the
European level (or in at least more than two Member States) or US federal level
were included. Private associations only active in one EU member state or one
U.S. federal state are not part of this database.
• Regulations adopted by transnational private associations active in the transat-
lantic area were included.
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• To access and download older versions of private regulations, the digital archive
Wayback Machine was used. This archive made possible to collect almost all doc-
uments put forward by private associations in the transatlantic area since 1995.
• Only regulations that were in force between 1995 and 2017. The choice of 1995
as a starting date reflects the year of adoption of the European Data directive in
1995. Only two regulations adopted before that were included: the OECD privacy
guidelines of 1980 and the 1994 code of marketing and social research practice
jointly adopted by the ICC and ESOMAR.
What counts as a “rule”?
• Rules are standards of behavior followed, voluntarily or not, by an actor.
• Rules can have a high degree (“must”, “shall”, “will”, etc.) or low degree (“may”,
“could”, “encourage”) of commitment.
• Rules can be found in a single sentence or an entire paragraph. Similarly, a rule
can be really detailed or really broad.
• Rules potentially found in the preamble, the foreword or the explanatory memoran-
dum of a regulatory document were not considered. The explanatory memorandum
could however be used to clarify the meaning of a rule and code it accordingly.
• Lists of definitions and objectives were also not considered as creating rules.
• Rules can be repeated many times in the same regulatory document. Those repe-
titions do not need to be found in the same parts of the regulation.
• Vague references to another article or another regulation were not considered as
incorporating the rules found in them.
• Similarly, it is not assumed that a general reference to another regulation means
that an actor adhere to all the rules potentially found in it. It is only coded
when it is clearly mentioned that the actor will apply the rules put forward in the
regulations.
What counts as “data protection”?
• Data protection broadly refers to measures taken to insure that personal data are
safeguarded against any wrongful actions.
• “Personal information” are understood as a synonymous of personal data.
• Rules aiming to protect “data privacy” are also included.
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• This database only focuses on data controller’s obligations towards data subjects
and on data subject’s rights vis-a-vis data controllers. Data controllers’ obligations
towards states or states’ obligations towards data subjects were not coded.
• Importantly, this codebook uses a terminology (“data subjects”, “data controllers”,
“data protection”, etc.), which is traditionally used in Europe. This however does
not reflect any personal preference for the EU model. It is moreover not intended to
exclude rules using another terminology, such as the American one (“individuals”,
“consumers”, “privacy”, etc.). This codebook aims to compare the extent to which
rules on “data protection” or “data privacy” are substantively similar, not how




• Broadly refers to data controllers’ obligations to clearly inform and notify data
subjects of their data collection practices.
• Include data controllers’ obligation to publish a “privacy notice”, “privacy policy”,
“privacy statement” or “policy content”.
• Include data controllers’ obligation to follow an openness principle and inform data
subjects of their online practices.
• The content of the privacy policies or the nature of the information that data
controllers must give to data subjects should be coded in their respective nodes.
01.01 Privacy statement
• Include the obligation for data controllers to publish a privacy notice or state-
ment on their website.
• Include any mention that a data controller should broadly inform or describe
its privacy practices to data subjects.
• Include the obligation for data controllers to have a privacy notice, which is
clear, conspicuous and/or easy-to-read.
• Include the obligation for third parties to provide notice on their own website.
However, the obligation for data controllers to inform data subjects that third
parties collect their personal data should be coded in node 01.09.
• Exclude the obligation to provide information with the aim to educate con-
sumers (see node 15). Only code here the obligation for data controllers to
inform data subjects or their consumers of their own privacy practices.
01.02 Data controller’s identity
• Include the obligation for data controllers to inform data subjects of their
identity.
• Include any rules stating that data controllers must provide their contact
information in their privacy notice or statement.
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01.03 Data types and purposes
• Refer to the obligation for data controllers to inform data subjects of the types
and purposes (or nature) of data affected by their data collection or processing
practices.
• Include rules requesting data controllers to say how they will use personal
data.
• Include the obligation for data controllers to indicate that no personal data
is collected or that some types of personal data are excluded from their data
collection and processing practices.
01.04 Data source
• Include any rules requiring data controllers to inform data subjects of the
source of their data.
• Include the obligation for data controllers to inform data subjects when they
merge their data with personal data collected from other sources.
• Include rules indicating that data controllers cannot prohibit other controllers
or users of personal data to inform data subjects that they are the ones which
originally collected their personal information.
01.05 Data retention time
• Include any rules stating that data controllers must inform data subjects of
how long their personal data will be kept.
• Also code here the obligation for data controllers to reveal how do they deter-
mine the data retention time.
01.06 Third-party transfer
• Include rules providing that data controllers must inform data subjects that
their personal data might be shared or disclosed with third parties.
• Include rules requesting data controllers to disclose with whom they share
personal data.
01.07 Third-party transfer safeguards
• Include the obligation for data controllers to inform data subjects of which




• Include the obligation for data controllers to inform data subjects that third
parties may collect personal data on their website.
• Include rules indicating that third parties must post an enhanced notice on
the website where they are collecting personal data.
01.09 Automated or passive data collection (Cookie notice)
• Include the obligation for data controllers to inform data subjects that they
may be subject to passive or automated data collection techniques (e.g.: cook-
ies).
01.10 Consequences of withholding personal information
• Include any obligations of data controllers to inform data subjects of what
consequences are entailed from their decision not to disclose their personal
data.
01.11 Policy change
• Include any rules providing that data controllers must notify or inform data
subjects of any policy change.
• Also include rules providing that data controllers must obtain consent before
applying any policy change, even though it is not clearly written. It is im-
plicitly understood that data subjects will have to be notified to be able to
provide consent.
02. Consent
• Refer to any rules pertaining to the obligation for data controllers to obtain the
consent of data subjects before collecting and processing their personal data.
• Include both opt-in and opt-out approaches. Opt-in approaches are situations
where the data subjects must take affirmative steps to allow data collection or
processing practices. As opposed, opt-out approaches are situations where the




• Refer to the obligation for data controllers to obtain the consent of data sub-
jects, either implicitly (opt-out) or expressly (opt-in), before collecting and
processing their personal data.
• Include the obligation for data controllers to provide data subjects with choices
with regards to the collection and use of their personal data.
• Include the obligation for data controllers to obtain consent before using per-
sonal data for secondary uses (i.e., use unrelated to the original transaction.
However, exclude rules requiring to obtain consent before using for purposes
other than that for which they were originally collected. See 02.02 and 04.01.
• Also code here any mentions that data controllers should respect the choices
or wishes of data subjects.
02.02 Consent renewal
• Include any rules requiring data controllers to renew consent after having
changed their privacy policy.
• Include any rules indicating that data controllers must treat personal data ac-
cording to their original privacy policy to which data subjects have consented
until they are able to renew their consent.
• Include any rules stating that data controllers can only use personal data
in ways compatible with their original policy except if they obtain the data
subject’s consent. Also code this norm in 04.01.
02.03 Consent withdrawal
• Refer to the possibility for data subjects to withdraw their consent to the
collection or use of their personal data. It can either be for implicit or explicit
consent.
• Include the possibility to withdraw consent for data transfer.
02.04 Cookie consent
• Refer to the obligation for data controllers to obtain data subjects’ consent
or provide a choice to data subjects before storing cookies on their computer.
The obligation to obtain consent before storing information on a data subject’s
computer, even when there is no mention of cookies should also be coded here.
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• Include the obligation for data controllers to obtain data subjects’ consent
before automatically harvesting/collecting all URLs traversed by a particular
computer.
02.05 Third-party collection and use consent
• Refer to the obligation for data controllers collecting and using personal data
from third-party websites to gain consent or offer choices to data subjects.
• Do not confuse with the obligation to obtain consent before sharing personal
data with third parties. Only code here the obligation for a party collecting
personal data own the website of another party to still allow data subjects
to make choices or give consent. This obligation is often linked with rules on
Online Behavioural Advertising (OBA).
02.06 Right to refuse automated decision-making
• Refer to the obligation for data controllers to respect the choice of data sub-
jects not to be subject to decisions solely based on automated data processing.
02.07 Right to object
• Refer to the obligation for data controllers to offer data subjects the possibility
to object to the use of their personal data. This rule should not be confused
with to obligation to offer choices to the data subject. Most notably, do not
code here the obligation to allow data subjects to opt-out at anytime. Only
code here, the obligation for data controller’s to allow data subjects to object
to the use of their personal data when it is not based on his consent (i.e.:
legitimate interests or public interests).
03. Collection limitations
• Refer to rules requiring data controllers to minimize data collection to what is
necessary for specified and legitimate purposes.
• Exclude mere indication that privacy policies must inform individuals of their data
collection practices. Code as a transparency measure.
• Exclude data controllers’ obligation to collect personal data that is relevant to fulfill
legitimate purposes. See 06.02.
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03.01 Purpose limitation
• Include the obligation for data controllers to only collect personal data that
is necessary for the specified purposes.
• Include the obligation for data controllers to only collect personal data for
legitimate purposes.
• Include the obligation for a data controllers to limit their collection practices
to data appropriate to their business (e.g., marketing or sale).
• Include the obligation stating that data controllers should limit their collection
practices to data relevant for their specified purposes.
03.02 Fair and lawful
• Include the obligation for data controllers to collect personal data in a fair
and lawful way.
• Do not confuse with the obligation to process personal data in a fair and lawful
way. This rule should be coded in 04.02, not here.
03.03 Third-party source
• Refer to the obligation for data controllers using personal data collected from
third parties to verify that the latter collected the data in a legitimate way.
• Include the obligation to do due diligence when collecting personal data from
third parties.
04. Use limitations
• Refer to any obligations limiting the use of personal data by data controllers.
• Exclude any limitations based on the special nature of personal data (sensitive
data, children data, third-party collected data, etc.)
04.01 Original purposes
• Refer to any rules providing that data controllers should only use personal
data as originally notified to data subjects.
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• Include any obligations to only use personal data for one specific purpose (e.g.:
marketing) or only in ways associated with a data controller’s business.
• Include any rules requiring data controllers to not process personal data for
new purposes, except with the consent of data subjects. Also code in 02.02.
04.02 Fair and lawful
• Refer to the obligation for data controllers to only use personal data in a fair
and lawful way.
• Do not confuse with the obligation to collect personal data in a fair and lawful
way. This rule should be coded at 03.02.
04.03 Right to restrict
• Refer to the possibility for data subjects to temporarily limit the use of their
personal data by data controllers.
05. Disclosure
• Refer to any rules related to the transfer of personal data by data controllers to
third parties.
• Include the obligations of data controllers regarding cross-border transfers and the
sale of personal data.
05.01 Sharing with independent controller
• Refer to any obligations related with the transfer of personal data from a data
controller to an unaffiliated third parties.
05.01.01 Consent
• Code here the obligation to obtain the consent of data subjects before
transferring their personal data to third parties.
• Include the obligation to offer a choice to data subjects before transferring
their personal data.
• Include the right of data subjects to refuse that data controllers share
their personal data with third parties. This is considered to be equal to
an opt-out form of consent.
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05.01.02 Adequacy of third-party policies
• Refer to the obligation for data controllers to verify the adequacy of third
parties before sharing with them personal data.
• Include any rules requiring data controllers to share personal data with
third parties which provide substantially similar privacy protections. The
obligation to otherwise inform data subjects if their personal data is trans-
ferred to third parties without sufficient privacy protections should also
be coded here.
• Include the obligation for data controllers to share their privacy policies
with third parties with which they are sharing personal data.
• Include the obligation for data controllers to have an agreement providing
an equivalent level of protection to their privacy policy with third parties
should both be coded here and in 05.01.03.
05.01.03 Contract
• Refer to the obligation for data controllers to have have an agreement or
contract with any third parties with which they share personal data.
• Include any mention that a data controllers should “contractually” require
that a third party receiving personal data should abide by its policies.
• Include the obligation that the contract specifies that the data controller
remains responsible for the use of its collected personal data.
05.01.04 Remedial actions
• Refer to the obligation for data controllers to take remedial actions against
third party which receives personal data. It is often based on a contract
that the data controller should have established with the third party.
05.02 Sharing with joint controller
• Refer to any rules defining how two or more data controllers which jointly
manage personal data should operate.
05.03 Sharing with processor
• Refer to any obligations of data controllers when sharing data with proces-
sors or service providers, i.e., third party companies employed to specifically
analyze the data for the data controllers.
05.03.01 Use limitations
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• Refer to the obligation for data controllers to ensure that processors will
only process under the instruction of the data controller.
• Include any rules indicating that a processor should not hire another
processor without prior authorization from the data controller. Also code
here the obligation that this second processor should respect the same
obligations than the first one.
05.03.02 Adequacy of processor policies
• Refer to any obligations of data controllers to ensure that processors re-
spect the same level of protection that they offer.
• Include any rules stating that processors must respect the privacy policy
of the data controller and keep personal data confidential.
• Include any mention that processors must maintain a level of security
equivalent to the one of the data controller.
05.03.03 Contract
• Refer to the obligation for data controllers to have a contract or an agree-
ment when sharing personal data with a processor or service provider.
• Importantly, if it is indicated that the contract should foresee that the
processor or service provider must respect the privacy policy of the data
controller or only use personal data under its instruction, also code in
05.03.01 and 05.03.02.
• Include the obligation that the contract specifies that the data controller
remains responsible for the use of its collected personal data.
05.04 Third-country transfer
• Include any obligations that data controllers must specifically respect when
transferring personal across borders.
05.05 Prohibition to transfer prospect information
• Refer to the obligation for data controllers not to share personal data collected
indirectly, i.e., personal data on a data subject collected through another one.
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06. Data quality
• Refer to rules aiming to ensure that personal data collected by data controllers is
of quality.
• Include the obligation for data controllers to ensure that personal data they collect
is accurate, complete and kept up-to-date.
• Include any obligation for data controllers to develop procedures to maintain the
accuracy of personal data.
• Any mention that data controllers should allow data subjects to access their per-
sonal data to ensure they remain up-to-date should both be coded here and at
07.01.
07. Individual participation
• Refer to the ability of data subjects to control how their personal data is used and
shared.
07.01 Acces and review
• Refer to the possibility for data subjects to access and potentially review
personal data that a data controller has on them.
• Include the obligation for data controllers to ensure that data subjects are able
to determine whether a data controller holds information on them. Similarly,
the obligation for data controllers to confirm to data subjects if they hold
personal data on them should be coded here.
• The obligation for data controllers to ensure data quality by providing data
subjects with an access to their personal data should be coded here and at
06.01.
• Also code here rules providing that data subjects may correct their personal
data if no rules specifically indicate that a data subject may access its personal
data. It is implicitly assumed that to be able to correct its data, data subjects
will be given access to its personal data.
07.02 Correct
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• Include any rules providing that data subjects may correct, rectify or change
the personal data that a data controller has on them.
07.03 Erasure
• Include any rules providing that data subjects may request the erasure, sup-
pression or blocking of their personal data.
• Include any rules providing that data subjects can request that data controllers
remove inaccurate data.
07.04 Notification of third parties
• Include any rules providing that the data controller should inform any data
recipients of changes to the personal data of a data subject.
07.05 Access denial
• Code here any rules requesting data controllers to explain to data subjects
why a request for access, correct or remove personal data has been refused.
07.06 Right to challenge
• Include any rules allowing data subjects to challenge any decision by data
controllers to deny access requests.
07.07 Right to be informed of automated practices
• Include the obligation for data controllers to inform data subjects of the exis-
tence and logic behind their automated processing practices.
07.08 Authentication
• Include the obligation for data controllers to verify the identity of a data
subject before giving him/her access to personal data.
07.09 Not unduly limit
• Include the obligation for data controllers to not create any unnecessary bar-
riers for data subjects to access, correct and delete their personal data.
• Include any obligation stating that access to personal data should be free or
should not cost more than a specific price.
07.10 Data portability
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• Include any rules providing that data subjects may request to receive their
personal data in portable format. Do not confuse this norm with the possibility
to have access to its personal data. Only code here, rules specifically requesting
that the personal data may be shared in a portable format (i.e., in a format,
which can easily reused by another data controller).
08. Sensitive data
• Refer to any rules which specifically apply to the protection of sensitive data.
• Sensitive data include information. While the definition of sensitive data may differ,
it generally includes data on racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or
philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, genetic data, biometric data, data
concerning health or data concerning a person’s sexual orientation.
08.01 Consent
• Include any rules providing that data subjects must give their consent before
sensitive data may be collected and/or processed by data controllers.
• Include rules that only apply to one type of sensitive data (e.g., health data
or financial data).
• Also code here any indication that sensitive data require a “higher” level of
choice than non-sensitive data.
08.02 Third-party transfer
• Include any rules that a data controller must request data subject’s consent
before sharing personal data with any third parties.
• rules indicating that a data controller should use encryption or any other
security measures when sharing sensitive data should not be coded here, but
in 08.03.
08.03 Special security measures
• Include any rules indicating that data controllers should adopt security mea-
sures specifically designed to protect sensitive data.
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• Include rules requesting data controller to use encryption to protect sensitive
data, either when storing or sharing them.
• Include rules providing that data controllers should adapt their security mea-
sures to the level of sensitivity of personal data.
09. Children data
• Refer to any rules which specifically apply to the protection of children data. The
different age used to determine who is a children is not considered.
09.01 Special notification
• Include any rules providing that data controllers must provide a special notice
for the collection and/or process of children data.
• Include rules indicating that data controllers should notify children when they
leave their website for another one which may not use the same privacy policy.
• Include any rules requiring data controllers to provide any type of information
(e.g., data source, potential use, etc.) on their data collection and processing
practices relating to children data.
• rules calling for data controllers to notify data subjects of their rights and
obligations should be coded here and in the other nodes applicable.
• The obligation to use “awareness tools” when dealing with children on their
website should be coded here.
• Parental notifications should also be coded here.
09.02 Special collection limitations
• Include any obligations of data controllers to limit their data collection prac-
tices with regards to children.
• Include the obligation for data controllers to remind children of not posting
online personal data.
• Include the obligation for data controllers to not condition a children par-
ticipation in an activity online on the condition of giving his/her personal
data.
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• Include any rules indicating that children data may not be collected for a
specific purpose.
09.03 Parental control
• Include any rules requiring data controllers to encourage parents to get in-
volved an monitor their children’s online activities.
• Include any rules pushing data controllers to encourage parents to use the ad-
equate technology and software to protect the privacy of their children online.
• Include any rules indicating that data controllers should inform parents about
ways to protect the privacy of their children online.
09.04 Parental consent
• Include the obligation for data controllers to obtain parental consent before
collecting, using and/or processing children data.
• rules providing that data controllers should allow parents to refuse further use
of their children data.
09.05 Parental access
• Include any rules providing that parents may access the personal data of their
children.
• Include any rules allowing parents to request that their children data be cor-
rected or removed.
09.06 Third-party transfer
• Include any rules providing that data controllers must provide specific infor-
mation to parents when sharing their children data with third parties.
• Include any rules requiring parental consent before any children data may be
transferred to third parties.
09.07 Automated collection practices
• Include any rules requiring specific measures when using automated practices
(cookies, web beacons, etc.) to collect children data.
09.08 Special security measures
• Include any rules stating that data controllers should adopt security rules
specifically designed for children data.
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10. Data security
• Refer to any rules requesting data controllers to implement security measures to
protect the confidentiality of personal data.
10.01 Commitment to data security
• Refer to any rules specifying that data controllers should develop an environ-
ment conducive to data security.
• Include broad statements that data controllers should take reasonable precau-
tions, maintain a written data security policy and adopt control measures.
• Importantly, rules foreseeing that security measures must be proportional to
the sensitivity of the personal data being collected or processed should be
coded in 08.03.
• Include rules providing that data controllers must use specific techniques like
notably encryption, firewall, safe servers or VPN to protect personal data.
• Include rules asking that data controllers take measure to protect themselves
against virus or malicious codes. However, do not code here rules provid-
ing that data controllers should refrain from introducing virus or malicious
codes on the computer of data subjects. This is not considered to be a data
protection measure.
• Include rules requesting that personal data may not be accessible to any peo-
ple. However, rules providing that personal data may only be accessed by a
data controllers’ employees with a legitimate business reason should be coded
in 10.02.
• Include rules stating that data controllers must establish physical, electronic
and administrative security measures.
• Include rules indicating that data controllers must adopt security measures of
a physical nature (e.g., locks, secured rooms, etc.)
10.02 Anonymization or Pseudonymization
• Include any rules requiring that data controllers anonymize or pseudonymize
the personal data that they have collected and processed.
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• Exclude rules stating that “de-identified” or “anonymized” data is considered to
be non-personal information. Only include rules that indicates that anonymi-
ation or pseudonymization should be used when possible.
• Exclude rules requiring that data controllers adopt encryption or other tech-
nical measures to protect personal data.
• Exclude rules that require data controllers to destroy or anonymize when the
personal data is no longer needed. See node 11 instead.
10.03 Access control
• Include any rules limiting access to personal data to employees who “need to
know” based on their job responsibilities.
• Exclude any rules stating that data controllers must prevent unauthorized
access by external people or third parties. Similarly, exclude rules stating
that only authorized users can access personal data. Instead code 10.01 as
broad commitments to data security.
10.04 Record-keeping
• Include any rules providing that data controllers must keep a record of their
processing activities or authorized users accessing personal data.
• Include any rules requiring that data controllers should keep a record of to
whom they share personal data.
10.05 Review and monitor
• Include any rules requiring data controllers to regularly review and monitor
their security measures.
• Exclude the obligation for data controllers to regularly check or demonstrate
their compliance with their broad privacy policy. Code instead in 13.02.
10.06 Employee training
• Include rules providing that data controllers must provide training to their
employees to ensure that they respect their privacy policy.
10.07 Privacy risk assessment
• Include any rules providing that data controllers must do a privacy risk as-
sessment before processing personal data.
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• Exclude any mention of annual or regular risk assessment of current security
practices. Code in 10.05 as a review mechanism.
10.08 Data protection officer
• Include any rules requiring data controllers to designate an individual as ac-
countable for the implementation of its privacy policy (i.e., data protection
officer).
• Any mention that responsibility and accountability must be assigned to an
employee should be coded here.
• Include rules indicating that a data controller must establish a contact point
for privacy enquiry.
• Include rules requesting data controllers to name a chief privacy officer or
engineer.
• Include rules indicating that data controllers should assign responsibility of
ensuring the respect of their privacy policy to an individual or group of indi-
viduals.
11. Data retention
• Refer to any rules indicating that data controllers must not keep personal data for
longer than necessary.
12. Data breach
• Refer to any rules requesting data controllers to take actions to prevent or resolve
data breaches.
12.01 Privacy breach management policy
• Include any rules providing that data controllers should adopt a specific policy
or procedure to deal with potential data breaches.
• Include the obligation to set up a readiness plan.
• Exclude obligations to notify data subjects or authorities, see 12.02 & 12.03.
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12.02 Data protection authorities’ notification
• Include any rules requiring data controllers to inform relevant data protection
authorities of data breaches.
12.03 Data subjects’ notification
• Include any rules requiring data controllers to inform all data subjects affected
by a data breach.
13. Accountability
• Refer to any rules aimed at ensuring that data controllers comply with their own
rules and remain accountable for their data practices.
• Include all rules related to complaint mechanisms.
• Exclude vague rules indicating that data controllers need to be accountable. Only
code rules requiring the existence of specific accountability mechanisms.
• rules indicating that responsibility or accountability should be attributed to an indi-
vidual or group of individuals should be coded in node 10.08 as they are considered
to be equivalent to name data protection officer(s).
13.01 Complaint mechanism
• Include any rules requiring data controllers to establish a complaint mecha-
nism or join a dispute settlement program.
• Include rules requesting data controllers to inform data subjects that they can
submit complaints with regards to the use of their personal data.
• Include any rules stating that data controller must establish a mechanism to
appeal any decisions taken by the dispute settlement body.
• Include rules related to the possibility to have access to a remedy with the
data controllers. But exclude rules indicating that data subjects retain the
right to a remedy in front of national courts.
• Exclude rules stating that data controllers must allow data subjects to chal-
lenge decisions to refuse them access to their personal data. See instead 07.06.
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13.02 Compliance mechanisms
• Include any rules stating clearly that the data controller must be able to
demonstrate how it is accountable for his/her data practices. It may includes
annual compliance review with its data policies, external audits, etc.
14. Education
• Include any obligation for data controllers to educate or teach data subjects about
their data collection and data processing activities.
• Exclude rules requiring data controllers to educate its employees. See 10.05.
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